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THE NEXT STEP IN DIVERSITY: EXTENDING THE LOGIC
OF GRUTTER v. BOLLINGER TO FACULTY TENURE
PATRICK M. GARRY
I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to 2003, the United States Supreme Court had decided only
one case involving affirmative action policies in higher education. In
Regents of University of California v. Bakke,' the Court overturned a
medical school's racial set-aside program that reserved 16 out of 100
admission slots for members of certain minority groups. 2 Twenty-five
years later, the Court in Grutter v. Bollinger3 upheld the University of
Michigan Law School's race-conscious admissions policy. 4 This deci-
sion hinged on the issue of whether diversity constitutes a compelling
interest that can justify the "use of race in selecting applicants for admis-
sion to public universities." 5  Never before had the Court recognized
diversity as a compelling interest that could sustain a challenge brought
under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.6 In making
that recognition, the Court relied heavily on the arguments of law school
faculty and administrators regarding the vital educational benefits de-
rived from classroom diversity.7  Such diversity, the argument main-
tained, was essential for the development and training of society's future
leaders.
8
The Grutter Court accepted without question the arguments press-
ing for student-body diversity to be ruled a compelling interest.9 How-
ever, if a racially diverse student body leads to a "livelier, more spirited"
classroom discussion and a "better understanding" of different races,'
0
logic dictates that a truly diverse faculty would more directly and imme-
diately lead to such an outcome. If an institution of higher education has
a compelling interest in racially diversifying its students, it has an even
t Assistant Professor, Univ. of South Dakota School of Law; J.D., Ph.D. University of
Minnesota.
1. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
2. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 271.
3. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). The companion case to Grutter, decided at the same time and
involving the admissions policies to the University of Michigan undergraduate program, was Gratz
v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003).
4. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 307-10.
5. Id. at 322.
6. Id. at 341.
7. Id. at 308.
8. Not only did minority students have to be admitted so as to create this diversity, but a
"critical mass of underrepresented minority students" was needed. Id. at 319.
9. Id. at 307-08.
10. Id. at 330.
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greater interest in racially diversifying its faculty. The problem, though,
is tenure. A law school's student body turns over every three years; and
every fall an entirely new class of students is admitted. Consequently,
student diversity can be achieved somewhat quickly. But faculty diver-
sity is another matter. Because of tenure, very few openings occur each
year. While new hires may be subjected to affirmative action guidelines,
true diversity will come very slowly, especially if none of the tenured
professors resign or retire.
There is no group in society more committed to affirmative action
and racial diversity than the nation's higher education faculty." At the
same time, under the logic of Grutter, there is no group in society more
vital to the training and education of America's diverse population.
Given this urgent and vital need for diversity, this article asserts that the
arguments made in Grutter for a race-based student admissions policy
extend logically to a university's dismantling of its tenure system so as to
achieve a faculty as equally diverse as its students.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN GRUTTER
At issue in Grutter was the University of Michigan Law School's
(Law School) race-conscious admissions policy. 12 Petitioner Grutter, a
white applicant to the Law School who had qualifying test scores and
grade point average, filed suit after she was denied admission, claiming
that the Law School had discriminated against her on the basis of race in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.,
3
The Law School admitted that it used a race-conscious admissions policy
to enroll a critical mass of certain minorities, and that this critical mass
was "a number that encourages under represented minority students to
participate in the classroom and not feel isolated."'14  According to the
Law School, only a critical mass could achieve the "educational benefits
11. See infra notes 34 and 36.
12. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306. This policy, implemented as a means of achieving student
diversity, "[affirmed] the Law School's commitment to diversity with special reference to the inclu-
sion of African-American, Hispanic, and Native-American students, who otherwise might not be
represented in the student body in meaningful numbers." Id. The policy "requires admissions offi-
cials to look beyond grades and test scores to other criteria that are important to the Law School's
educational objectives." Id. at 315. The policy "seeks to guide admissions officers in producing
classes both diverse and academically outstanding." Id. at 316. What the race-conscious policy
attempted to do was to enroll a "critical mass" of certain minority students. Id.
13. Id. at 316-317. The president of the University of Michigan at the time of the lawsuit's
filing was Lee Bollinger. Id. at 316.
14. Id. at 318. At trial, the Director of Admissions for the law school testified that the race of
applicants must be considered "because a critical mass of underrepresented minority students could
not be enrolled if admissions decisions were based primarily on undergraduate GPAs and LSAT
scores." Id. The faculty member who chaired the committee that drafted the race-conscious admis-
sions policy testified that the policy aimed at including "students who may bring to the Law School a
perspective different from that of members of groups which have not been the victims of such dis-
crimination." Id. at 319.
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of diversity."'15 As Justice O'Connor stated in her opinion for the Court,
Grutter presented an issue of national importance-"[w]hether diversity
is a compelling interest that can justify the narrowly tailored use of race
in selecting applicants for admission to public universities.
16
In her opinion, Justice O'Connor recognized that the Law School's
admissions policy "must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict
scrutiny."' 7  When strict scrutiny is employed, a race-based action can
survive only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government
interest.' 8  Relying upon Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, Justice
O'Connor ruled that "the attainment of a diverse student body" did in-
deed constitute a compelling state interest that justified the use of race in
admissions decisions.' 9 However, Justice O'Connor limited that ruling
to the area of higher education, stating that universities occupy "a special
niche in our constitutional system." 20 When reviewing race-based gov-
ernmental action, even under a strict scrutiny analysis, courts must con-
sider the "context" and all "relevant differences," Justice O'Connor
15. Id. at 319. When such a critical mass is present, "racial stereotypes lose their force be-
cause nonminority students learn there is no 'minority viewpoint' but rather a variety of viewpoints
among minority students." Id. at 320.
16. Id. at 322. This issue had been previously addressed by the Fifth Circuit in Hopwood v.
Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that diversity is not a compelling state interest) and by
the Ninth Circuit in Smith v. University of Washington Law School, 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000)
(ruling that diversity is a compelling state interest).
17. Id. at 331. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no
State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id. at 326
(quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV). Therefore, any governmental action based on race classifica-
tions must be subject to "detailed judicial inquiry to ensure that the personal right to equal protection
of the laws has not been infringed." Id. at 326 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S.
200, 227 (1995) (holding that "government may treat people differently because of their race only
for the most compelling reasons")).
18. Id. at 327. While much of the Court's opinion, as well as the dissenting opinions, ad-
dressed the 'narrowly-tailored' requirement, this article will focus on the 'compelling government
interest' requirement of strict scrutiny review.
19. Id. (stating that "today we endorse Justice Powell's view that student body diversity is a
compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions"). According to
Justice O'Connor's rendition of his opinion, Justice Powell had been careful to state that race was
only one factor among many that a university may properly consider when compiling a diverse
student body. Id. As Justice Powell wrote, the "diversity that furthers a compelling state interest
encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin
is but a single though important element." Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315
(1978).
The Bakke decision produced six separate opinions, none of which produced a majority of
the Court. Id. Justice Powell provided the fifth vote which broke the logjam between the four
Justices who would have upheld the racial set-aside program on the ground that race could be used
to remedy the injuries caused by past racial prejudice. Id. at 325 (joint opinion of Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). Four other
Justices never even reached the constitutional question, but struck down the program for statutory
reasons. Id. at 408 (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ.,
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). Justice Powell's opinion announcing the
judgment of the Court invalidated the set-aside program, yet reversed the state court's injunction
against any use of race whatsoever. Thus, according to O'Connor's opinion in Grutter, the only
holding in Bakke was that a state "has a substantial interest that legitimately may be served by a
properly devised admissions program involving the competitive consideration of race and ethnic
origin." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 322-23, quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320.
20. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329.
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wrote.21 Upon such consideration, diversity in the realm of higher educa-
tion becomes a compelling government interest because of the unique
and vital "educational benefits" it provides.22
According to Justice O'Connor's opinion, diversity promotes
"cross-racial understanding," helps students to "better understand per-
sons of different races," and leads to a "more enlightening and interest-
23ing" classroom discussion. Diversity not only prepares students to be
good citizens, but helps train them to be society's future leaders.24 Fur-
thermore, since education "is the very foundation of good citizenship,"
diversity in our colleges and universities demonstrates that "public insti-
tutions are open and available to all segments of American society, in-
,,25cluding people of all races and ethnicities. Thus, higher education,
and particularly the nation's law schools, plays an indispensable role in
conveying "generic lessons in socialization and good citizenship. 2 6 This
is a role that sets higher education apart, in terms of affirmative action
policies, from other social or economic institutions or organizations.
The Court applied the strict scrutiny test the way it did because of
the special nature of higher education. Normally, the use of strict scru-
tiny spells the demise of whatever government action is being chal-
lenged.27 Rarely does the Court apply strict scrutiny, as it did to the Law
21. Id. at 327. According to Justice O'Connor, "[clontext matters when reviewing race-based
governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause." Id. "Not every decision influenced by
race is equally objectionable and strict scrutiny is designed to provide a framework for carefully
examining the importance and the sincerity of the reasons advanced by the governmental decision-
maker for the use of race in that particular context." Id. at 328.
22. Id. For this reason, it is doubtful that Gruntter applies to affirmative action programs
outside of the educational area.
23. Id. at 330. According to the Court, the educational benefits of diversity are "important
and laudable." Id. The Court also cited studies which show that student diversity "better prepares
students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better prepares them as profession-
als." Id.
24. Id. at 332. Institutions of higher education, and particularly law schools, "represent the
training ground for a large number of our Nation's leaders." Id. (citing Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S.
629, 634 (1950) (describing law school as a "proving ground for legal learning and practice")). As
the Court recognized, persons with law degrees occupy more than half of the seats in the U.S. Sen-
ate. Id. The Court also cited Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, which stated that the "'nation's
future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure' to the ideas and mores of students as
diverse as this Nation of many peoples." Id. at 324, quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313. According to
Justice O'Connor, "law schools cannot be effective in isolation from the individuals and institutions
with which the law interacts." Id. at 332.
25. Id. at 331-32. "And nowhere is the importance of such openness more acute than in the
context of higher education." Id. at 332. This openness is vital for instilling the confidence of a
heterogeneous society in the integrity of its educational institutions. Id. The Court likened higher
education to the military, in the sense that America's "most selective institutions must remain both
diverse and selective." Id. at 331.
26. Id. at 348 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
27. The Court has previously held that racial classifications are "presumptively invalid and
can be upheld only upon an extraordinary justification." Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643-44 (1993).
Almost never do government actions survive strict scrutiny. In fact, "when the Court has applied
strict scrutiny to a race-conscious measure designed to assist minorities, it has never upheld the
measure." Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J., 427, 433 (1997). See generally City of
Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny to overturn race prefer-
(Vol. 82:1
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School's admissions policy, and still uphold the policy or program at
28
issue. Thus, the only explanation for the Grutter outcome is that in the
field of higher education, diversity provides an extra-compelling gov-
ernmental interest. 29 If this is the case, then diversity should also justify
ences in government contracting). Lower courts have previously used strict scrutiny to invalidate
race-conscious policies in public university admissions. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th
Cir. 1996). See also Taxman v. Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (invalidating race prefer-
ences in employee layoff policies). Strict scrutiny, as the highest standard of constitutional review,
has been famously termed by Gerald Gunther as "strict in theory and fatal in fact." Gerald Gunther,
Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for Newer Equal Protec-
tion, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
Before 1995, affirmative action programs implemented by the federal government only
needed to pass the intermediate scrutiny test. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564-65
(1990). But in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, the Court shifted its stance and held that strict
scrutiny applies to all government affirmative action programs. 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (holding
that "federal racial classifications, like those of a State, must serve a compelling governmental
interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest").
28. According to the dissent, the Court made no serious effort to scrutinize the Law School's
claim that it "has a compelling interest in securing the educational benefits of a diverse student
body." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 356 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The dissent
described the Court's approach as "unprecedented deference to the Law School-a deference anti-
thetical to strict scrutiny." Id. at 362. In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that "[allthough
the Court recites the language of our strict scrutiny analysis, its application of that review is un-
precedented in its deference." Id. at 380 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy stated that
the Court, "in a review that is nothing short of perfunctory, accepts the University of Michigan Law
School's assurances that its admissions process meets with constitutional requirements." Id. at 389
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
29. Justice O'Connor suggested that the reason for the unusual deference toward a racial
discriminatory policy lay in the First Amendment's protection of academic freedom and educational
autonomy. Id. at 329 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312) (stating that the "freedom of a university to
make its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its student body"). However,
educational autonomy is a highly suspect basis for judicial deference on something as important as
racial discrimination. Even with the First Amendment and freedom of speech, the Court has not
given deference to educational institutions. In Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., the Court refused to
let a school censor an anti-war symbol worn by students throughout the school day. 393 U.S. 503,
514 (1969). The school argued that, during the height of the Vietnam War, such symbols would
cause disruption within the school. Id. at 510. But even though this was an issue that touched upon
the educational and learning environment of the school, the Court refused to defer. Id. at 514.
Likewise, in Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, the Court declined to defer to a school's decision to
remove some "just plain filthy" books from the school library. 457 U.S. 853, 857 (1982). But this
issue again went to the very heart of the school's educational mission-e.g., the kind of books and
materials to which it was exposing its students. Grutter, on the other hand, involves an issue less
central to the educational function of the school. It does not involve the behavior of students who
are already in a classroom, nor does it involve the kind of books that are filling library bookshelves
and being read by students. Instead, Grutter involves a kind of pre-education decision---e.g., whom
to admit as students. In a sense then, Grutter involves a gate-keeping function, performed prior to
any educational function. Thus, there is less of a need to respect the educational autonomy of the
Law School in this regard. Moreover, the notion of academic freedom and educational autonomy
are justified in part by the courts' acknowledgment that they are not the best judges of such matters.
See generally Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier,
484 U.S. 260 (1988).
The courts, with regard to education, have traditionally taken a hands-off approach and
left educational matters to the educators. For instance, in a situation like Tinker, where possible
disruption of the actual school environment is concerned, courts defer and recognize that educators
are in the best position to judge. Similarly, in cases like Pico, where the choice of learning and
textual materials is concerned, the courts consider that educators are in a better position to judge.
But in Grutter, which entails a race-based admissions policy, the courts are actually in a better
position to judge, and hence should be less likely to defer. Perhaps the courts cannot adequately
determine the effect of sexual innuendo on children (as in Bethel) or the role and standards of a
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other governmental actions that would not otherwise be permissible in
any other area.
The fact that the Law School's admissions policy survived strict
scrutiny-a feat that almost no other state interest ever accomplishes-
means that diversity in the educational arena is an interest that surpasses
all other government interests. Furthermore, it means that racial diver-
sity constitutes a subject matter that the courts will treat differently than
any other area of constitutional protection. For instance, a program that
restricts the speech rights of a particular group of people will almost
automatically be struck down, but a program that infringes on the equal
protection rights of a particular racial group may survive if the purpose is
to create racial diversity. Because of this apparently unique mixture of
diversity, education and race, it is asserted below that the same argu-
ments presented in Grutter can also justify governmental encroachment
on the property rights of tenured faculty.
III. THE EXTENSION OF GRUTTER TO FACULTY DIVERSITY
The argument used by the University of Michigan for the achieve-
ment of a critical mass of underrepresented minorities was that without
such numbers, minority students would feel isolated and pressured to act
like spokespersons for their race. According to the Law School, only a
critical mass of minority students would provide a meaningful opportu-
nity for all students to reexamine racial stereotypes and produce the edu-
cational benefits that diversity has to offer.31 However, as the dissent
pointed out, it is the educational benefits that are the real goal or compel-
ling interest behind the Law School's race-based admissions policy.
32
school newspaper (as in Hazelwood), but courts are definitely in a position to adequately judge the
constitutionality of race-based actions.
The Court's decision in United States v. Virginia also indicates that Grutter cannot be
explained on the basis of educational autonomy or academic freedom. 518 U.S. 515 (1996). In
Virginia, the Court found an equal protection violation in a state military college's exclusion of
women. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 545-46. This finding occurred even though the college argued that
"single-sex education provides important educational benefits," as well as "character development
and leadership training." Id. at 535. Furthermore, the Court acknowledged that several amici urged
that "single-sex schools can contribute importantly to [educational] diversity." Id. at 534 n.7. Yet
despite these educational-benefits arguments, and despite the fact that the Court evaluated the case
under a lower level of scrutiny than that used in Grutter, the Court did not recognize educational
autonomy and defer to the judgment of the school. Id. at 533, 555 (stating that the test used for
evaluating gender-based classifications is "whether the proffered justification is exceedingly persua-
sive," and that such classifications warrant "heightened scrutiny"). See also Jeffrey A. Barnes, The
Supreme Court's "Exceedingly [Unlpersuasive" Application of Intermediate Scrutiny in United
States v. Virginia, 31 U. RICH. L. REv. 523, 523 (1997) (noting that the Court in Virginia applied a
"form of intermediate scrutiny").
30. See Respondent's Brief at 26, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241).
31. As the Court's opinion stated, "diminishing the force of such stereotypes is both a crucial
part of the Law School's mission, and one that it cannot accomplish with only token numbers of
minority students." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333. The Court accepted without question the Law
School's conclusion, based on its experience, "that a critical mass of under represented minorities is
necessary to further its compelling interest in securing the educational benefits of a diverse student
body." Id.
32. Id. at 355 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Diversity, in effect, is only the means to the end.33 If diversity produced
no educational benefits, then diversity would not be a compelling interest
of an institution of higher education. But when educational benefits are
recognized as the real goal, then student diversity must be recognized as
the second-best way of reaching that goal. Since faculty are the leaders
of the educational environment in universities and law schools and,
hence, are in the best position to produce educational benefits, then it
stands to reason that faculty diversity is more urgent and vital than stu-
dent diversity.
As a group in general, university faculty have been strongly suppor-
tive of affirmative action.34 Law schools in particular have put immense
pressure on themselves to diversify. Schools that fail to make progress
in diversifying their student bodies risk loss of accreditation from the
American Bar Association and the American Association of Law
Schools. 35 In Grutter, ninety-one colleges and universities filed briefs in
support of the University of Michigan; not one college or university filed
a brief opposing affirmative action.36 A recent survey of 500 law school
faculty members found that an overwhelming majority supported efforts
to achieve diversity in the classroom.37 Not only have law school faculty
been outspoken advocates for affirmative action in academia, but they
have argued for its implementation elsewhere.38
33. "And, for law schools especially, racial and cultural diversity is crucial in order to prepare
students to be effective and responsible lawyers, academics and judges in an increasingly multi-
racial, multi-ethnic and multi-cultural world." Brief of Amici Curiae Judith Areen et al. at 3, Grutter
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241).
34. Robert Atwell, president of the American Council on Education, has characterized the
legal arguments against racial preferences as "bogus." Elizabeth Shogren, In U.S. Reversal, Minor-
ity-Based Scholarships OK, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1994, at Al. In general, "there is an abundance of
commentary by educators on the pedagogical value of attaining a racially diverse student body."
Goodwin Liu, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: The Diversity Rationale and the Compelling
Interest Test, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 411 (1998). See also Richard A. White, Law School
Faculty Views on Diversity In the Classroom and the Law School Community, (May, 2000), at
http://www.aals.org/statistics/diverse3.pdf (discussing widespread law faculty support for diversity
in the classroom).
35. Kirk A. Kennedy, Race-Exclusive Scholarships: Constitutional Vel Non, 30 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 759, 795 (1995).
36. Neal Devins, Explaining Grutter v. Bollinger, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 347, 368 (2003) (ex-
plaining that the briefs argued that "pluralistic, widely representative colleges provide a more enrich-
ing learning environment and better preparation for life in a multicultural world"). See also Suzanne
E. Eckes, Race-Conscious Admissions Programs: Where Do Universities Go From Gratz and Grut-
ter?, 33 J.L. & EDUC. 21, 48 (2004) (describing the amici briefs filed by universities in support of
the University of Michigan's race-based admissions policy as arguing that "diversity is essential for
the interplay of ideas in a nation that is becoming increasingly diverse").
37. See Eckes, supra note 36, at 49. Prominent law faculty members have argued that stu-
dents benefit in an ethnically diverse classroom. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Making Sense of the
Affirmative Action Debate, 22 OHIO N.U. L REV. 1159, 1159-60 (1996). Psychology professors
have also argued that students learn better in a diverse educational environment. See Eckes, supra
note 36, at 50. The presidents of sixty-two major research universities have publicly defended the
use of race in admissions decisions. See Association of American Universities, On the Importance
of Diversity in University Admissions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1997, at A27.
38. See Frances Lee Ansley, Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class and the Future of Civil Rights
Scholarship, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 993, 1071 (1989) (arguing that legal scholars "must continue to
20041
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In espousing the value of diversity in higher education,39 legal
scholars have argued that any hope in making racial progress lies "in the
unique ability of colleges and universities to bring together persons of all
racial backgrounds to achieve the educational benefits of diversity and,
ultimately, to create a more just, racially integrated society. ' '40  This call
for diversity in higher education includes and recognizes the need for
faculty diversity.4' Indeed, a diverse faculty is even more important than
a diverse student body, in terms of producing enlightening classroom
experiences.4 2 As one minority law student reports, "women and minori-
ties can feel silenced" by white male professors.43
Faculty diversity appears to be a necessary condition to student di-
versity. Minority students may not enroll at an institution that does not
have sufficient minority faculty; and even if they do enroll, they may
find themselves alienated and eventually drop out or transfer.44 More-
work for greater diversity at home on university faculties" and to "defend affirmative action from
attack in other institutions as well").
39. See Jack Greenberg, Diversity, the University, and the World Outside, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 1610, 1615-16 (2003). See also Robert A. Sedler, Affirmative Action, Race, and the Constitu-
tion: From Bakke to Grutter, 92 Ky. L.J. 219, 235 (2003-2004) (arguing that if "racial minorities are
truly to be full and equal participants in all important areas of American life, this should include
minority representation in substantial numbers at the elite universities and at their law schools and
medical schools as well"). Law faculty also report that students value and welcome diversity. In
one survey, nearly fifty percent of the law students said that diverse classes offer "more scrious
discussions of alternative perspectives than homogeneous classes." Rachel F. Moran, Diversity and
Its Discontents: The End of Affirmative Action at Boalt Hall, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2241, 2266 (2000).
Numerous published studies argue that diversity serves the educational mission of the nation's law
schools. See, e.g., GARY ORFIELD & DEAN WHITLA, DIVERSITY AND LEGAL EDUCATION: STUDENT
EXPERIENCES IN LEADING LAW SCHOOLS 4-6, 15 (1999); Anthony T. Kronman, Is Diversity a Value
in American Higher Education?, 52 FLA. L. REv. 861, 865 (2000).
40. Brief of Amici Curiae NAACP Legal Defense Fund and the ACLU at 2, Grutter, 539 U.S.
306 (2003) (No. 02-241).
41. Diversity, in this sense, means racial diversity. See Jim Chen, Diversity and Damnation,
43 UCLA L. REV. 1839, 1882 (1996) (stating that because "a professor's experiences, outlooks, and
ideas do correlate in some measure with his or her race, an unbiased decisionmaker could conclude
that race can sometimes be a reasonable proxy for intellectual diversity").
42. See Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47 STAN. L. REV. 855,
864 (1995) ("It is largely the faculty who set an institution's tone and agenda").
43. Moran, supra note 39, at 2282 (reporting that opinions expressed in a student survey
included one student's statement that "most professors are White males, so White males feel more
comfortable participating" in the classroom). In general, students say that "the professor play[s] a
significant role in setting the tone for discussion" in the classroom. Id at 2287.
44. See Abigail Therstrom, Voting Rights: Another Affirmative Action Mess, 43 UCLA L.
REV. 2031, 2048 (1996) (citing the argument for the need of minority faculty to connect with and
serve as a positive influence to minority students). See also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for
Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060, 1080 (1991) (arguing that white teachers, unaware
of race and cultural differences, can unwittingly disadvantage black students by asking questions in
ways that conform to white middle-class customs). According to supporters, affirmative action is
needed not only to give students authority figures with whom they can connect, but also to eliminate
"black invisibility" by demanding that whites see "blacks in positions of power, authority, and
responsibility-as teachers .. .." Id. at 1109. Various surveys have concluded that minority stu-
dents can feel discrimination from and have very little interaction with white faculty. See, e.g.,
Sylvia Hurtado, Graduate School Racial Climates and Academic Self-Concept Among Minority
Graduate Students in the 1970's, 102 AM. J. EDUC. 330 (1994); Sylvia Hurtado & Deborah Faye
Carter, Effects of College Transition and Perceptions of the Campus Racial Climate on Latino Col-
lege Students' Sense of Belonging, 70 SOCIOLOGY OF EDUC. 324, 325-38 (1997).
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over, there is an argument that the absence of minority faculty "lessens
the probability that minority students will complete graduate and profes-
sional programs at the same rate as white students." 45 A research study
asserts that the best predictor of graduation rates of African-American
graduate and professional students is the presence of minority faculty
members.46 Schools that had African-American faculty members were
found to have graduated more African-American students.47 Therefore,
by implication, if an institution does not have a critical mass of minority
faculty, it may not be able to attract and keep a critical mass of minority
students.48
The chain of argument goes as follows: to achieve student diversity,
a diverse faculty must be present; and to achieve a diverse faculty, af-
firmative action programs must be implemented. Without such pro-
grams, minority faculty members and candidates face unfair and prejudi-
cial barriers; and if they have not graduated from prestigious schools,
minority candidates may not be able to compete with those candidates
who have.49  According to academic supporters of affirmative action,
minority scholars often face discrimination regarding their fields of re-
search.50 Furthermore, because they are less likely than their white col-
45. Edgar G. Epps, Affirmative Action and Minority Access to Faculty Positions, '9 OHIO ST.
L.J., 755, 759 (1998).
46. See JAMES E. BLACKWELL, MAINSTREAMING OUTSIDERS: THE PRODUCTION OF BLACK
PROFESSIONALS 64 (Philip Eisen ed., General Hall, Inc.1981).
47. See id. at 70.
48. See Epps, supra note 45, at 759-60. Furthermore, the "research suggests that the presence
or absence of minority faculty members in graduate and professional schools is a relatively good
informal indicator of an institution's commitment to the goal of equal opportunity for minorities in
higher education." Id. at 759. Professors Brest and Oshige argue that minority faculty "tends to
make minority students feel that they are welcomed at the institution." Brest & Oshige, supra note
42 at 865. Minority faculty often provide "counsel, support, and comfort for minority students." Id.
"[T]he presence of minority faculty lends reality to the possibility of academic careers for minority
students." Id. Moreover, minority faculty have a beneficial effect on white students who may never
before have "encountered members of minority groups in positions of authority." Id.
49. See Richard Delgado & Derrick Bell, Minority Law Professors' Lives: The Bell-Delgado
Survey, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 349, 361-362 (1989).
50. See Aleinikoff, supra note 44 at 1085 (arguing that "scholarship done by minority schol-
ars on minority issues is frequently greeted with skepticism from majority members of the acad-
emy."). According to Professor Aleinikoff, race-consciousness is "an entrenched structure of
thought," even among faculty members, that can lead people "to interpret situations and actions
differently when the race of the actors varies." Id. at 1067. "The stories that African-Americans tell
about America-stories of racism and exclusion, brutality and mendacity-simply do not ring true to
the white mind." Id. at 1069. To ask whites to give credibility to these stories would be "to ask
whites to give up too much of what they 'know' about the world." Id. Moreover, "[w]hite percep-
tions of black inferiority cannot be overcome by repressing our implicit recognition of race," but
"only when whites see blacks as equals." Id. at 1108 (emphasis added). It is argued that what quali-
fies as acceptable research topics is largely defined by the values and experiences of the majority
racial group. "Faculty of color voice a common concem that their work is undervalued and that they
are treated differently in the academy than their peers." Epps, supra note 45, at 769 (quoting Caro-
line Sotello Viernes Turner & Samuel L. Myers, Jr., Faculty Diversity and Affirmative Action, in
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION'S TESTAMENT OF HOPE: STRATEGIES FOR A NEW ERA IN HIGHER EDUCATION
132 (Mildred Garcia ed., State University of New York Press 1997)). In the humanities, for in-
stance, a minority scholar may have to spend an inordinate amount of time "justifying the inclusion
of African-American literature, art, or music in the curriculum." Id. Consequently, as Professor
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leagues to be tenured, "they are more vulnerable to threats, open or un-
spoken." 51 Minority faculty also can find themselves deluged with ad-
ministrative and academic advising duties. Apparently, since there are
relatively few minority faculty members, the few that are on staff end up
advising and counseling the majority of minority and female students.52
Moreover, minority faculty are said to be "overburdened with committee
responsibilities," since the university wants to staff as many committees
as possible with the few minority faculty members available.5 3
Given these arguments, affirmative action policies aimed at faculty
composition are essential, because if a diverse faculty does not exist,
then the educational benefits of diversity in which the state has a compel-
ling interest cannot occur. But there is a substantial obstacle to faculty
diversity, an obstacle much greater than those facing the achievement of
student diversity. That obstacle is the tenure system.
In Grutter, the Court recognized that since a "core purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to do away with all governmentally imposed
discrimination based on race," any race-conscious admissions policy
must be limited in duration.54 The Court accepted the Law School's as-
sertion that it would "terminate its race-conscious admissions program as
soon as practicable."'55  However, by limiting the time duration of these
affirmative action admissions policies, the Court has imposed a degree of
urgency on the matter.56 Indeed, by even accepting a race-based admis-
sions policy, the Court recognized that the country cannot wait for un-
regulated social conditions to produce the desired diversity, but rather
that racial diversity in the nation's institutions of higher education must
Epps argues, "the minority scholar is constrained by the culture of the major research university to
select research paradigms, research topics, and publication outlets that conform to the traditions of
institutions that have historically excluded minorities." Id.
51. Chen, supra note 41, at 1887. Minority scholars contend that institutions must look be-
yond the traditional measurements of academic achievement or potential when evaluating minority
candidates for faculty positions. See Amado M. Padilla, Ethnic Minority Scholars, Research, and
Mentoring: Current and Future Issues, EDUC. RESEARCHER, May, 1994, at 24-27.
52. See Epps, supra note 45, at 767 (claiming that minority faculty end up becoming "mentors
to many more students than is typical for university faculty"). Because "students looking for suppor-
tive role models seek out the limited number of minority (and women) professors for advice and
moral support," minority (and women) faculty members find themselves swamped with "writing
letters of recommendation and helping with graduate or professional school selection, job and fel-
lowship applications, and post-doctoral research opportunities." Id.
53. Id.
54. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. at 341. According to the Court, the requirement that all
race-conscious admissions policies have a termination point "assure[s] all citizens that the deviation
from the norm of equal treatment of all racial and ethnic groups is a temporary matter, a measure
taken in the service of the goal of equality itself." Id. (quoting City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510 (1989)).
55. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342. As Justice O'Connor stated, "[w]e expect that 25 years from
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come rapidly.57 Therefore, because the tenure system operates as a huge
brake on any significant and immediate progress regarding the compel-
ling interest of diversity, it should likewise suffer the same fate as ra-
cially-homogenous student bodies.
At many law schools, more than eighty to ninety percent of the full-
time, tenure-track faculty are in fact tenured.58  This huge overhead of
permanently employed faculty members means that only a small fraction
of faculty positions open up each year, and it is out of this small number
that law schools are attempting to achieve faculty diversity.
59 Quite
commonly, at the vast majority of the Nation's law schools, during a
student's enrollment not one faculty position will turn over. Conse-
quently, despite the school's professed commitment to diversity and af-
firmative action among the faculty, absolutely nothing will be done. And
because the faculty lags in its diversity, the student body will most
probably lag in its diversity, despite all the meticulously drafted race-
conscious admissions policies.
IV. THE DIVERSITY ARGUMENT FOR TENURE TERMINATION
Tenure termination may impose some significant effects on a se-
lected group of people. 60 However, these effects are justified, perhaps
even mandated, by the very arguments accepted by the Court in Grutter.
The quest for diversity of employee personnel would not justify a
business corporation firing all its non-minority employees.
61 Yet as
57. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Can Affirmative Action Be Defended?, 59 OHiO ST. L.J.
669, 682 (1998) (arguing that "[a]ffirmative action grows out of the frustration with the apparent
intractability of this country's inability to achieve [racial equality]"); Chen, supra note 41 at 1849
(stating that "[dieliverance [from the need of affirmative action] cannot come soon enough").
58. The University of Dayton Law School, for instance, reports that 85 percent of its faculty
are tenured. See http://www.udayton.edul-vpadmin/fbookfileslhr/faIlO31tenurefac pdf (n.d.). At St.
Mary's Law School, 91 percent are tenured. See Gloria Padilla, Decision to Deny Tenure Sparks
Protest at St. Mary's, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESs-NEWS, April 7, 1999, at lB.
59. The tenure system "diminishes an institution's opportunity to recruit and retain a younger
and more diverse faculty." James J. Fishman, Tenure and Its Discontents: The Worst Form of Em-
ployment Relationship Save All of the Others, 21 PACE L. REV. 159, 170 (2000). In over 300 years,
for instance, Harvard University has never fired a tenured professor. Id. at 173.
As argued in the amicus brief of several deans of prominent national law schools, univer-
sity education for most students "typically occurs early in life and then ends." Brief of Amici Curiae
Judith Areen et al. at 9, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241). Therefore, in the case of law
school students, their academic legal training is limited to three years. Given the arguments for
diversity made in Grutter, it is all the more vital that these law students experience a "diversity"
legal education as soon as possible. For the rest of their lives, they will be active in business and
professional groups and enterprises, but they have only three years in which to avail themselves of
all the educational benefits of diversity. This alone should make the need for immediate and com-
plete faculty diversity all the more acute.
60. Some degree of economic hardship is inevitable in any affirmative action program. See
infra notes 97-110. In desegregation programs, for instance, some students have to endure bussing
over long distances in order to achieve school diversity. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Ed., 362 F. Supp. 1223, 1232 (D.C.N.C., 1973) (acknowledging that the desegregation plan will
require many children to be "bussed out of their home neighborhoods, often for long distances").
61. Since Justice O'Connor's Grutter opinion focuses on the educational benefits conferred
by diversity, and on the need for these benefits to prepare the future leaders of tomorrow, her case
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Grutter recognized, higher education is unique. It is a special institution
in the social, political and economic life of the nation.62 Consequently, if
only diversity can produce the necessary educational benefits described
by the Court, and if the educational system is vital for the sustenance of
democracy, then education is an area in which extraordinary measures
must be taken to achieve that diversity.
As the Court stated in Grutter, the strict scrutiny test requires that
any governmental racial discrimination meet two requirements: first, it
must serve a compelling state interest; and second, it must be narrowly
tailored to meet that interest. 63 Thus, any race-based distinction must be
the most narrowly drawn distinction possible.64 Given this constitutional
command, it can be argued that the path toward educational diversity
does not wind through the larger and ill-defined pool of potential stu-
dents, but through the specific and existing faculty staffs of the law
schools. Since student diversity is largely dependent on faculty diversity,
then the way to achieve the former is to focus narrowly on the latter.
Another reason why tenure should be abolished as a means of
achieving more rapid faculty diversity is that the persons who will be
most impacted are the persons who in American society most eagerly
advocate on behalf of diversity and affirmative action.65 If there is any
fundamental tenet of a democratic society, it is that those adversely af-
fected by a decision should have some say in or agreement with that de-
for affirmative action would not apply to private businesses. See also Rebecca Hanner White, Af-
firmative Action in the Workplace: The Significance of Grutter?, 92 Ky. L.J. 263, 263-64 (2003-
2004) (asserting that Grutter "does not directly apply to the affirmative use of race or other protected
characteristics in the workplace," and that the Court "was careful to limit its discussion to the ques-
tion" of whether diversity was a compelling interest that can justify the use of race in university
admissions policies).
62. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (stating that "[wie have repeatedly acknowledged the overriding
importance of preparing students for work and citizenship, describing education as pivotal to 'sus-
taining our political and cultural heritage' with a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of soci-
ety") quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982). See also Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (stating that education "is the very foundation of good citizenship").
63. As the Grutter opinion stated: "[e]ven in the limited circumstance when drawing racial
distinctions is permissible to further a compelling state interest, government is still 'constrained in
how it may pursue that end: [Tihe means chosen to accomplish the [govemment's] asserted purpose
must be specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose."' Gruner, 539 U.S. at 331
(quoting Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 908 (1996)). See also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515
U.S. 200, 226-27 (1995) (stating that all governmental racial classifications are subject to strict
scrutiny).
64. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331.
65. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text. Many academics argue that color blind-
ness is a futile delusion because of the past and present race discrimination in America. See, e.g.,
Stanley Fish, Reverse Racism or How the Pot Got to Call the Kettle Black, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Nov. 1993, at 128, 130. Others argue that affirmative action is indispensable to alleviate the stigma
and prejudice facing minorities in America. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE
295-302 (Harvard Univ. Press 1985); Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the
Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1327, 1331 (1987).
Affirmative action programs at the university level even extend to shaping how scientists
conduct their research. For instance, federal law requires that federally-funded research involve
women and minorities both as researchers and as subjects of research in clinical studies. See Sally
L. Satel, Science by Quota, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 27, 1995, at 14.
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cision. And it certainly cannot be argued that the majority of law school
66
faculty do not agree with the need or wisdom of affirmative action.
Many legal scholars claim that race-conscious admissions policies
are needed in universities to remedy the blatant racism practiced by those
institutions in the past.67 The courts have long held that affirmative ac-
tion policies are warranted when governmental agencies--e.g., public
universities-have engaged in past racial discrimination. 68 In such cases,
diversity as a compelling interest is not even needed to justify the race-
conscious remedial actions.6 9 Consequently, on the basis of remedying
66. See Peter H. Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past, Present, and Future, YALE L. & POL'Y
REV., 1, 9 (2002) (stating that the educational system, like no other domain, "practices and supports
[affirmative action] so enthusiastically"). According to a former chancellor at the University of
California at Berkeley, a university without affirmative action is akin to educational apartheid,
"almost as pervasive and insidious as the strictest segregation in South Africa." Chang-Lin Tien,
Diversity and Excellence in Higher Education, in DEBATING AFFIRMATIVE AcTION, 237, 239 (Nico-
laus Mills ed., Delta 1994). Other scholars argue that affirmative action in higher education is "the
best long-term remedy for the private beliefs and behavior that perpetuate the effects of racial caste."
Akhil Amar & Neal Katyal, Bakke's Fate, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1745, 1779 (1996). It has been re-
ported that "virtually all competitive law schools" operate "a quota system." Michael S. Greve, The
Newest Move in Law Schools' Quota Game, WALL ST. J., October 5, 1992, at A12. A former dean
of the University of California at Berkeley Boalt Hall Law School has publicly admitted to huge
discrepancies in the academic qualifications between blacks and other students. Id.
67. See generally Brief of Amici Curiae Judith Areen et al. at 3, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306 (2003) (No. 02-241) (stating that "today the Law School argues it would have 'too many' whites
if it could not discriminate in its admission process").
68. For instance, to remedy the injuries caused by past discrimination, the courts can impose
an affirmative hiring and promotional remedy, which prevails until a designated percentage of mi-
nority workers has been reached. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (holding
that "the effects of past discrimination in the Department 'will not wither away of their own accord'
and that 'without promotional quotas the continuing effects of this discrimination cannot be elimi-
nated.' (quoting the District Court in Paradise v. Prescott, 585 F. Supp. 72, 75 (M.D.Ala. 1983);
United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1977) (upholding the police department's
mandatory hiring quotas to correct past discrimination); NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir.
1974) (holding that police department quota relief was necessary to eliminate unconstitutional past
hiring policies).
Courts may also order such remedies against labor unions which have engaged in past
racial discrimination. See Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l. Ass'n. v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421
(1986) (upholding remedies, including preferential affirmative action hiring and the imposition of
substantial fines, to remedy the effects of pervasive past discrimination). In fact, until Grutter, the
constitutional justification of affirmative action was primarily limited to serving as a remedy for past
discrimination. See Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 214-20 (recounting the history of Supreme
Court decisions on racial discrimination).
As noted earlier in Hopwood, the Fifth Circuit ruled that diversity did not constitute a
compelling government interest and suggested that perhaps the only governmental interest compel-
ling enough to justify a race-based admissions policy was to remedy the present effects of prior
discrimination by that particular governmental body. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944-46. Consequently,
prior to Grutter, the only constitutionally compelling interest recognized by the Court that satisfied
the strict scrutiny test was the remediation of the effects of past race discrinmination. See Metro
Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 612 (1990) (holding "modem equal protection doctrine has
recognized only one such [compelling] interest: remedying the effects of racial discrimination").
69. The Court has endorsed the attempts by institutions who voluntarily try to achieve more
racial equality, even when there is no direct evidence of previous discriminatory behavior. See, e.g.,
Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 627-31 (1987) (ruling that an employer need not prove its
own past discriminatory acts so as to justify its adoption of an affirmative action program, only that
the employer demonstrate discrepancies in certain segregated job categories).
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past discrimination alone, substantial affirmative action mandates can be
imposed-substantial enough to justify the dismantling of tenure.
There is no shortage of statements, testimony, and research by legal
scholars regarding the racial discrimination that has existed, and that
continues to exist, in the nation's institutions of higher education.
70
These scholars assert that even today, unequivocal symptoms exist "indi-
cating that racial equality has not yet found its way to many institutions
of higher education," and that there is "ample evidence that there exists
some form of discrimination" even at some of the nation's elite law
schools.7 1 In both Hopwood cases, federal investigators claimed to have
found pervasive and egregious discrimination in the recent past of
Texas's higher education system.72 As a University of Texas law profes-
sor who also served as counsel for the University in the Hopwood cases
writes: "[W]e were able to persuade the trial court that the vestiges of
discrimination were not merely the lore of a bygone era.,
73
Legal scholars point to the disparity between the percentage of mi-
nority students in higher education and the percentage of full-time minor-
70. See Greenberg, supra note 39, at 1618 (recalling being told that approximately forty years
ago, at a time when some of today's senior legal faculty were obtaining or applying for tenure, the
University of Michigan "accepted only one black applicant each year"); Thomas Ross, Innocence
and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REV. 297, 312 (1990) (describing the burden on blacks of
persistent, unconscious racism). Even on racially integrated faculties, Ross argues, a black law
professor "must overcome widespread assumptions of inferiority held by students and colleagues,
while white colleagues enjoy the benefit of the positive presumption and of the contrast with their
black colleague." Id. See also Derrick Bell, Strangers in Academic Paradise: Law Teachers of
Color in Still White Law Schools, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 385 (1986).
See, e.g., Yollander Hardaway, Affirmative Action: Does the Fifth Circuit's Hopwood
Ruling Place Affirmative Action on Shaky Ground?, 122 EDUC. L. REP. 1089, 1101 (1998) (stating
that "recent studies concerning minorities and higher education reveal present vestiges of past dis-
crimination"); Charles R. Lawrence M, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 321 (1987) (arguing that racism is an illness that "in-
fects almost everyone"); Darryl Brown, Racism and Race Relations in the University, 76 VA. L.
REV. 295, 322 (1990) (discussing the "daily repetition of subtle racism and subordination in the
classroom and on campus").
Also, Professor Aleinikoff states that racism in America is "widespread, deeply ingrained,
passed from generation to generation." T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Constitution in Context: The
Continuing Significance of Racism, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 325, 352 (1992). "It is becoming increas-
ingly clear.., that the academic world that many students of color experience... [is one] in which
minority students feel as if they are outsiders-too often the victims of stereotypical (and essential-
ist) assumptions and, with increasing frequency, outright racist behavior." ld. at 367. "The increase
in overt acts of racism on college campuses in recent years is well documented," with professors
"often send[ing] similar messages" of racism. Id. As Professor Aleinikoff argues, what needs to be
changed is "the institutional culture" of universities-a culture that is "overwhelmingly white," in
which access "to power hierarchies is generally limited to whites." Id. at 369-70.
71. Kent Kostka, Higher Education, Hopwood, and Homogeneity: Preserving Affirmative
Action and Diversity in a Scrutinizing Society, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 265, 279-80 (1996).
72. Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 555-56 (W.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd by 78 F.3d 932
(5th Cir. 1996).
73. Issacharoff, supra note 57, at 681 (expressing also his deep skepticism about even those
universities that have implemented affirmative action programs). He argues that "it is highly
unlikely in this day and age that the institutions of higher education that have heavily internalized a
commitment to affirmative action are at the same time remedying their own discrimination." Id.
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ity faculty as evidence of continuing discrimination.74 Others accuse
universities and law schools of subtly reinforcing racial stereotypes
through their use of discriminatory testing and admissions standards.75
Implicit within these accusations is the larger criticism that racial dis-
crimination is deeply ingrained in America's current system of higher
education.76  As Critical Race Theory proclaims, the standards used to
measure achievement in higher education are a "gate built by a white
male hegemony that requires a password in the white man's voice for
passage."
77
The faculty of the nation's higher education institutions have been
the most vociferous critics of the nation's racial practices and attitudes.
78
They fault society, including institutions of higher education, for not
admitting to this racism and to the need for affirmative action.79  They
further argue that minorities are oppressed not just by individual racist
attitudes, but also "and more importantly by intractable hierarchical and
institutional structures that a more passive, slow-moving non-
74. See Epps, supra note 45, at 761. The percentage of minorities in the full-time faculty
ranks of higher education is approximately half of the percentage of minorities in the student ranks.
Id. The persistence of discrimination in higher education can be seen from the fact that "minorities
are still tremendously underrepresented in undergraduate and graduate programs nationwide, includ-
ing law." Kostka, supra note 71, at 281. "Socialized biases that extend far beyond formal admission
barriers cannot be quantified or eliminated by merely opening up the doors to disadvantaged racial
minorities; there still exists a pervasive discriminatory atmosphere in society that disadvantages
many, and thus, justifies race-based remedies." Id.
75. See Rubenfeld, supra note 27, at 426. Professor Rubenfeld argues that just as segregating
schools was held unconstitutional in Brown, so too should "reliance on the SAT, the LSAT, and all
the other standardized tests" that unfairly convey the message that minorities cannot compete be
found unconstitutional. Id. The use by law schools of the Law School Admission Test (LSAT) has
been strongly criticized by supporters of affirmative action. The "substantial disparate effect" that
the [SAT has on minorities "has been well-documented." Brief of Amici Curiae Society of Amei-
can Law Teachers at 16, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241).
The SAT, it is argued, reflects the country's "legacy of racial injustice." K. ANTHONY
APPIAH & AMY GtJTMANN, COLOR CoNscIous: THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF RACE 125 (Princeton
Univ. Press 1996). The racial discrimination of the SATs are demonstrated by the fact that "when
average SAT scores are broken down by class and race, we also see enormous gaps between black
and white students within the same income groups." Id. at 140.
76. Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The New Voice of Color, 100 YALE L.J. 2007, (1991).
77. Id. at 2052. For a description of Critical Race Theory, see Tanya Kateri Hemandez,
Comparative Judging of Civil Rights: A Transnational Critical Race Theory Approach, 63 LA. L.
REV. 875, 877 (2003) (arguing that "Critical Race Theory is a strain of legal scholarship that chal-
lenges the ways in which race and racial power are constructed and represented in legal culture and,
more generally, in society as a whole"). See also John 0. Calmore, Random Notes of an Integration
Warrior-Part 2: A Critical Response to the Hegemonic "Truth" of Daniel Farber and Suzanna
Sherry, 83 MINN L. REV. 1589, 1592 (1999) (stating that "Critical race theory primarily investigates
how the law contributes to and diminishes racial subordination").
78. See, e.g., supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text. These sweeping criticisms are re-
flected in the arguments put forth by respondents in Grutter. "The inescapable conclusion is that
this is not a 'color blind' society," but one that is "a socially-constructed racial hierarchy with whites
firmly on top." Brief of Amici Curiae NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund and the ACLU
at 22, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241). "[R]acial discrimination persists across all class
levels and affects even those African Americans with advanced skills and credentials." Id. at 19.
79. See Michael Selmi, The Facts of Affirmative Action, 85 VA. L. REV. 697, 733 (1999)
(stating that it is rarer still that a university "defending a plan [for affirmative action] will be willing
to assert its own past discrimination as justification for affirmative measures").
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discrimination principle cannot effectively dislodge."80  Yet despite this
comprehensive criticism of the many ways in which higher education
discriminates against minorities, faculty members rarely address the
problematic tenure system.
The tenure system most likely qualifies as one of those intractable
hierarchical and institutional structures that sustains the racial discrimi-
nation of the past. Academic tenure was born in a racist age, and if the
remnants of discrimination exist everywhere else in society they cer-
tainly must in the tenure system.81 Many currently tenured faculty were
awarded tenure at a time when, by the very admissions of faculty mem-
bers, women and minorities were being shut out. Consequently, it seems
logical that tenure as an institutional structure rooted in a past of oppres-
sive racism should suffer the same fate that other remnants of racism
have experienced. To the degree that tenure has placed white males into
positions of power and privilege-and, given the overwhelming numbers
of white male tenured professors, it apparently has-then that instrument
of racial privilege should be dismantled. Only then will women and mi-
norities, who have previously been excluded from those positions, finally
assume their rightful and long-neglected place.82
V. BREAKING DOwN THE TENURE BARRIER TO DIVERSITY
In a way, the academic community has enjoyed a free ride on the
racial-virtue train. Faculty members have been eager advocates of af-
firmative action and, yet, because of tenure they have had to incur no
costs or burdens in the social crusade for diversity. Moreover, by adopt-
ing the diversity argument, academia has been able to shift focus away
from the more backward-looking remedial rationale for affirmative ac-
tion. This is because the diversity argument incorporates a "future-
oriented vision,, 83 and, thus, "ascribes no guilt, calls for no arguments
about compensation. '"84 So, by supporting affirmative action policies
aimed at students and new faculty hires, white male faculty members can
80. Schuck, supra note 66, at 28.
81. The beginnings of tenure in the U.S. higher education system dates back to 1900. See
Fishman, supra note 59, at 165.
82. Institutions of higher education "continue to perpetuate racial disadvantage," Brief of
Amici Curiae NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund and the ACLU at 3, Grutter, 539 U.S.
306 (2003) (No. 02-241). And for "far too long, the doors to those positions [within higher educa-
tion] have been shut to Negroes." Id. at 26.
The Supreme Court has endorsed a narrow version of what could be construed as a restitu-
tion argument, permitting affirmative action where identifiable past discrimination has been proved,
when this discrimination continues to affect individual victims, and when the racial preference is
narrowly tailored to remedy this particular discrimination. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S.
747, 777 (1976) (allowing affirmative action to dismantle a seniority status promotion system to
remedy prior discrimination); see, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,448-49 (1980) (holding
affirmative action in federally funded public construction projects constitutional).
83. See Sheila Foster, Difference and Equality: A Critical Assessment of the Concept of "Di-
versity," 1993 Wisc. L. REv. 105, 107 (1993).
84. Eugene Volokh, Diversity, Race as Proxy, and Religion as Proxy, 43 UCLA L. REV.
2059, 2060 (1996).
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ease whatever guilt or discomfort they might feel on racial issues, while
at the same time incurring no risk of being forced to suffer any profes-
sional or economic hardship themselves.
85
Surveys have shown that university faculty tend to be "ideologically
and politically far more liberal, Democratic, statist, and secular than
other Americans. ' '86  But their insulation from any adverse effects of
affirmative action programs casts a certain suspicion on the arguments of
faculty members in support of such programs. They are seen as safely
immune from the burdens or consequences of their beliefs. Indeed, most
of the Supreme Court's affirmative action decisions have involved not
the professional or intellectual classes, but occupations such as police
officers and firefighters. 87  The bulk of the judicial affirmative action
docket has been directed at, as the Court once described it, "the work of
the manual laborer, as distinguished from that of the professional ... or,
indeed, of any class whose toil is that of the brain. 88
Of course, imposing an affirmative action program that does away
with faculty tenure would indeed place some significant burdens on cur-
rently tenured faculty. However, such a program may be the only way a
university or law school can effectively and immediately achieve the
educational benefits of diversity, which constituted the compelling state
interest under Grutter.89 If a public university, pursuing the compelling
interest of diversity, focused on its faculty make-up and disbanded the
tenure system as a means of achieving diversity, it would be exercising
85. Most university professors "are profoundly uncomfortable at the thought of teaching a
class or being on a faculty containing only whites and Asians." Schuck, supra note 66, at 36 (adding
that "tenured professors have little or nothing to fear personally from affirmative action for students
or faculty"). Affirmative action, in fact, benefits tenured faculty "by eliminating the discomfort they
would feel in classes and faculty meetings without non-Asian minorities, and they bear few of the
program's costs." Id.
86. Id. See also Rachel Zabarkes Friedman, Waking Up, NAT'L REVIEW, October 13, 2003, at
44 (describing student dissatisfaction with "the radical left-wing views of their professors").
87. See generally Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (allowing firefighters to challenge
prior consent decrees); see generally United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 150 (1987) (upholding
50 percent promotion requirement for black state troopers under the Equal Protection Clause); Local
No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986) (discrimination suit brought by
minority firefighters); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984) (addressing
a fire department's suit over racially biased hiring, promotion, and lay-off practices).
88. Rector, etc. of Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 463 (1892).
89. The termination of tenure, for the sake of achieving diversity, could be achieved in two
ways. The first, and the one most consistent with the Grutter reasoning, would be if the public
academic institution itself implemented change. In this way, it could rely upon the academic free-
dom and educational autonomy justification relied on by Justice O'Connor. The second way, how-
ever, would be for the state to abolish tenure. It could do so in the name of the compelling state
interest of diversity, which in turn produces educational benefits, which in turn produces better and
more enlightened social leaders of the future. Arguably, according to Grutter, the state has as com-
pelling an interest in diversity as does the Law School. After all, the benefits of diversity extend far
beyond the boundaries of the academic community. They include the development of good democ-
ratic citizens, the nurturing of enlightened social and political leaders, and the promotion of racial
harmony in society, through the strengthening of trust in minorities that social institutions are open
to them. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328-29 (deferring to law schools' judgment on issues of student
admission and diversity).
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just the kind of academic freedom cited by Justice O'Connor as one of
the reasons for upholding the race-based admissions policy in Grutter.9°
Granted, the now untenured faculty members would feel some loss of
economic and professional security, but they would all be eligible to re-
apply for a faculty position under the new affirmative action policy.
Moreover, mere economic loss or professional insecurity cannot be a
barrier to an interest as compelling as diversity.
Even outside the higher education arena, where diversity is not such
a compelling interest, affirmative action programs impose financial and
professional costs on nonfavored racial groups. For example, in the field
of public and private contracting, laws often impose "set-asides, quotas,
and other preferences for minority contractors." 91 Public housing pro-
jects are subject to affirmative action mandates; and private developers
receiving public funds are often required to implement set-asides or quo-
tas for minority groups.92 Each year, over 100 million dollars in race-
based financial aid is distributed by colleges and universities.93 In pro-
fessional schools alone, ten percent of all available scholarship money
goes exclusively to minority students.94 At Harvard University, all mi-
nority graduate students receive full tuition, room, and board irrespective
of their financial need.95 Obviously, when this money is given to certain
minority students, it is denied to nonninority students, thus causing them
to suffer a definite financial injury.
96
Courts have approved affirmative action programs that levy some
economic burdens on nonminority groups. In United States v. Para-
dise,97 the Court upheld a promotion scheme for the Alabama State
Troopers requiring that one African-American be promoted for every one
white promotion." In Fullilove v. Klutznick,99 the Court endorsed an
affirmative action program that mandated that a certain percentage of
government business be awarded to minorities.9 ° In Wittmer v. Pe-
ters,101 three white candidates who had applied for lieutenant positions in
an Illinois correctional boot camp, where nearly seventy percent of the
90. Id. at 328.
91. Schuck, supra note 66, at 9; see generally TAMAR JACOBY, SOMEONE ELSE'S HOUSE:
AMERICA'S UNFINISHED STRUGGLE FOR INTEGRATION 9 (Free Press 1998) (attacking modem af-
firmative action practices).
92. Schuck, supra note 66, at 10.
93. Kennedy, supra note 35, at 789.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. "In an era of diminishing educational budgets, affirmative action quite literally takes the
form of preferential finance." Chen, supra note 41, at 1899.
97. 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
98. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171 (holding that the "one-for-one promotion requirement was
narrowly tailored to serve its several purposes").
99. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
100. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 473 (in which ten percent of federal construction funds went to
minority businesses, so long as the bids were competitively priced).
101. 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996).
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inmates were black men, 10 2 sued when a black candidate was selected for
the position, even though he had ranked far below the white candidates
on an employment test. 10 3 Conceding that race was a factor in the hiring
process, the state defended its decision on the grounds of "penological
necessity."' 4 The state argued that a black lieutenant was needed be-
cause the black inmates "are believed unlikely to play the correctional
game of brutal drill sergeant and brutalized recruit unless there are some
blacks in authority in the camp."' 05 Similarly, in the university setting,
the elimination of tenure can be justified on the basis of educational ne-
cessity.
In United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,'0 6 the Court held that
private and governmental employers could adopt race-conscious em-
ployment policies designed to increase the employment of minorities in
jobs where they had been traditionally underrepresented.' 0 7 Also, in We-
ber,10 8 the Supreme Court approved of an employer's decision to reserve
fifty percent of the openings in a certain training program to black em-
ployees. 0 9 The training program and the reservation of fifty percent of
its openings to blacks, according to the Court, was an effort to "eliminate
traditional patterns of racial segregation."" 0
These cases establish some precedence for abolishing tenure. First,
because the ranks of tenured faculty in higher education have tradition-
ally been racially segregated,"l' very few blacks have held such posi-
tions. 12 Additionally, the economic costs incurred by faculty members
who have had their tenure status revoked may be no more than the eco-
nomic costs incurred by nonminority businesses or employees in the
above-referenced cases. Indeed, the detenured faculty members may
even retain their positions, since there would be no bar to their re-
applying. Moreover, given the special nature of education, as recognized
in Grutter, the achievement of diversity in the nation's universities
should justify greater costs than those tolerated in other areas of Ameri-
can life.
102. Wittmer, 87 F.3d at 917.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 920.
106. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
107. Weber, 443 U.S. at 193.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 197-98.
110. Id. at 201.
111. See Brian Baskin, Top Universities Struggle to Hire Black Faculty, Study Shows, Brown
Daily Herald, at http://uwire.com/content/topnews03O5O200l.html (Mar. 3, 2002) (citing a study in
which, for instance, Brown University was ranked second out of the nation's 27 top schools with 4.1
percent of its tenured professors being black).
112. See generally, ASS'N OF AM. LAW SCH., STATISTICAL REPORT ON LAW SCHOOL
FACULTY AND CANDIDATES FOR LAW FACULTY PoSrrIONS (2002-03), available at
http://www.aals.org/statistics/2002-03/page2.html.
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In Grutter, Justice O'Connor emphasized that the strict scrutiny
standard did not preclude some judicial deference to the Law School's
judgment that diversity was essential to its educational mission. 113 Since
law schools are "the training ground for a large number of our Nation's
leaders,"' 14 and since in order "to cultivate a set of leaders with legiti-
macy in the eyes of the citizenry it is necessary that the path to leadership
be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and
ethnicity," 5 the Court granted a kind of leeway that it has never before
granted. What Grutter did that Hopwood did not do was recognize the
incontrovertible nexus between higher education and society. 116 As sug-
gested in Grutter, higher education, more than any other profession, is
inextricably linked to the social fabric and political processes. 117
This societal importance of higher education means that the need
for diversity is more urgent and immediate than in any other segment of
society. Students devote only a few years to higher education, but spend
the rest of their lives in their professional, occupational and community
roles. Therefore, if students need diversity to become well-rounded citi-
zens and future leaders, then they need it very quickly. Indeed, as critics
have pointed out, a nondiverse education can be devastating on stu-
dents.' 18
Affirmative action programs in the past have often been defeated
because of the burden they place on the non-favored racial group. 19 But
this burden is different when it comes to tenured faculty in higher educa-
tion. By revoking their tenure, according to the implied arguments of
many scholars, the university is not unduly depriving faculty members of
a well-earned property interest as much as it is taking back a discrimina-
tory privilege set up during a period in our nation's past when minorities
and women were blatantly excluded. It is argued that the tenure stan-
dards and expectations which persist today incorporate the vestiges of
past discrimination. Therefore, just as it was wrong for the non-slave
113. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
114. Id. at 334.
115. Id.
116. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306; Hopwood, 78 F. 3d at 932.
117. As also implied by Grutter, although the link between government construction contracts
and societal discrimination may be ambiguous, higher education provides society with leadership
and a forum for the dissemination of ideas. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332-33.
118. Professor Epps states the scenario:
The voices of minority and women students may be silenced in different ways. For ex-
ample, when one speaks up in a class discussion, the professor and white males may lis-
ten politely and then continue the discussion as if no comment had been made; or the top-
ics of interest to minority and women students may be considered trivial or peripheral.
Exclusion may take the form of not including such students in study groups or coopera-
tive research projects. It may also take the form of denying teaching or research assis-
tantships to students who do not fit the mainstream ideal.
Epps, supra note 45, at 765.
119. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
120. See Epps, supra note 45, at 765. "Unless these types of structural barriers to success are
eliminated, it will be difficult to increase the representation of minority and women students in
[Vol. 82:1
THE NEXT STEP IN DIVERSITY
owning descendants of slave owners to claim innocence while living off
the inheritance provided by their ancestors, it is wrong for tenured white
male faculty today to advocate for affirmative action while enjoying an
academic position that has racist roots.
Legal scholars argue that all of America suffers from "unconscious
racism. '"121 If this is so, then all of America's institutional structures are
tainted with racism. Since tenure is one of the oldest and most powerful
structures in American higher education, then it too incorporates the dis-
criminatory effects of unconscious racism and should be abolished. 122 If
the academic arguments about racism in America are true, then the ten-
ured faculties in the nation's universities have been among society's big-
gest benefactors of that racism, since for decades white males have been
obtaining lifetime tenure positions at the expense of women and minori-
ties.
Even though tenured teachers have a "property interest in their ten-
ure,' ' 23 it is not an interest "created by the Constitution."' 124 Nor does it
rise to the level of a fundamental right protected under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.12 5 Consequently, the property interest of a tenured faculty
member falls lower on the ladder of constitutional rights than does the
equal protection interest of the white applicant in Grutter. Thus, if the
compelling interest of diversity justifies an infringement of an equal pro-
tection right, it certainly can support an infringement of a lower-priority
property interest. 126
Most tenure policies provide for termination in the event of extraor-
dinary instances of "institutional need." 127 Examples of such institutional
faculty positions. These practices represent a form of institutionalized elitism that makes it difficult
for minority and women graduate students to compete on an equal basis with white men." Id.
121. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 70, at 313 (discussing the ways in which white males are
benefited, to the disadvantage of minorities, by society's unconscious racism).
122. In Croson, the Court stated that the remedying of past discrimination was the only com-
pelling interest that could justify an affirmative action, set-aside program. City of Richmond v. J. S.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 497 (1989). Racial inequality "has also provided unfair advantages to
whites as a group, who have disproportionately benefitted." Brief of Amici Curiae NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund and the ACLU at 23, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241).
Thus, there is the need to "dismantle the institutional protection of benefits for whites that have been
based on white supremacy and maintained at the expense of Blacks." Id. at 27. Indeed, the argu-
ment can be made that the tenure system at a public university represents a state-sponsored policy
sustaining the vestiges of racism.
123. Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 928-29 (1997) (holding that an employee's due process
rights had not been violated because due process could be satisfied by a prompt post-suspension
hearing).
124. Bd. of Regents of State Coll. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (holding that a professor
does not have a protected interest in continued employment when he is merely a contract employee).
125. Harrah Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194, 199 (1979) (holding that the school
board's refusal to renew the teacher's contract did not constitute an equal protection deprivation).
126. The Constitution does not permit a university to "achieve diversity on the cheap." Sedler,
supra note 39, at 238.
127. See Gwen Seaquist & Eileen Kelly, Faculty Dismissal Because of Enrollment Declines,
28 J. L.& EDUC. 193, 193 (1999). Such instances of institutional need include declining enrollments
and program downsizing. Id. at 207.
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need include financial emergencies brought on by declining enrollment
and severe budget cutbacks. 128 Sometimes, tenure termination is allowed
when programs or departments are reorganized. 129  Therefore, if budget
shortfalls and department reorganization are sufficient to justify a termi-
nation of tenure, then clearly the constitutionally compelling need for
diversity can also support such a termination.'
30
VI. CONCLUSION: THE QUEST FOR REAL DIVERSITY
The value of diversity to higher education rests on the same ration-
ale that Justice Holmes first used to justify the protection of unpopular
speech. 13  Only through a truly open marketplace of ideas can a democ-
ratic society acquire the truth and insights needed to govern itself.32
Likewise, the diversity that a university community needs is a market-
place-of-ideas diversity, a viewpoint diversity. This is the nature of the
diversity recognized by Grutter as a compelling state interest.
33
Higher education is devoted to intellectual development and learn-
ing. Consequently, the most valuable diversity is one of intellectual or
ideological diversity. Racial diversity is but a proxy for viewpoint diver-
sity.t34 It is a presumptive substitute, based on the theory that people of
128. The University of Illinois at Chicago tenure policy allows for tenure termination in the
event of "grave institutional financial stringency." Jemimah Noonoo, What is Tenure? CHICAGO
FLAME-NEWs, February 17, 2004, at http://www.chicagoflame.corn/globaluserelements
printpage.cfm?storyid=222483. Virginia Commonwealth University provides for dismissal of ten-
ured faculty upon a "[b]ona fide financial emergency in a department or school, or reorganization or
termination of programs as defined by established University policies and procedures." Procedure
for Termination of Employment of Tenured Faculty Members, at http://www.vcu.edu/ireweb/
policies/tenure.htm. According to the Southem Illinois University tenure policy, a tenured faculty
member's employment is subject to "generally applicable amendments to personnel policies of the
[university]." Tenure Policy and Guidelines, at http://www.siue.edu/PROVOSTIFHB/7-16-l.html.
129. See Seaquist, supra note 127, at 193 (stating that instances of institutional need justifying
tenure termination include declining enrollments and program downsizing); See also Procedure for
Termination of Employment of Tenured Faculty Members, at http://www.vcu.edu/ireweb/
policiesttenure.htm.
130. There may be even more reasons to terminate faculty tenure. One prominent criticism is
that tenure solidifies and encourages incompetence. According to one study conducted over a three
year time period, almost fifty percent of all senior tenured law faculty did not publish anything. See
Michael 1. Swygert & Nathaniel E. Gozansky, Senior Law Faculty Publication Study: Comparisons
of Law School Productivity, 35 J. LEGAL EDuc. 373, 381 (1985).
131. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (rejecting the
majority's affirmation of a conviction for conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act of Congress).
132. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 616.
133. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (citing the benefits of diversity as being a "livelier, more spirited,
and simply more enlightening and interesting" classroom discussion. Id. (quoting Respondents'
Brief for Certiorari to the Unites States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Grutter v. Bollinger,
137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (No. 02-241)).
134. Id. at 307 (stating that the "diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses
a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single
though important element"). Id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315). On the other hand, although the
University of Michigan Law School purported to consider other types of diversity such as unusual
employment experiences and extracurricular activities, race was the most identifiable diversity factor
that separates one applicant from another. Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 827-28. But the argument is
that educators truly believe that viewpoint diversity strengthens education, they should pursue it
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different races have different viewpoints. However, the next step in
achieving real diversity is to go beyond using race as a proxy for view-
point diversity.
With the Grutter recognition of diversity as a compelling interest,
universities have now been put on notice. They have been told that the
nation's future depends on citizens and leaders educated in an academic
environment of diverse ideas. They have been empowered to aggres-
sively and creatively pursue this diversity. They have been informed that
the compelling interest of diversity can justify infringement of the most
fundamental of rights.
Countless scholars have stressed the urgent need for a diverse fac-
ulty that can in turn foster a diverse classroom experience and encourage
the development of a diverse student body.135  As these scholars have
argued, the ranks of America's higher education faculty are woefully
lacking in racial and gender diversity. 136 However, those are not the only
areas of diversity that are lacking. Religious diversity is almost nonexis-
tent among university faculty. Eugene Volokh states that "the lack of
religious diversity at many schools is at least as severe as the lack of ra-
cial diversity. '37 As noted in The Atlantic Monthly, "it's appalling that
evangelical Christians are practically absent from entire professions,
such as academia."'138 But if there is a compelling interest in discriminat-
ing on the basis of race so as to promote an educational atmosphere with
a supposedly more diverse set of student views, then surely it would be
proper and even necessary to discriminate among viewpoints so as to
achieve a balanced mix of opinions and beliefs in the faculty and student
body. Under the Grutter logic of diversity, faculty membership should
reflect all viewpoints, even those of religious conservatives.
In addition to a lack of religious diversity, university faculty are
also strikingly nondiverse in their political ideology. For instance, law
faculty tend to be seventy percent less likely to be Republican than the
public at large. 39 A study of several universities found that nearly 90
percent of liberal arts professors were Democrats. 14° Thus, if universities
directly rather than using race as a proxy. Id. at 849-50 (explaining that viewpoint diversity may be
equally attainable by non-minority students).
135. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text. See also White, supra note 34.
136. See Baskin, supra note 111.
137. Volokh, supra note 84, at 2072. Professor Volokh estimates that law school faculty are
approximately 75 percent less likely to attend religious services than the public at large. Id. at 2072.
138. David Brooks, People Like Us, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, September, 2003, at 32.
139. Volokh, supra note 84, at 2073 n. 23.
140. Brooks, supra note 138, at 32. Of the forty-two professors in the English, history, sociol-
ogy, and political-science departments at Brown University, all were Democrats. Id. In his dissent
in Grutter, Justice Kennedy recounted the testimony of one law school dean who described a faculty
debate whether Cubans should be counted as Hispanics: "[o]ne professor objected on the grounds
that Cubans were Republicans." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 393 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). A study of
various university faculties showed that at Cornell the ratio of liberal to conservative faculty mem-
bers was 166 to 6, at Stanford it was 151 to 17, at UCLA it was 141 to 9, and at the University of
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can discriminate on the basis of race to achieve diversity, they should be
able to discriminate on the all-important basis of political ideology. If
they require themselves to screen faculty candidates for racial and gender
diversity, they should surely be required to screen for viewpoint diver-
sity. In pursuit of the cause of diversity, and extending the logic of Grut-
ter, perhaps the content of libraries or the content of law review articles
should be monitored or regulated so as to achieve the proper balancing of
viewpoints. Certainly the types of books available in a school library
have a significant effect on the educational environment of the school, as
well as on the liveliness and nature of discussion in the classroom.
Colorado it was 116 to 5. Jeff Jacoby, "Intellectual Diversity," Townhall.com, December 5, 2004 at
www.townhall.comlcolumnists/jeffjacoby/printjj2004l204.shtml. A poll of Ivy League professors
had liberals outnumbering conservatives by more than ten to one. Id. And in a survey of more than
1700 social science professors, a Santa Clara University researcher found that between 80 and 90
percent identify as 'liberals' and vote Democratic. David Horowitz, "It's Time for Fairness and
Inclusion in Our Universities," FrontpageMagazine.com, December 14, 2004, at
www.frontpagemag.com/articles/printable.asp?ID=-16301. The same study showed that among
junior faculty at Stanford and Berkeley, the ratio of liberals to conservatives was 30 to 1. Id
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BEYOND LANE: WHO IS PROTECTED BY THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT, WHO SHOULD BE?
RUSSELL POWELLt
I. INTRODUCTION
When the Americans with Disabilities Act' (the "Act" or the
"ADA") was enacted in 1990, many disability rights advocates expected
that it would usher in a new era of equal opportunity and acceptance for
people with disabilities.2 Written in the tradition of both the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 19733 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964,4 the ADA reflected
the ideal of distributive justice in its mandate to both counter discrimina-
tion and provide accommodation;5 however, the courts gradually nar-
6rowed its coverage. Some empirical studies assert that the ADA actu-
ally caused a decline in the rate of employment among people with dis-
abilities. By early 2000, some scholars predicted that the ADA would
fade into obscurity as an ill-conceived relic that failed to adequately an-
ticipate social costs and the rational choices of employers and people
with disabilities.8
However, the ADA received new vigor from the Supreme Court
with the May 2004 opinion, Tennessee v. Lane.9 In a 5-4 decision, the
Court affirmed that Congress validly exercised its power when it sub-
jected states to suits under the ADA, at least with regard to limitations on
access to courts.' 0 While the decision addresses Title II of the ADA," it
does have broader implications for the Act as a whole. Lane reflects a
t Assistant Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law, visiting at Santa Clara
University School of Law. AB 1988, Harvard College; J.D. 1996, University of Virginia School of
Law; M.A. 2001, Loyola University of Chicago. Member of the New York, California, and District
of Columbia bars. I would like to thank David Ingram, Jennifer Parks and Marcus Kosins for their
helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this piece. I would also like to thank Nicole
Aeschleman for her comments and research assistance.
1. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
2. Leslie Francis & Anita Silvers, Introduction to AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES:
EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS xiii, xix (Leslie
Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds. 2000) [hereinafter Francis & Silvers].
3. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 706, 794 (2000).
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 7000e (2004).
5. S. REP. No. 101-16, at 2 (1989).
6. James Leonard, Symposium: The American with Disabilities Act: A Ten-Year Retrospec-
tive: The Shadows of Unconstitutionality: How the New Federalism May Affect the Anti-
Discrimination Mandate of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 52 ALA. L. REV. 91, 91-92 (2000).
7. See discussion infra Part IV.
8. Thomas DeLeire, The Unintended Consequences of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
Regulation, 2000, Vol. 23, No. 1 at 24.
9. 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004).
10. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1994.
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165.
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significant shift in the ethical paradigm used by the Court to decide ADA
cases and creates the opportunity to re-open dialogue about the real pol-
icy goals of the ADA and broader questions of justice for those with dis-
abilities. Analysis of the measurable impact of the ADA continues and
results in sometimes conflicting assertions. But whatever conclusions are
ultimately proven, the question of our policy goals and our conception of
justice for people with disabilities must be distinguished from the judicial
and legislative tools intended to achieve those goals.
The ADA's legislative history makes it clear that it was intended to
address the social issues associated with discrimination as well as acces-
sibility issues for those with physical impairments. 12  The Supreme
Court's emphasis on impairment and the notion of a discrete and insular
minority found in civil rights legislation has transformed the scope of the
ADA found in its plain meaning. The result is that some claimants who
fall within the intended and literal scope of the ADA do not receive the
benefit of its protection.' 3  Furthermore, states have largely been ex-
empted from the requirements of the ADA,14 Lane notwithstanding.
Under Title I (the ADA's employment provisions), 15 even those
who can make a successful claim may be caught in the catch-22 of win-
ning a case but being terminated because their impairment makes them
unemployable.1 6  Although those who care for the disabled are not ex-
pressly covered by any part of the ADA, it is arguable that they consti-
tute a vulnerable class which should receive fair compensation and per-
haps legal protections under the ADA (though admittedly this might be
more appropriately addressed under a different legislative aegis). 7 For
these reasons, this paper recommends a reconsideration of the ADA's
goals and a review of its effectiveness. While such a project is broader
than the scope of this paper, its ultimate conclusions may necessitate
changes in disability policy and justify substantial amendments to the
ADA which would better-serve the original legislative intent and the
interests of the disabled.
Part II of this article comments on the scope of the ADA in its statu-
tory language, its legislative history, the regulations intended to provide
clarification and the history of major Supreme Court decisions interpret-
ing it. Part I reflects on the philosophical paradigms that appear to be
12. Lowell P. Weicker, Jr., Historical Background of the ADA, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 387, 387-89
(1991) [hereinafter Weicker].
13. Claudia Center & Andrew J. Imparato, Redefining "Disability" Discrimination: A Pro-
posal to Restore Civil Rights Protections for Al! Workers, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 321, 321-22
(2003) [hereinafter Center & Imparato].
14. Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001).
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2004).
16. Ronald Turner, The Americans with Disabilities Act and the Workplace: A Study of the
Supreme Court's Disabling Choices and Decisions, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SUtRv. AM. L. 379, 409 (2004).
17. Mary Mahowald, A Feminist Standpoint, in DISABILITY, DEFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION,
209, 239-50 (Anita Silvers et. a]. eds., 1998) [hereinafter Mahowald].
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operative in the creation and interpretation of the ADA. The concerns
raised by some of the major empirical studies and recommended new
areas for research are addressed in Part IV. Part V comments on possible
revision of the ADA to create effective and legally valid incentives that
better achieve national justice goals.
II. SCOPE OF THE ADA
The scope of the ADA is not self-evident. The text of the statute
and its legislative history created high expectations.1 8  In general, the
regulations implementing the ADA reinforced these expectations. 19
However, the case law, particularly at the Supreme Court level, has cur-
tailed those expectations by narrowing the definition of disability and by
according state governments a significant degree of immunity.20
A. The Statute
The ADA is divided into five separate titles, four of which provide
rights of action.21 Title I contains employment antidiscrimination provi-
sions intended to protect the disabled. 2 Title I requires that state and
local governments provide all public programs, activities and services
without discriminating on the basis of disability.23 Title II prevents pri-
vate entities that provide public services from discriminating on the basis
of disability. 24 Title IV requires telecommunications companies to pro-
vide equipment and services for the hearing and speech impaired.25
Lastly, Title V contains miscellaneous interpretive provisions and dis-
pute resolution clauses.26
The ADA describes a disability as "a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the [individual's] major life ac-
tivities." 27 In theory, the protection of the ADA also extends to those
who are regarded as having a disability or who have a record of disabil-
ity.28  Although Title I protection should theoretically be extended in
18. Richard K. Scotch, Making Change: The ADA as an Instrument of Social Reform, in
AMERICANS WITH DSABILITIES: EXPLORING THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND
INSTITUTIONS 275, 276 (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds. 2000) [hereinafter Scotch].
19. See infra notes 41 and 50.
20. See Center and Imparato, supra note 13, at 324-29.
21. Americans with Disabilities Act, §§ 42 U.S.C. 12101-12213.
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2004).
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (2004).
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (2004).
25. 47 U.S.C. § 225 (2004).
26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201-12213 (2004).
27. The Americans with Disabilities Act, § 3(2)(A) (1990) [hereinafter ADA]. Quoting all of
Section 3(2), "Disability-The term 'disability' means, with respect to an individual-(A) a physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an
impairment." Id. at §3(2)(A)-(C).
28. Id. at § 3(2)(B) & (C). These sections clearly address the issue of discrimination as dis-
tinct from impairment. Those who have a record of disability would include disabled persons who
no longer have a disability, but who still suffer from discrimination. For example, someone who
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these cases according to the language of the statute, it has not been due to
the narrow definition of disability used by the Supreme Court.29  The
legislative history of the ADA refers to 43 million as the hypothetical
number of Americans living with disabilities in 1990.30 In an effort to
limit the scope of the ADA by including no more than that estimated 43
million people, the Court has required proof of severe physical or mental
impairment, usually construed as a specific medical disorder, whether
caused by genetics, injury or disease.3'
B. Legislative History
Historically, the ADA is the logical extension of the protections of
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.32 Where the Rehabilitation Act
only protected against discrimination by groups receiving federal fund-
ing,33 Title I of the ADA applies in theory to nearly all private and state
entities. Disability rights groups lobbied extensively for these protec-
tions in the 1988 presidential race.34
To fulfill expectations for new and more expansive disability anti-
discrimination protection, a joint hearing was held before the Senate
Subcommittee on Disability Policy and the House Subcommittee on Se-
lect Education in September 1988. 35 Many people with disabilities testi-
fied before the overflowing room about architectural and communication
barriers and the pervasiveness of stereotyping and prejudice.36 Senator
Kennedy, Chair of the Labor and Human Resources Committee, Senator
Harkin, Chair of the Subcommittee on Disability Policy, and Representa-
tive Owens of the House Subcommittee on Select Education committed
themselves to passing a comprehensive disability civil rights bill.37 Over
the following two years, a significant body of testimony and statistics
was presented to Congress and became a part of the legislative record of
the ADA. While the legislative record strongly indicates Congressional
suffered from a disabling disease that has been cured, may still suffer discrimination as a person who
had a stigmatizing disease. Similarly, someone may suffer discrimination for being perceived as
disabled even if she is not. Also, someone may be discriminated against because she is believed to
suffer from a disabling disease, even if she does not.
29. See Center and Imparato, supra note 13, at 324-29.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2004).
31. This is a reference to the so-called "medical model" of disability. See Elizabeth A. Pendo,
Disability, Doctors and Dollars: Distinguishing the Three Faces of Reasonable Accommodation, 35
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1175, 1214 (2002) [hereinafter Pendo I]; See generally Joel Feinberg, Disability
and Illness, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR
INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 244 (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds., Routledge
2000) (challenging the alleged objectivity of medical diagnoses as a basis for demonstrating disabil-
ity discrimination) [hereinafter Feinberg].
32. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 701,794.
33. 29 USC § 794(a) (2004).
34. Francis & Silvers, supra note 2, at xix.
35. Weicker, supra note 12, at 391.
36. Francis & Silvers, supra note 2, at xix.
37. Weicker, supra note 12, at 391.
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intent for broad protections, 38 the Supreme Court has largely ignored it.
39
Extensive references to the legislative history of the ADA in Lane indi-




Within one year of the ADA's passage, Congress authorized the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") to issue regula-
tions implementing Title 1.41 The most important definitions proffered
are "physical or mental impairment, ',42 "substantially limits, ' 43 and "ma-
jor life activity."" However, both Sutton v. United Airlines45 and Toyota
Motor Manufacturing v. Williams,46 further described below, convinc-
ingly call into question the validity of these regulations.47  Thus, while
they may be instructive, the EEOC regulations are today accorded little
deference. 48 As a result, the definition of "disability" is largely the prod-
uct of judicial opinions, and the assertion that a plaintiff is not a "quali-
38. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2004).
39. Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999). "[The dissent] relies on the legisla-
tive history of the ADA for the contrary proposition that individuals should be examined in their
uncorrected state. See Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimi-
nation Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1, 10-18 (2000). Because we decide that, by its terms, the ADA cannot
be read in this manner, we have no reason to consider the ADA's legislative history." Id.
40. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1984-92.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (2004).
42. Regulations To Implement The Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans With
Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2004).
(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss
affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, spe-
cial sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, di-
gestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or (2) Any mental or
psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or
mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.
Id.
43. Id. at § 1630.20)(1) (2004).
The term substantially limits means: (i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the
average person in the general population can perform; or (ii) Significantly restricted as to
the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular ma-
jor life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the aver-
age person in the general population can perform that same major life activity.
Id.
44. Id. at § 1630.2(h)(2)(i) (2004). "Major Life Activities means functions such as caring for
oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and work-
ing." Id.
45. See generally Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482-83 (1999) (discussing that
no agency has been delegated authority to interpret the term "disability").
46. See generally Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002) (substituting a
more restrictive interpretation of "substantially limits" in place of the EEOC's definition of that
element).
47. Lisa Eichhom, The Chevron Two-Step and the Toyota Sidestep: Dancing Around the
EEOC's "Disability" Regulations under the ADA, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 177, 180 (2004) [here-
inafter Eichhom].
48. fd.
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fled person with a disability" is the most common defense in ADA em-
ployment cases.
49
The Department of Justice ("DOJ") issued regulations implement-
ing Title H with the intention of harmonizing them with Title VII civil
rights regulations. 50 These regulations provide detailed standards for
state and local government compliance with the antidiscrimination provi-
sions of Title H."' Notably, they provide specific guidelines for access to
courtrooms, the very question posed by Lane52 discussed below.53
Since the definition of disability in the ADA was based on the
three-pronged definition in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (including
impairment, a record of impairment and being regarded as having an
impairment), courts have used regulations originally drafted by the De-
partment of Health, Education and Welfare implementing the Rehabilita-
tion Act to interpret terms in the ADA.54 These regulations, now under
the auspices of the Department of Health and Human Services
("DHHS"), are particularly important in defining "major life activities."
D. Supreme Court Jurisprudence
The ADA has been limited in several ways. Most significantly, the
Supreme Court has narrowed the scope of ADA coverage by limiting the
definition of a qualified person with a "disability. 55 Congress clearly
intended to protect from discrimination those with epilepsy, diabetes,
mental health conditions, amputees and others who are able to mitigate
the effects of their impairment.56 However, claims on the basis of these
disabilities are "routinely dismissed as outside the protection of the stat-
ute." 57 Title I cases against states universally fail to overcome Eleventh
Amendment immunity although Tennessee v. Lane has notably upheld
Title II at least with regard to court access. 58 This is significant in that it
represents a trend toward judicially limiting the scope and protections of
the ADA.5 9 Presuming that the current Supreme Court will not radically
shift its position in favor of greater protection for the disabled, any real
change must originate in Congress, must provide measurable results and
49. Susan Stefan, Delusions of Rights: Americans with Psychiatric Disabilities, Employment
Discrimination and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 52 ALA. L. REV. 271, 303 (2000).
50. 28 C.F.R. § 35 (2004).
51. Id.
52. Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1979.
53. See generally 28 C.F.R. § 35.102, 35.104 (2004) (providing definitions for interpretation
of the ADA, which apply to all services, programs, and activities provided or made available by
public entities).
54. Eichhom, supra note 47, at 182-83.
55. Center & Imparato, supra note 13, at 322.
56. Id. at 321.
57. Id. at 322.
58. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1980-82 (2004).
59. Scotch, supra note 18, at 279.
[Vol. 82:1
BEYOND LANE
must be calculated to pass constitutional muster under the prevailing
precedents.
1. The First Cases
Many of the earlier ADA cases provided clarification and tended to
narrow the protections of the Act, creating a complex and often inconsis-
60tent set of rules. One of the great challenges facing the Supreme Court
in its ADA decisions has been reconciling the perceived need for clear
rules with the tragic circumstances faced by many ADA claimants.
Some of the first Supreme Court cases interpreting the ADA
seemed to uphold the scope of the Act indicated by its text and legisla-
tive history. Bragdon v. Abbott asserted that an individual with H1V is
considered a person with a disability even in the beginning stages of the
disease.62 While somewhat controversial at the time, this result was
clearly intended by some in Congress. 63 Cleveland v. Policy Manage-
ment Systems Corporation64 declared that it is not a contradiction of
terms when an individual claims to be "totally disabled" in order to col-
lect Social Security Disability Insurance, and at the same time is able to
perform the essential functions of a job under the ADA. 65 However, this
rule has only been distinguished in reported federal cases, never fol-
lowed.66 Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey 67 declared
that state prisons are state entities subject to the requirements of Title 11
of the ADA,68 and that entities operating as extensions of state power are
subject to Title I unless state immunity would apply.69
In 1999, there appeared to be a shift in Supreme Court decisions,
significantly narrowing the protections of the ADA.70  However,
Olmstead v. L. C.7 found that under Title II of the ADA it is appropriate
to place people with mental disabilities in community-based settings
when such placement is deemed appropriate by the state's treatment pro-
fessionals. 72 The Court required that the State of Georgia provide these
60. Center & linparato, supra note 13, at 325-26.
61. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
62. Id. at 637.
63. 136 Cong. Rec. S. 9684 (1990).
64. 526 U.S. 795 (1999).
65. Id. at 798-99.
66. A Shepard's report was run using LEXIS on January 17, 2005.
67. Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 210.
68. Id. at 210.
69. Laurence Paradis, Symposium: Development in Disability Rights: Title 11 of the Americans
with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act: Making Programs, Services and
Activities Accessible to All, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 389, 395 (2003).
70. See infra notes 79, 80 and 81.
71. 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
72. Id. at 607.
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alternatives to institutionalization so long as the costs remain reason-
able.73
There have been a few very narrow decisions that have upheld ADA
protection in highly disputed cases since 1999. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Mar-
tin74 was decided after Sutton and its sibling cases, but it reflects a more
expansive reading of the ADA. It required that the PGA allow Casey
Martin to ride in a golf cart rather than walk the course during PGA tour-
naments.75 The Court held that riding does not fundamentally alter the
nature of the game and must be allowed to accommodate the disabled
under Title 111.76 The ruling was so specific that it is unclear what sort of
fact patterns would be governed by this precedent."
Abbott, Policy Management Systems Corp., Yeskey, and Martin
generally indicate a desire by the Supreme Court to protect those they
perceive as being truly disadvantaged, a group that seems to be limited in
these later cases to those without the ability to see, hear or walk.78 How-
ever, the inconsistency in applying the original intent of Congress in en-
acting the ADA has created a patchwork of rules resulting in actual and
perceived inequity in the judicial treatment of different groups of dis-
abled people.
2. The Sutton Trio
Three related cases, Sutton v. United Airlines, 7 Murphy v. U.P.S. 0
and Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg8 l(the "Sutton Trio"), decided on the
same day in 1999, further limited the protections afforded by the ADA.
Sutton v. United Airlines held that in order to determine if an individual
is disabled within the meaning of the ADA, it is important to take into
account any corrective measures the individual with the impairment em-
ploys.8 2 Therefore, individuals who are able to correct their vision to
20/20 or better with eyeglasses are not to be considered disabled.83 In a
similar manner, Murphy relied on Sutton to conclude that the petitioner's
high blood pressure could not be considered a disability when he was
taking medication that effectively controlled it. 84 Kirkinburg, the third
case of the Sutton Trio, concluded that cases questioning the existence of
73. Id. at 587.
74. 532 U.S. 661 (2001).
75. Id. at 661-62.
76. Id. at 690.
77. David A. Monaghan, Title III of the ADA Allows a Qualified Disabled Entrant to Use a
Motorized Cart on the Professional Golf Tour: PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 40 DUQ. L. REv. 403, 425
(2002).
78. Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 195.
79. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
80. 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
81. 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
82. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.
83. Id. at 481.
84. Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521.
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a disability must be examined on a case-by-case basis regarding whether
an individual is impaired in any major life activities.85
There are two significant problems with these three decisions. First,
the Supreme Court has reinforced an "objective" medical standard for
disability.86 Second, "disabilities" that are correctable by device or
medication do not qualify as protected disabilities under the ADA.87
This rule was promulgated as a rejection of the claim that correctable
vision constitutes a protected disability. 88 Although Justice Scalia re-
jected the inclusion of correctable vision problems as overly broad,89
Justice Ginsburg took a more nuanced approach, noting that "[Plersons
whose uncorrected eyesight is poor, or who rely on daily medication for
their well-being, can be found in every social and economic class; they
do not cluster among the politically powerless, nor do they coalesce as
historical victims of discrimination. ' 90
Thus the Supreme Court has interpreted the purpose of the ADA in
the context of its goal to protect the "disabled" as an insular minority
characterized by political and economic disadvantage.
3. Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Williams
91
In Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Williams, respondent Ella Wil-
liams claimed that her employer, Toyota, had violated Title I of the ADA
by not providing a reasonable accommodation for her claimed disability,
which included the inability to hold her arms at shoulder height for hours
at a time.92 Toyota successfully argued that the claimed disability only
prevented Ms. Williams from performing the sort of manual labor re-
quired for her job and would not constitute a substantial disability with
regard to a broad range of jobs.93  Significantly, the Court issued a
unanimous decision.94
The key question before the Court was whether the inability to per-
form manual tasks that are not necessarily encountered in daily living,
85. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. at 556.
86. See Pendo I, supra note 31, at 1214; David Wasserman, Stigma Without Impairment:
Demedicalizing Disability Discrimination, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING
IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 146, 149 (Leslie Pickering Francis
& Anita Silvers eds., Routledge 2000) [hereinafter Wasserman].
87. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488.
88. Id. at 487-88.
89. Wasserman, supra note 86, at 146.
Justice Scalia removed his glasses and waved them in the air. He was making the point
that if mitigation were ignored, he, along with millions of other Americans, would be
swept into the category of "disabled," swelling its ranks far beyond the 43 million recog-
nized by Congress when it adopted the statute ....
Id.
90. Id. at 147.
91. 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
92. Id. at 189.
93. Id. at 200.
94. Id. at 184.
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but are required in some jobs, "substantially limits" a "major life activ-
ity." 95 If not, Ms. Williams could not be considered a "qualified individ-
ual with a disability" for the purposes of the ADA.96 What is clear from
the opinion is that the Court presumptively considers substantial impair-
ments of the major life activities of walking, seeing and hearing as the
clearest indications that a person is qualified to make a disability claim
under Title 1. 97 In quoting the DHHS regulations for the Rehabilitation
Act defining "major life activities" which include such relevant catego-
ries as "performing manual tasks," the Court singles out "walking, see-
ing, [and] hearing." 98 The Court seems to be seeking a bright line test for
eligibility, and blindness, deafness and the inability to walk provide a
clear standard.
In stark contrast, the description of carpal tunnel syndrome from
which the respondent suffered seems to trivialize the diagnosis without
regard to her specific condition. 99 The Court reiterates its claim that
Congress limited the ADA's scope to the 43 million it considered dis-
abled.100 If only those unable to see, hear or walk are presumptively dis-
abled under the ADA and thus protected by Title I, then the number of
those considered disabled in 1990 would only have been approximately
3.22 million.'0 ' Clearly, Congress intended to protect a broader class of
people. Even so, Sutton and the other cases from the 1999 term had nar-
rowed the scope of ADA coverage to the extent that no Justice dissented
to the similar standard proposed in Williams.
0 2
95. Id. at 196.
96. Id. at 191.
97. See id. at 191-96.
98. Id. at 195.
99. Id. at 199.
While cases of severe carpal tunnel syndrome are characterized by muscle atrophy and
extreme sensory deficits, mild cases generally do not have either of these effects and cre-
ate only intermittent symptoms of numbness and tingling. Studies have further shown
that, even without surgical treatment, one quarter of carpal tunnel cases resolve in one
month, but that in 22 percent of cases, symptoms last for eight years or longer .... Given
these large potential differences in the severity and duration of the effects of carpal tunnel
syndrome, an individual's carpal tunnel syndrome diagnosis, on its own, does not indi-
cate whether the individual has a disability within the meaning of the ADA.
Id.
100. Id. at 197.
101. According to Chiang, Bassi & Javitt there were 1,103,600 legally blind Americans in
1990. Prevalence of Vision Impairment: National Estimates, at Lighthouse International: Statistics
on Vision Impairment, at http://www.lighthouse.org/vision-impairment.prevalenceolder.htm (last
viewed Oct. 10, 2004). In 1990, 552,000 Americans were unable to hear or understand speech.
Prevalence and Characteristics of Persons with Hearing Trouble: United States, 1990-1991: Series
10: Data from the National Health Survey, No. 188, at Table C, available at U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, http:/Iwww.cdc.gov/nchs/datalsefies/sr_10/srIO_188.pdf (Mar. 1994).
There are 1,564,000 people in the United States using wheelchairs. National Health Interview
Survey on Disability (NHIS-D)for 1994, at Table 1, available at National Center for Health Statis-
tics, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/about/major/nhisdis/ad292tbl.htm (last viewed Oct. 10, 2004).
102. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 184.
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4. Chevron v. Echazabal
10 3
The second major ADA case of the October 2001 term is Chevron
v. Echazabal. Like Williams, it was a unanimous decision and reinforced
the narrowing of ADA protection.' °4 However, instead of raising the
standard for disability qualification, Echazabal gives employers greater
latitude to fire or deny employment on paternalistic grounds.
05 That is,
if the employer determines that employment poses a risk to the disabled
employee, it has discretion to dismiss the employee.
10 6  Mr. Echazabal
was diagnosed with a liver disease which could have been exacerbated
by continued employment at a Chevron petrochemical refinery.
0 7 Upon
the advice of his doctor, Mr. Echazabal determined that his potential
health risk was minimal and decided to continue in his job.
0 8 Chevron
fired Mr. Echazabal due to the potential risk to his health on the basis of
EEOC regulations which were interpreted to allow a threat-to-self de-
fense. 1°9
Echazabal created a new catch-22 for people with disabilities.
While it had been earlier decided that qualified persons with disabilities
who require accommodations are not afforded ADA protection if such
accommodations are not reasonable (i.e. demonstrating disability status
provides grounds for dismissal or failure to hire),"
l0 employers may also
terminate or fail to hire a person whose disability poses a potential risk to
him or herself even if no accommodation is requested."' While the
ADA was enacted to prevent employer paternalism in the form of dis-
crimination, the Court reasoned that the threat-to-self defense reflected a
different and acceptable form of paternalism. 
112
This decision is problematic to the extent that it is at odds with the
goals of integration and self-determination, but it provides a bright line
rule to protect employers who would assume known risks to employees,
particularly when such personal injury risk might not be waivable. The
unanimity of the Court implies that it is willing to allow paternalism in
the name of judicial efficiency so long as it does not appear overly dis-
criminatory.
103. 536 U.S. 73 (2002).
104. Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 73.
105. D. Aaron Lacy, Am I My Brother's Keeper: Disabilities, Paternalism, and Threats to Self,
44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 55, 84-85 (2003).
106. Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 74-75.
107. Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc., 226 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2000).
108. Echazabal, 226 F.3d at 1065.
109. Id.
110. Sch. Bd. Of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 (1987) (finding that tuberculosis
qualifies as a "handicap" under the Rehabilitation Act but that the threat of contagion could disqual-
ify an individual from protection).
Ill. Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 86.
112. Id. at 85.
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5. U.S. Airways v. Barnett113
U.S. Airways v. Barnett addresses the conflict between seniority hir-
ing systems and requests for accommodation. Mr. Barnett was a bag-
gage handler for U.S. Airways until he injured his back. 1 4 He was then
transferred to a mail room position within the company for a period of
time.' 5 However, U.S. Airways decided to make the position available
through its seniority system.11 6 Barnett requested to stay in the position
as a reasonable accommodation of his disability." 7 U.S. Airways argued
that circumventing a seniority system negotiated with labor was not a
reasonable accommodation and fired Barnett. 18 The Court agreed that
this was a valid, though rebuttable, presumption. 19
The most troubling fact in the case is that Barnett's position in U.S.
Airways' mailroom was not a vacant position that the company needed
to fill. 20 Barnett's only request for accommodation was to remain in the
position to which he had been transferred.12 ' However, the rule given by
the Court does give employees with disabilities the opportunity to over-
come the presumption by showing "special circumstances" that make
disregarding a seniority system a reasonable accommodation. 22
The dissents to key portions of the decision are quite different. Jus-
tice Scalia's dissent, in which Justice Thomas joins, rejects the Court's
rule that allows a case-by-case analysis even though it creates a presump-
tion in favor of employers. 23 Justice Souter's dissent is joined by Justice
Ginsburg, and it rejects the notion that seniority rules ought to be insu-
lated from the ADA requirement for reasonable accommodations.1 24 Not
surprisingly, these reactions seem to reflect the expected policy prefer-
ences of the Justices. 25 While Barnett does not fully resolve the compe-
tition between seniority systems and the ADA, it does not represent the
kind of clear erosion of disability rights seen in Sutton or Williams.
113. U.S. Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002).





119. Id. at 406.
120. Id. at 423.
121. Id. at 391,423.
122. Id. at 405.
123. Id. at 419-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 423-24 (Souter, J., dissenting).
125. See generally Youngsik Lim, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Justices' Deci-
sionmaking, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 721 (2000), and Frederick Schauer, Lecture: Incentives, Reputation
and the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial Behavior, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 615 (2000).
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6. Tennessee v. Lane
126
The most recent Supreme Court case addressing the ADA is Ten-
nessee v. Lane. The respondents, George Lane and Beverly Jones, are
both paraplegics who use wheelchairs. 127 Lane crawled up two flights of
stairs to make an appearance to respond to criminal charges in a court-
house that had no elevator.' 28 When he returned for a hearing, he refused
either to crawl or be carried to the courtroom and was arrested and jailed
for failure to appear. 129  Beverly Jones, a certified court reporter who
relied on access to courtrooms for her livelihood and was unable to gain
access to a number of county courthouses, joined in the action challeng-
ing the State of Tennessee pursuant to Title II of the ADA.
130
Tennessee moved to dismiss the suit at the District Court level on
the grounds of Eleventh Amendment immunity. 31 The District Court
denied the motion, and Tennessee appealed the decision to the Sixth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals. 32 The Sixth Circuit ultimately affirmed the denial
of dismissal on due process grounds. 33 Since the Supreme Court had
ruled in Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett34 that states were im-
mune from Title I liability despite equal protection concerns, some
commentators expected Eleventh Amendment immunity to be extended
to all Title II suits. 35 However, in a 5-4 decision drafted by Justice Ste-
vens, the Supreme Court ruled that the fundamental right to court access
is a valid justification for Congress' enactment of Title II pursuant to its
authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.'
36
The Court applied the two-part test adopted in Kimel v. Florida Bd.
of Regents137 that requires Congress to unequivocally express its intent to
126. Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004).
127. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1982.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1983.
130. Lane v. Tennessee, 315 F.3d 680, 683 (6th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Lane II].
131. Lane 1I, 315 F.3d at 682.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 683. The Circuit Court of Appeals indicates the absence of a factual record in the
District Court opinion. Id.
134. 527 U.S. 356, 364 (2001). Garrett raised the question of the constitutionality of Title I of
the ADA to the extent that it regulates state governments. Id. This ruling relied on a strong interpre-
tation of the II th Amendment according to Ruth Colker & Adam Milani, Garrett, Disability and
Federalism: A Symposium on Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett: The Post-Garrett World:
Insufficient State Protection Against Disability Discrimination, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1075, 1077-81
(2002).
135. See Bazelon Center for Mental Health Press Release, Supreme Court to Review Americans
with Disabilities Act: Ruling Could Shield States from Anti-Discrimination Suits, at
http:f/www.bazelon.orglnewsroon/1 1-12-03tennv_lane.htm (Jan. 15, 2004); see Memphis Center
for Independent Living Journal, Tennessee v. Lane Oral Arguments: Why Are the Civil Rights of
People with Disabilities a "States Rights" Issue? (stating comments made by disability rights advo-
cates prior to oral arguments for Lane), at http:/lwww.mcil.org/mcilllog2004/O11504sa.asp (Jan. 15,
2004) [hereinafter MCIL].
136. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1994. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. art. XIV, § 5.
137. 528 U.S. 62,73 (2000).
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abrogate state immunity and act pursuant to valid constitutional authority
in rejecting the Eleventh Amendment challenge. 38 Title II itself consti-
tuted unequivocal intent to abrogate immunity, 39 but the question of
valid authority implicated the test in City of Boerne v. Flores,140 which
sets out the standard for permissible remedial legislation in these cases.
The rule allows remedial legislation so long as it is "congruen[t] and
proportional[]" to the threatened injury. 14 1 Given the history and pattern
of discrimination against the disabled and the compelling interest in a
fundamental due process right, the Supreme Court upheld Title II with
regard to states at least in cases involving access to courts.142 It is notclear whether Title H is enforceable against states in other settings. 143
Although Lane is primarily an Eleventh Amendment case, it does
have broader implications for other categories of ADA litigation. It has
sent a signal to the disability rights community that the ADA has not
become a dead letter yet. 44 The majority in Lane includes those Justices
who are typically considered the more liberal members of the Court (Jus-
tices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer), along with Justice
O'Connor, and seems to represent a shift away from the trend toward
narrowing the scope of the ADA, at least with respect to the due process
right to court access. 145 However, it is not clear whether this rule will
apply to Title II suits under any other circumstances.' 46 Such a specific
carve-out may not contribute to greater predictability and efficiency in
ADA litigation, but it does represent a response to facts that demon-
strated an extreme case of the sorts of indignity people with disabilities
have been subjected to in this country-with limited or no legal recourse.
As the clear deciding vote, Justice O'Connor's position is almost cer-
tainly a reaction to this extreme sort of indignity. While not a formalist
in the sense of more conservative members of the Court, among her col-
leagues, Justice O'Connor is among the most consistent supporters of
states' rights. 147 Thus, her decision to abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity in this case indicates a competing, more important value.
Justices Thomas and Kennedy join Chief Justice Rehnquist in his
dissent.148 In it they dispute the majority's conclusions in applying the
138. Id.
139. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1983.
140. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
141. Id. at 520.
142. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1993-94.
143. Id. at 1992-93.
144. See Bazelon Center for Mental Health Press Release, Supreme Court Decides Tennessee
v. Lane and Jones, Upholds Civil Rights Protections for People with Disabilities, at
http://www.bazelon.org/newsroom/5-17-041anedecision.htm (May 17, 2004).
145. See id.
146. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1992-93.
147. See Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85
GEo. L.J. 491, 548-49 (1997) [hereinafter Klarman 11.
148. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1997 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Boerne test as reaffirmed in Garrett.149 On the sole basis of formalism,
the argument is likely more consistent with Eleventh Amendment juris-
prudence than the majority position. Justice Scalia's dissent'
50 objects to
the "congruence and proportionality test" generally as a "flabby" test.
15
His concerns are characteristically both pragmatic and textual.
E. The Definition of Disability in the ADA
Disability, as with all categories of disadvantage, contains a wide
variety of expressions. There is cause, time of onset, expected duration,
the severity of impact, the type of impairment and recognizabil-
ity/unrecognizability. 152 These are all valid categories that help to define
with particularity the nature of a given disability. Presumably the spec-
trum of disadvantage ranges from the involuntary, permanent and severe
to the voluntary, temporary and mild. Notably, time of onset and recog-
nizability do not fit neatly within this gradient because they vary depend-
ing on the details of a person's experience and are thus more subjective.
Although there may be inconsistency in the way the ADA is applied
to different groups, the statute itself does not inquire as to the cause or
time of onset of the disability.' 53 Severity and type of disability have
been used as thresholds for recovery. 154 As mentioned earlier, those with
correctable vision problems do not have a claim under the ADA.
155 Al-
though recognizability would play a significant role in determining dis-
crimination cases based on stigma, this factor tends merely to contribute
to the threshold analysis in recent cases.'
5 6
1. Impairment versus Stigma, the Medical versus the Social Model
There are entire classes of people who are stigmatized but do not
have a physical or mental impairment. The impairment classification is
the product of statistics (a characteristic such as height or weight which
is two standard deviations from the mean) or medical pathology.1 57 Dis-
abilities related to height and weight are raised in numerous articles cri-
tiquing the ADA. 158 For example, a boy who produces normal amounts
of growth hormone and is very short, but not so short that he would be
considered to have an impairment based on statistics, might suffer the
same discrimination as a child with a hormonal deficiency, but it is not
149. Id. at 2005-06.
150. Id. at 2007 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 2008.
152. See Wasserman, supra note 86, at 148-52.
153. See id. at 147.
154. Id. at 147-48.
155. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482-83.
156. See Pendo I, supra note 31, at 1224-25.
157. Wasserman, supra note 86, at 149.
158. See Christopher J. Martin, Protecting Overweight Workers Against Discrimination: Is
Disability or Appearance the Real Issue?, 20 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 133 (1994); see also Post, supra
note 39, at 1.
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likely that he would be protected under the ADA. This is an area of in-
justice which intuitively might seem to merit protection under the ADA
but does not as it is currently interpreted. This is the situation for many
groups who suffer systematic discrimination due to social stigma rather
than as a direct cause of impairment.
59
Although the discussion of stigma raises serious questions of jus-
tice, it seems to address the issue of discrimination generally, rather than
disability as it is commonly understood. The ADA was never intended
to protect all people from all forms of discrimination. Even so, its lan-
guage and legislative history make it clear that Congress intended to ad-
dress disability as a social construct-not simply as a medical phenome-
non.
160
2. A Different Standard for States: Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Title II of the ADA expressly prohibits discrimination by state and
local governments on the basis of disability with regard to employment,
public programs, activities, and services. 161 In Garrett, the Supreme
Court struck down the provisions of Title I with regard to state govern-
ments as a violation of the Eleventh Amendment, a federalism provision
granting states immunity to federal claims brought by private parties. 162
This case is consistent with a series of cases decided over the past twelve
years that have breathed new life into the Tenth and Eleventh Amend-
ments.163 This reinvigorated federalism has reasserted the sovereignty of
states and has limited previously accepted federal power over certain
local issues. 64 It is unlikely that the ADA would have been found un-
constitutional on these grounds at the time of its adoption. There is no
significant debate that Congress intended for the rights of the disabled to
improve access to employment and freedom from discrimination to have
greater significance than state interests in discriminating.' 65  However,
the application of Eleventh Amendment immunity results in the denial of
Title I protection for disabled employees of state governments, including
instrumentalities of state governments.
A major factor underlying this result is that state discrimination on
the basis of disability receives only rational basis review under the Equal
159. Wasserman, supra note 86, at 148-50.
160. THE ADA OF 1989 Cal. No. 216: COMM. ON LABOR AND HUMAN RES., S. REP. No. 101-
115, at 15-16 (1989).
161. 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (2004).
162. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363 ('The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." (quoting U.S. CONST.
amend. XI)).
163. Note, The Irrational Application of Rational Basis: Kimel, Garrett, and Congressional
Power to Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity, 114 HARv. L. REv. 2146, 2147 (2001).
164. William Claiborne, Supreme Court Rulings Fuel Fervor of Federalists, WASH. POST, June
28, 1999 at A2.
165. See generally Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1978.
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Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;166 therefore, discrimi-
nation is constitutional as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose. 67 Because such classifications are generally con-
stitutional, and because Congressional action abrogating state immunity
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment must be congruent and
proportional to a constitutional violation, 168 it is difficult (though as Lane
demonstrates, not impossible) for Congress to bar state-sanctioned dis-
ability-based discrimination. While the ADA claims constitutional au-
thority under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution and the Fifteenth
Amendment, the Supreme Court has rejected this claim to the extent that
legislation infringes on the legitimate authority of the states unless there
has been a clear demonstration of discrimination by states themselves
providing a specific due process justification. 6
9 The Supreme Court has
ruled that this is not the case with Title I of the ADA.
70
Garrett exempts states from suits brought under the employment
provisions of Title I, but it does not address the question of liability un-
der Title II. At least one federal circuit court has found that the rule in
Garrett would apply to Title H1 claims. 7 1 While this is reasonable with
regard to Garrett, a similar Supreme Court ruling applicable to Title II
could have completely invalidated the title. Thus with one relatively
narrow ruling on the basis of federalism, the Court paved the way for
completely gutting Title II. Since the disabled rely heavily on programs,
activities, and services largely administered by state governments, strik-
ing down Title H would have a profound impact on the disabled by re-
moving the one direct cause of action against states they currently have
based on discrimination. 172 Although Lane saved Title H from extinc-
tion, it only found a constitutional basis for Title H in the very narrow
issue of access to courts.
3. The Catch-22 of Employment Cases
For those who are not employed by states or state entities, Title I
claims may still be brought; however, these claims have been mostly
unsuccessful when litigated. 73 Statistics on cases brought under the
ADA are not necessarily indicative of the strength of the Act unless they
include data on cases that are settled through administrative channels or
166. Michael H. Gottesman, Disability, Federalism and a Court with an Eccentric Mission, 62
OHIO ST. L.J. 31, 106 (2001).
167. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1976).
168. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 520.
169. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 80-83 (2000).
170. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 80-83.
171. U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
172. National Council on Disability, Policy Briefing Paper: Tennessee v. Lane: The Legal
Issues and the Implications for People with Disabilities, September 4, 2003 at
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroor/publications/200311egalissues.htm (Sept. 4, 2003).
173. See SUSAN MEZEY, DISABLING INTERPRETATIONS: THE ADA IN FEDERAL COURTS
(forthcoming U. of Pittsburgh Press 2005) [hereinafter MEZEY].
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otherwise prior to litigation. 114 That said, Title U cases tend to be moresuccessful than Title I cases when litigated.'
The problem that has arisen is that plaintiffs must show actual dis-
ability in the form of physical impairment even with correction by medi-
cation or device in order to make a claim under Title I, but once they
have established that claim, employers are allowed to terminate employ-
ees because they do not have the requisite physical ability or qualifica-
tion. 176 Thus, an employee is forced to "emphasiz[e] all the things he or
she cannot do in order to claim ADA protection, and then, once through
the courthouse door, [downplay] limitations in order to prove he or she is
qualified for the job."'177
As a practical matter, it would seem that employers will take advan-
tage of this inconsistency whenever possible. Plaintiffs are effectively
insulated from this rule only in cases where the claim is based on a
clearly identifiable condition traditionally associated with physical,
rather than developmental, disabilities such as blindness, hearing im-
pairment, paraplegia, etc. Based on repeated references by the Court to
these three categories, 178 it is likely that judges are likely to presume
ADA protection for those who have paradigmatic disabilities such as
blindness, deafness or paraplegia even if the discrimination suffered is no
different than that suffered by those who do not have such impairments.
II. PHILOSOPHICAL PARADIGMS
ADA cases and their complex patchwork of rules are in some meas-
ure the result of conflicting philosophical paradigms. 179 Here, philoso-
phy generally means ethics in the broad sense of identifying and making
choices that promote "the good. 1 80 Though similar, it is distinct from
morals, which are narrower, more personal, and less concerned with
teleology.1 8 Undoubtedly, the Court must give a nod to formalism by
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. See Anita Silvers, The Unprotected: Constructing Disability in the Context of Antidis-
crimination Law, in THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE
LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 126, 129 (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds.,
Routledge 2000).
177. Arlene Mayerson & Matthew Diller, The Supreme Court's Nearsighted View of the ADA,
in THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR
INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 124, 124-25 (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds.,
Routledge 2000).
178. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1978 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 195;
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 502.
179. See generally Laura F. Rothstein, Reflections on Disability Discrimination Policy-25
Years, 22 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L. REV. 147 (2000); see generally Elizabeth A. Pendo, Substan-
tially Limited Justice?: The Possibilities and Limits of a New Rawlsian Analysis of Disability-Based
Discrimination, 234 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 225 (2004) [hereinafter Pendo 11].
180. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED 1698 (Merriam-
Webster Inc. 1993) (defining "philosophy" as "the study of the principles of human nature and
conduct.").
181. Id. at 1468 (defining "morals" as "based on inner conviction.").
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providing a precedential basis for its decisions. However, after Bush v.
Gore'82 it is impossible to deny that Supreme Court decisions reflect the
underlying values of the individual Justices. 183 While it is simple enough
to categorize the basis for decisions as partisan, the ADA cases seem to
indicate that competing ethical systems may motivate the decisions of
individual Justices differently in different cases. We would expect these
sorts of decisions to be more likely in cases on the margins, those with
facts that are shocking or unusual. Clearly there is a tension between the
judicial impulse to create coherent and consistent rules that are predict-
able and efficient and the impulse to provide just solutions within the
framework of legal tradition.
A. The ADA as an Expression of Rawlsian Justice
The ADA was drafted in the shadow of Title VII and related civil
rights legislation and addressed questions of distributive justice that may
be understood within the context of the philosophy of John Rawls
1 84
The philosophy of John Rawls is most thoroughly described in his A
Theory of Justice.185  Rawls posits that justice must fundamentally be
fairness. 186  He proposes that rational persons not knowing the circum-
stances into which they were born would choose a system in which they
would be in the best possible position if they were born into disadvan-
tage. 187  That is, if we knew that we might be born into a marginalized
group, whether discriminated 'against on the basis of class, race, ethnic-
ity, gender, religion, orientation or disability, we would choose a system
that would provide opportunities comparable to those who were not dis-
advantaged. The ADA attempts to move closer to such a system in its
combination of antidiscrimination and accommodation provisions.
182. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). For a more detailed discussion of the competing paradigms see Jack
M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 YALE L.J. 1407, 1441-
1458 (2001).
183. See generally Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore through the Lens of Constitutional His-
tory, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1721 (2001) [hereinafter Klarman III.
184. See generally Pendo II, supra note 179.
185. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press rev. 1999) [hereinafter Rawls I] (It is significant that the ADA received support as an expres-
sion of distributive justice in the classical liberal tradition. Rawls posited that fair legal rules can be
developed as a social contract negotiated from the "initial position." Id. at 10-11. The initial posi-
tion is a notion similar to the classical "state of nature;" however, it is an artificial position that
requires ignoring the actual state of privilege and/or disadvantage into which one is born. Id. It
assumes that one cannot make a fair decision regarding the distribution of social goods knowing a
priori what advantages or disadvantages he or she will actually be born into. Id. So, in order to
negotiate a fair social contract, we make distributive decisions pretending not to know. Id. This is
called the "veil of ignorance." Id. at 118-23. As opposed to some other theories of social contract,
Rawls' veil of ignorance is thick in that it denies knowledge of any details of life such as gender,
race, ethnicity, intelligence, health, disability, orientation, etc. Id. Presuming human rationality and
risk aversion, Rawls assumes that a person in the original position reasoning behind the veil of
ignorance will choose to live in the best possible situation if born into disadvantage even if it means
sacrificing economic or social privilege if born into advantage.). Id.
186. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT xvi (Erin Kelley ed., 2001) [here-
inafter Rawls I].
187. See generally RAWLS I, supra note 185.
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While this ethical system is reflected in the Act itself and its implement-
ing regulations, justice as fairness has not been a clear ethical basis for
Supreme Court decisions interpreting the ADA, except perhaps in Abbott
and Martin. In both cases, the Court seems to be motivated to provide
equal access for those considered disabled by combating irrational dis-
crimination or by providing reasonable accommodations, respectively.188
The power of Rawls's theory of justice is most significant with re-
gard to the ADA in creating a consensus regarding policy goals. To that
extent, "justice as fairness" analysis ought to be used in any reconsidera-
tion of the goals of the ADA. 189 However, it is not as useful in develop-
ing rules that efficiently achieve those policy goals. While the ADA
should be scrutinized to discover whether it has achieved the goals set
out by Congress, failure to achieve those goals efficiently demands re-
considering the legal mechanisms of the ADA-not the goals of the
ADA.
B. The Role of Standpoint Theory
Standpoint theory is largely a product of feminist theory, but it has
been adapted by a number of marginalized groups, including people with
disabilities. 190 The core ethical insights of this philosophy are that the
disadvantaged are in the best position to observe and judge the relative
justice or injustice of a system.'9' Concomitant to these ideas is the no-
tion that the disadvantaged ought to have a privileged position in modify-
ing systems in order to make them more just. 192 This position is not nec-
essarily in conflict with a Rawlsian view, which requires that rational
people at least consider what it would be like to be disadvantaged. The
difference is that the Rawlsian social contract is the product of a thought
experiment: "What would life be like if I were disabled, poor, etc.?"
Within standpoint theory, notions of justice are actually defined by the
disadvantaged themselves.
To the extent that the ADA was influenced by the contributions of
people with disabilities (such as Senator Robert Dole), it may be consid-
ered a product of standpoint theory. Since none of the sitting Justices
would likely consider themselves to be disabled, their decisions are
unlikely to be the product of standpoint theory from the point of view of
the disabled. However, some of the Justices admit a high regard for the
view of the disadvantaged even if they are not members of that particular
class. This group would likely include Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter,
188. See Abbott, 524 U.S. at 637; Martin, 532 U.S. at 661-62 (2001).
189. See infra Part V for a detailed discussion.
190. Mahowald, supra note 17 at 211.
191. Id. at 209.
192. Id. at 209-10.
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and Stevens. 193  Some commentators would also characterize Justice
O'Connor as a feminist.
194
Standpoint theory should be considered in any evaluation or revi-
sion of the ADA. Views of the disabled must be considered in the analy-
sis of raw employment data. Empirical studies should be designed to
compare experiences of discrimination and well-being since the enact-
ment of the ADA and similar state provisions. Also, in refining our pol-
icy approach to the antidiscrimination and participation goals of the
ADA, the voices of people with disabilities must be seriously considered.
This is also true in a Rawlsian analysis of the ADA.
C. Pragmatism in Narrowing Coverage
All nine members of the Court are driven by pragmatic concerns for
judicial consistency and clarity to varying degrees.195 The fact that im-
portant cases limiting ADA protection such as Williams were decided
unanimously 196 seems to indicate a concern for efficiency over fairness in
individual circumstances. From Sutton onward, the Court has denied
protection to people who might otherwise be considered disabled be-
cause it views the class of qualified persons with disabilities as necessar-
ily limited-first, because Congress itself numbered the disabled in the
United States at 43 million' 97 and second, because the costs would be
excessive if ADA protection were given to everyone who wears
glasses' 98 or has carpal tunnel syndrome. 99 This is a position defended
by Justice Scalia as evidenced by his dissent in Lane and his position on
many other ADA cases.'00
Of course, the Court must distinguish between disabilities that cre-
ate major impairments requiring accommodations and those that do not
in order to all6cate limited economic resources. However, broad applica-
tion of the antidiscrimination provisions of the ADA does not necessarily
193. These Justices tend to be considered sympathetic to feminist perspectives at least in part
because of their ruling on abortion rights cases. See, e.g., Patricia Dreher & Mindy Davis, After 30
Years of Roe v. Wade: We Won't Go Back!, at http://www.now.org/nnt/fall-2002/roe.htnl (Jan. 22,
2003). "Four justices who can be counted on to vote for reproductive freedom and against most
restrictions on abortion: Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsberg, David Souter and John Paul Ste-
vens." Id.
194. Michael E. Solimine & Susan E. Wheatley, Rethinking Feminist Judging, 70 IND. L.J.
891, 895 (1995).
195. Klarman II, supra note 183, at 1723.
196. Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 187 (2002).
197. Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471, 484 (1999).
198. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 487.
199. Toyota 534 U.S. at 199.
200. See e.g., PGA Tour v. Martin, 532 U.S. 6661 (2001); Lane, 123 S. Ct. at 3; Wright v.
Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998); Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Veskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998);
Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002); US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002); U.S. v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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impose additional costs on employers. 20 1 Pragmatism, including but not
limited to neoclassical economics, offers powerful analytical tools for
achieving particular goods. However, it is not as helpful in identifying
the justice goals of our society.2 °2
D. Formalism and States' Rights
Formalism is an awkward basis for judicial decision making. On
the one hand, it is the dominant view of the Langdellian revolution in
legal education which still dominates American law schools and influ-
ences many judges.2 °3  On the other hand, legal scholars and average
citizens find it patently obvious that judges make decisions based on
their personal preferences and cloak those decisions with an aura of for-
malism-particularly on the margins and in difficult cases.20 4 That said,
those judges typically considered conservative seem to rely more heavily
on formalism, as in Rehnquist's dissent in Lane.2°5 Critical scholars
might point out that conservative jurists are more likely to rely on for-
malism because it reinforces the status quo, even though that status quo
may be rife with unfairness.
206
One result of formalist decisions in ADA cases is the upholding of
Eleventh Amendment state immunity. This is particularly noticeable in
Garrett, but it is also evident in most Title II cases with the notable ex-
ception of Lane. Although the Court has made it fairly clear that equal
207protection claims will not abrogate state immunity, perhaps Lane will
open the door to state liability under Title II for due process claims other
than the denial of access to the courts.
201. While there are persuasive intuitive arguments that the threat of litigation increases firing
costs, there is empirical evidence indicating that hiring disabled employees can provide businesses
with competitive advantages. Furthermore, accommodations are usually unnecessary and tend to be
inexpensive when they are necessary. See Peter D. Blanck, Studying Disability, Employment Policy
and the ADA, in THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW
FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITTrrIONS 209, 212 (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds.,
Routledge 2000).
202. Pendo I, supra note 31, at 1205-08.
203. See Michael Ariens, Modem Legal Times: Making Professional Legal Culture, 15 J. OF
AM. CULTURE 25, 25-26 (1992).
204. Klarman I, supra note 183, at 1734-35.
205. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1999 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress's failure to
document state due process violations in the legislative record was a formal reason that the majority
opinion in Lane was an invalid exercise of Fourteenth Amendment power).
206. Michael Ashley Stein, Market Failure and ADA Title 1, in THE AMERICANS wITH
DISABILITIES ACT: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS
193, 196 (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds., Routledge 2000) (noting that the status quo
is "designed by an empowered majority that has already absorbed existing prejudices and made them
endogenous to future decision making").
207. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1983; id. at 1997 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice
Rehnquist clarifies that Title I claims based on equal protection grounds would be subject to the
same rational base standard applied to Title I claims in Garrett. Id. at 2004 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissent-
ing).
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E. Virtue Ethics in Reaction to Extremes
Virtue ethics 208 has grown in influence as a reaction to both Kantian
deontology and postmodern fragmentation.2 09 It is teleological in that it
looks toward an ultimate good, which in the case of a legal system would
be justice.21 Virtues21! can be imitated by individuals and are ultimately
reflected within the community. 2  Just individuals contribute to the
creation of a just society. While emulable virtues may come from a vari-
ety of sources, many virtue ethicists rely heavily on the Nicomachean
Ethics of Aristotle, even today.213 A virtue ethics analysis of disability
law is likely to address the facts of legal dispute rather than the rules. If
a result does not seem just, however defined, it is not likely to be just.
This is a possible explanation for Justice O'Connor's decision in Lane,
among other controversial decisions. Forcing a man who cannot walk to
crawl up two flights of stairs for a court appearance has an air of moral
unconscionability. It is the kind of thing that does not occur in a just
society, and no amount of formalistic gymnastics can make it just.
208. Virtue ethics concerns "the virtues themselves, motives and moral character, moral
education, moral wisdom or discernment, friendship and family relationships, a deep concept of
happiness, the role of the emotions in our moral life and the fundamentally important questions of
what sort of person I should be and how we should live." Rosalind Hursthouse, Virtue Ethics, in
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2003/entries
ethics-virtue/#l (last mod. Jul. 18, 2003) [hereinafter Virtue Ethics].
209. Kyron Huigens, Homicide in Aretaic Terms, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 97, 97-99 (2002)
[hereinafter Huigens].
There is a third major tradition in philosophical ethics, rooted in the writings of Aristotle
and revived recently under the name of virtue ethics. The philosophical tradition of virtue
has nothing to do with the rigid adherence to moral duty advocated by conservatives in
our ongoing culture wars. In its proper, technical sense, the word virtue refers to a capac-
ity for sound practical judgment, both on the occasion of action and in the assembly and
maintenance of one's system of ends and standing motivations. Virtue ethics as a phi-
losophical enterprise focuses its inquiry on normative governance at the level of motiva-
tion-as opposed to duty as dictated by reason, or prescriptions for optimal social wel-
fare.
Id.
210.. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 244, 244-55 (U. of Notre Dame Press, 2d ed.
1984) [hereinafter MACINTYRE 1] (discussing how virtues seek to define an "ultimate good," al-
though asserting that individualism can create competing views).
211. Virtue Ethics, supra note 208.
A virtue such as honesty or generosity is not just a tendency to do what is honest or
generous, nor is it to be helpfully specified as a 'desirable' or 'morally valuable'
character trait. It is, indeed a character trait-that is, a disposition which is well
entrenched in its possessor, something that, as we say 'goes all the way down', unlike a
habit such as being a tea-drinker-but the disposition in question, far from being a single
track disposition to do honest actions, or even honest actions for certain reasons, is multi-
track. It is concerned with many other actions as well, with emotions and emotional
reactions, choices, values, desires, perceptions, attitudes, interests, expectations and
sensibilities. To possess a virtue is to be a certain sort of person with a certain complex
mindset.
Id.
212. MACINTYRE I, supra note 210, at 191-193.
213. Virtue Ethics, supra note 208. "[Allmost any modem version [of virtue ethics] still shows
that its roots are in ancient Greek philosophy." Id.
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Alasdair Maclntyre proposes that virtue ethics can define a standard
of care for people with disabilities to which we should aspire. 14 He ar-
gues that this standard ought to inform our legal rules, including the
ADA. 15 Since we all depend upon the care of others, in childhood and
old age at the very least, we ought to be able to discern our obligation to
care for others.216 This, Maclntyre understands in the context of human
interdependence rather than benevolence owed to the unfortunate by the
fortunate.217 Though the goals may be different, the process of rooting a
standard of care in Aristotelian virtues in this case may resemble Rawl-
sian analysis to the extent that it requires one to be other-directed. Of
course, for Rawls this is an act of rational self-interest.
The challenge of legal decisions influenced by virtue ethics is that
they could lead to inconsistent or unintelligible doctrines when applied
only in cases with outrageous facts. This is a plausible explanation for
the patchwork of rules around the ADA, but it might not be the case if
virtue ethics were better integrated into judicial decision making. Per-
haps the most significant problem with relying on virtue ethics in a plu-
ralistic culture such as the United States is that there is little broad con-
sensus regarding what such virtues as justice actually require.
IV. IDENTIFYING VERSUS ACHIEVING THE GOOD
With the increased use of empirical studies by legal scholars and the
growing influence of law and economics on both scholarship and policy,
it is not surprising that a number of studies have been conducted to ob-
jectively measure the impact of the ADA in the lives of the disabled.21 8
Unfortunately, there is serious disagreement about the methodology,
usefulness, and conclusions of these studies.2 19 It is conceivable that the
ADA has created more problems than it has solved; however, even if
there is ultimately a consensus that the ADA has failed, an unlikely and
highly disputed possibility, the failure of particular policy mechanisms
must be distinguished from the goal of achieving social goods (the
lowering of irrational discrimination and providing greater opportunities
for the disabled).
214. Alasdair MacIntyre, The Need for a Standard of Care, in THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 81,
81 (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds., Routledge 2000) [hereinafter Maclntyre II].
215. Id. at 82.
216. Id. at 83.
217. Id. at 84.
218. See generally infra notes 220, 221, 226, 227 and 228.
219. Peter Blanck, Lisa Schur, Douglas Kruse, Susan Schwochau & Chen Song, Calibrating
the Impact of the ADA's Employment Provisions, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 267, 289 (2003) [here-




There are now a number of major empirical studies of the ADA's
impact on employment. Despite the initial optimism following the pass-
ing of the ADA, studies conducted by Thomas DeLier220 and Daron
Acemoglu and Joshua D. Angrist 221 seem to indicate that the ADA actu-
ally resulted in a decline of disabled employment. DeLeir used Survey
of Income and Program Participation ("SIPP") data for men aged eight-
een to sixty-four,222 and Acemoglu and Angrist used Current Population
Survey ("CPS") data for men and women between twenty-one and fifty-
eight years of age.223 DeLeire concludes that the ADA led to a 7.2%
decrease in the probability that a disabled man would be employed start-
ing in 1990, with no corresponding increase in wages. 224 Acemoglu and
Angrist found similar drops in employment probability, but not until
1992.225 The discrepancy in findings raises questions regarding both
methodology and reliability.
Contrary results were reached by John Bound and Timothy Waid-
226 2mann 6 and by Douglas Kruse and Lisa Schur.227 Looking at the same
SIPP and CPS data, these scholars attribute the decline in employment
probability to changes in federal disability benefits and health status.228
Christine Jolls argues that the decline may be accounted for by demon-
strated increases in the rate of disabled adults seeking education and em-
ployment training, presumably with the intention of obtaining new or
better employment. 229 Thus, the drop in the early 1990's was actually a
positive response to the ADA to the extent that those with disabilities
suddenly expected a greater return on investment in human capital.230
There are still a number of problems with these studies. The most
important methodological issue is that the data relied on does not use the
narrow definition for "disabled" from ADA jurisprudence. 231  Further-
220. Thomas DeLeire, The Wage and Employment Effects of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 35 J. HUM. RESOURCES 693, 694 (2000) [hereinafter DeLeire].
221. Daron Acemoglu & Joshua D. Angrist, Consequences of Employment Protection? The
Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 109 J. POL. ECON 915, 917 (2001) [hereinafter Acemo-
glu & Angrist].
222. DeLeire, supra note 220, at 698.
223. Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 221, at 917.
224. Deleire, supra note 220, at 705.
225. Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 221, at 929.
226. JOHN BOUND & TIMOTHY WAIDMANN, ACCOUNTING FOR RECENT DECLINES IN
EMPLOYMENT RATES AMONG THE WORKING-AGED DISABLED (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 7975, 2000).
227. Douglas Kruse & Lisa Schur, Employment of People with Disabilities Following the ADA,
42 INDUS. REL. 31-66 (2003) [hereinafter Kruse & Schur].
228. CHRISTINE JOLLS, IDENTIFYING THE EFFECTS OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
USING STATE-LAW VARIATION: PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE ON EDUCATIONAL PARTICIPATION
EFFECTS I (Am. Law and Econ. Assoc. Ann. Meeting, Working Paper 62, 2004), available at
http://law.bepress.coff/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1078&context=alea [hereinafter JOLLS 1].
229. Id.
230. Id. at 9.
231. Kruse & Schur, supra note 227, at 40-45.
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more, even discounting other external factors, the ADA would have rela-
tively little impact on employment levels in states that had comparable
protections in place before the passage of the ADA.z32
As a partial response to this problem, this paper proposes a new
empirical project to obtain data from those who would clearly qualify as
disabled under the ADA, particularly in states which had no comparable
state antidiscrimination statute before 1990. Ideally the target group
would consist of people who are unable to see, hear or walk, with a likely
presumption of disability under the ADA, from Arkansas, Mississippi
and Alabama (the states without prior protections),233 and between the
ages of thirty-four and sixty (those who would have been of working age
at least two years prior to the passage of the ADA).
B. Discrimination and Accommodation
The employment provisions of the ADA serve both as antidiscrimi-
nation and accommodation measures. 234 Civil rights legislation designed
to combat the effects of irrational discrimination also provided a cause of
action for discriminatory hiring and firing practices as well as granting
hiring preferences.2 35 Given perfect markets, it is true that irrational dis-
crimination ought to disappear because it is not efficient.236 However,
there remains clear evidence of irrational discrimination against people
with disabilities in the labor market.237 So, the ADA and related legisla-
tion effectively provides incentives for employers to overcome discrimi-
nation. These are primarily negative incentives in the form of mandatory
regulatory compliance and the threat of litigation. Accommodation,
however, is a cost borne at least initially by employers, intended to en-
able people with disabilities to compete in terms of worker efficiency.
Ideally, with reasonable accommodations, qualified people with disabili-
ties can compete with non-disabled employees, dispelling assumptions
that might perpetuate irrational discrimination. However, placing the
cost burden on employers could have the unwanted consequence of en-
couraging discrimination.
Christine Jolls argues that antidiscrimination and accommodation
measures in the ADA actually serve overlapping and complementary
roles.238 Legislation intended to lower taste-based discrimination 239 and
232. JOLLS I, supra note 228, at 2.
233. Id. at ll.
234. See Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L.REv. 642, 645
(2001) [hereinafter Jolls II].
235. Id. at 697-98.
236. Gary Becker, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 39-40 (Univ. Chicago Press, 2d ed.
1971) [hereinafter Becker].
237. Marjorie Baldwin & William Johnson, Labor Market Discrimination against Men with
Disabilities, 29 J. HUM. RESOURCES 1, 1-19 (1994).
238. Jolls 1I, supra note 234, at 698.
[C]ertain aspects of antidiscrimination law-in particular its disparate impact branch-
are in fact accommodation requirements. In such instances it is hard to resist the conclu-
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to provide fair opportunities to a historically disadvantaged class must
address the deeper causes of selective unemployment such as the lack of
education and job training.24 ° Ultimately, reasonable accommodation has
been required because it is essential if we are to achieve the goal of equal
participation in society by people with disabilities, in the tradition of the
Rawlsian ideal. Although the cost of reasonable accommodations may
limit the number of people who might otherwise benefit from the antidis-
crimination protection of Title I, accommodations are an essential ele-
ment in overcoming irrational discrimination.24 1
C. Incentives
Historically, the greatest negative incentives in the employment of
the disabled are discrimination and the lack of reasonable accommoda-
tions. There is insufficient incentive to invest in human capital through
education or vocational training if there is no hope for a reasonable re-
turn, particularly if accepting employment requires sacrificing disability
assistance. 242 In response, the ADA creates an accommodation require-
ment and a cause of action against discriminating employers as negative
243incentives to discourage discrimination. Although the antidiscrimina-
tion portion of this policy may be helpful, the accommodation provision
diverts employer resources that could be used to hire qualified people
with disabilities who require little or no accommodation. 244 Employer
costs increase, and the ADA is to blame.
Thus, it is imperative that positive incentives remove some of the
cost burden from employers. The clearest incentives are tax deductions
for the cost of accommodations. 245 To the extent that these are one-time
sunk costs, employers who have made accommodations would have ac-
cess to a broader labor market, including people with disabilities for
which they have already accommodated, making these employers more
competitive. Technological improvements make it more likely that ac-
sion that antidiscrimination and accommodation are overlapping rather than fundamen-
tally distinct categories, despite the frequent claims of commentators to the contrary. The
overlap between the two categories, I suggest, also sheds light on the question of Con-
gress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact laws (such as the
FMLA) that expressly mandate the provision of particular employment benefits directed
toward specific groups of employees.
Id.
239. The economic dynamic of irrational discrimination, a "taste for discrimination," was
described by Gary Becker in The Economics of Discrimination. Becker, supra note 236, at 39-40.
240. See JOLLS I, supra note 228, at 1.
241. Jolls 1I, supra note 234, at 698.
242. Peter Blanck, et al., The Emerging Workforce of Entrepreneurs with Disabilities: Prelimi-
nary Study of Entrepreneurship in Iowa, 85 IOWA L. REv. 1583, 1639-40 (2000) [hereinafter Blanck,
et al. II].
243. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2004).
244. Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 221, at 920-23.
245. 26 U.S.C.A. § 190 (2004).
2004]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
246commodations will be scalable within a business. On the employee
side, positive incentives, including access to education and job training,
are crucial, especially for those who did not invest in human capital be-
fore the ADA. 47
D. The Need for Meaningful Data
Congress has made the goal of combating discrimination and pro-
viding meaningful opportunities for the disabled to participate in the la-
248bor market and society a national goal. This is an acknowledged good
that legislation such as the ADA is intended to achieve. However, there
is no point in enforcing rules that do not further this goal. Detailed stud-
ies on the impact of legal incentives on the employment opportunities of
people with disabilities are critical for modifying current legal rules or
proposing new ones. It is encouraging that a body of literature has de-
veloped in the last four years that takes these issues seriously. However,
if antidiscrimination and inclusion are still national goals, we must con-
sider broadening the protections of the ADA to the extent originally ex-
pressed by Congress. Further studies will help provide a more rational
basis for changes in disability law.
V. BROADENING THE SCOPE OF THE ADA
The enactment of the ADA represented an ethical decision on the
part of Congress to provide greater access, opportunity, and protection to
people with disabilities. The language of the ADA itself makes the
elimination of discrimination a clear national mandate. 249 To the extent
that courts, including the Supreme Court, have limited the application of
the ADA and frustrated this goal, Congress ought to amend the ADA to
create clearer and more efficient rules for countering discrimination
against the disabled. Since discrimination as defined by the Act is rooted
in the social response to the disabled rather than the physical impairment
itself, ADA rules ought to more clearly address the stigma associated
with disability in attempting to reduce irrational discrimination. Any
proposed changes ought to address distributive justice concerns, the
246. Heidi M. Berven and Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the ADA Part I1- Patents and
Innovations in Assistive Technology, 12 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 9, 85-89, 96
(1998).
247. Blanck, et al. L supra note 242, at 286.
248. Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1984 (2004).
249. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2004).
It is the purpose of this chapter-(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national man-
date for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities; (2) to pro-
vide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against in-
dividuals with disabilities; (3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role
in enforcing the standards established in this chapter on behalf of individuals with dis-
abilities; and (4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to
enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address the ma-
jor areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.
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ramifications of increased litigation, state immunity problems and the
catch-22 created by Sutton.
A. Legislation Defining Disability as Stigma
In order to be relevant and effective, the ADA requires significant
changes, drafted within the context of disability law, but which would
unequivocally apply to anyone discriminated against on the basis of so-
cial stigma associated with disability. Such legislation should require
courts to consider the social model originally intended by Congress.
Philosophically, this position emphasizes broader protections from dis-
crimination based on differences that are consistent with a Rawlsian
point of view.
Congress needs to make it clearer that those covered by sections
3(2)(B) and (C) of the current ADA,people with a history of a disability
or perceived as having a disability,2 are intended beneficiaries of this
legislation. There should be clear examples of the kinds of people who
should be protected from discrimination listed in the Congressional Re-
cord---even if their conditions do not constitute a physical impairment
according to the medical model or if their conditions are managed with
drugs such as for epileptics or diabetics. To be absolutely clear, the pro-
posed changes would create a new category consisting of those who are
discriminated against due to the stigma of actual, historic, or perceived
disability. It is unfortunate that judicial activism has circumvented legis-
lative intent to the extent that the plain meaning of a statute is simply
reconstrued 2 but it requires that Congress express its intentions with
greater precision. Since any piece of legislation consists of a bundle of
compromises, this kind of clarity can be difficult to achieve, but the al-
ternative is to cede legislative authority to the courts, which seems to
have happened in ADA cases.
B. Distributive Implications
Broadening the protections of the ADA, or disability legislation in
general, might adversely impact the severely disabled who are among the
powerless described by Justice Ginsburg. With regard to accommoda-
tion, the ADA is an unfunded mandate (with the exception of subsidies
in the form of tax credits) and institutions need only make reasonable
accommodations. Thus, if more employees of a company could make
claims for accommodation, the pool available for the severely disabled as
currently understood would be reduced. It might be argued that that dis-
tribution could be prioritized. However, such an arrangement would
require a bright line test, could default to the current standard of impair-
250. This is true at the very least in the case of 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2)(C) of the ADA which
does not require actual impairment.
251. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2)(B) (2004).
252. Center & Imparato, supra note 13, at 322.
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ment, and would leave few, if any, resources for the newly covered. The
argument that there are limited resources is reinforced by the fact that
even now most challenged claims are denied.253
While these objections have validity with regard to the provisions
that require access to special services or require employers to make ex-
pensive accommodations, it would be possible and appropriate to limit
the scope of the ADA to preventing discrimination for those who make
claims based on stigma alone rather than actual impairment. After all, if
there is no actual impairment, there should be no need for accommoda-
tion. All of the arguments raised rely on the assumption that those pro-
tected by antidiscrimination provisions require accommodations. If we
do not grant accommodation to those claiming discrimination due to
stigma alone, there will be no accommodation costs. As with the Civil
Rights Act, aggressive distributive justice measures like affirmative ac-
tion and accommodations can be handled separately from the core anti-
discrimination provisions even though they serve overlapping functions.
C. Litigation
Drafting statutes requires line-drawing, and it is commonly under-
stood by legislators that bright line standards are most efficient. They
are admittedly arbitrary, but they establish that certain categories of peo-
ple are not intended to be covered. The medical standard typically used
in ADA litigation may appear to be more objective, but it is subjective in
that it requires a physician's opinion. There is significant evidence to
indicate that medical diagnosis fails as a truly objective standard in liti-
254gation. Ultimately, proving stigma may be no more subjective than
proving impairment.
It may be argued that a standard of individual impact due to stigma
would open the courthouse doors to mountains of potential claims by
"short, fat, homely people, ' 255 and that without clear standards, litigation
would become more time consuming and more expensive. There is
probably some truth to this claim. If we expand the protection of the
ADA, there will likely be more litigation. However, it must be noted that
Congress intended to cover those who are perceived to be disabled in the
original ADA, so technically such claims were litigable before. Fur-
thermore, if preventing injurious, unjustified discrimination is a goal of
our justice system, then litigation is an inevitable consequence of legisla-
tion that would further that goal as in the Civil Rights Act.
253. MEZEY, supra note 173.
254. SUSAN WENDELL, THE REJECrED BODY 117-138 (NY: Routledge 1996).
255. Wasserman, supra note 86, at 154.
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D. How to Overcome the Federalism Problem
The issue of federalism is the most problematic for the ADA, as the
response to Lane in both the majority and the dissents may indicate. 6 if
the Supreme Court has determined that Congress has no legal authority
to enact such legislation, then amendments will inevitably fail.
First, the legislative history and preamble to any new legislation
should more clearly document historical patterns of discrimination
against the disabled in both the private and public sectors. If a clear pat-
tern of discrimination is shown, the Court might be more willing to up-
hold restrictions on states as employers under equal protection and due
process rights other than access to courts.
Second, Congress could define qualified disabled persons as mem-
bers of a class requiring stronger protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment. As long as states can discriminate based on any "rational
basis," the current standard, there will be relatively little protection for
the disabled. While Congress may not have the power to designate a
suspect class for purposes of constitutional jurisprudence, the Court is
beginning to analyze discrimination cases on a more individualized basis,
257recommending proportional responses. This is particularly true in
light of Lawrence v. Texas.258 If Congress were to clearly identify pat-
terns of discrimination that justify a stronger federal response, the courts
would be under more pressure to enforce the legislation as written, even
if a new suspect class were not created for Fourteenth Amendment pur-
poses.
E. Solving the Catch-22
Here, distinguishing between stigma, with or without actual im-
pairment, and impairment alone is significant. With regard to discrimi-
nation, the key issue is stigma. The Supreme Court may have been rea-
sonable in concluding that those who have relatively minor correctable
vision problems are not "disabled" in the sense intended by the ADA.
Actual impairment still raises valid issues of accommodation and access,
256. MCIL, supra note 135.
This case is important not just because it threatens to gut the ADA, preventing millions of
people with disabilities from enforcing their rights, but also because it is the latest attack
in an aggressive campaign by extremist conservatives in recent years to weaken federal
civil rights protections for all Americans, under the notion of states' rights," said Nancy
Zirkin, deputy director and director of public policy at the Leadership Conference on
Civil Rights, a leading national civil rights coalition.
Id.
257. See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306 (2003).
258. Calvin Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
945, 996 (2004). The Court in Lawrence overturned the state power to criminalize sodomy estab-
lished in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) on due process grounds. While the standard
used by the Court does not resemble intermediate or strict scrutiny, neither does it appear to be a
simple rational basis standard. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571-579 (2003).
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and those cases could be litigated under different auspices than pure dis-
crimination claims. If someone with hypertension or diabetes is -stigma-
tized in some way, then they should receive protection from discrimina-
tion based on that stigma whether the condition is corrected by medica-
tion or not. If an employer makes irrational decisions based on preju-
dices regarding a person's health and perceived disability, there should
be a remedy under the ADA as originally drafted. The fact that a condi-
tion is correctable by prosthesis, device or medication does nothing to
eliminate the irrational bias and discrimination. Separating distributive
justice measures linked with impairment and antidiscrimination concerns
associated with stigma would eliminate the catch-22 in those cases in
which it seems most illogical.
VI. CONCLUSION
Our comprehensive approach to disability must distinguish between
cases that address functional issues of access based on impairment and
discrimination issues based on stigma. This would return us to the social
model apparently intended by Congress, at least with regard to discrimi-
nation cases, and would mitigate the catch-22 problem.z59
New legislation must be clearly drafted to unequivocally and strate-
gically define the categories of those who should be protected under the
ADA as well as demonstrate a clear history of discrimination against the
disabled. Legislation must aggressively address the challenges to Con-
gressional authority posed by recent Supreme Court cases within the
framework of those decisions in the context of federalism.
The ADA was intended to promote justice for the disabled. It has
become a model for many nations.260 Unfortunately, the reach of the
ADA has been gradually eroded by court decisions. Perhaps without
even intending it, the Supreme Court has created a legal framework that
is filled with contradictions and denies justice to the intended beneficiar-
ies of the legislation. If the ADA is not amended, its effectiveness as an
antidiscrimination law will likely continue to diminish, even if cases
such as Lane occasionally enforce its provisions in narrow circum-
stances.
259. Pendo I, supra note 31 at 1226.
260, Jerome E. Bickenbach, The ADA v. the Canadian Charter of Rights: Disability Rights and
the Social Model of Disability, in THE AMERICANS WITH DIsABILITIES ACT: EXPLORING
IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 354 (Notes) (Leslie Pickering
Francis & Anita Silvers eds., Routledge 2000). A number of nations have enacted legislation mod-
eled on the ADA, including Australia (Disability Discrimination Act, 1992), the United Kingdom
(Disability Discrimination Act, 1995, c 50), New Zealand (Human Rights Act, 1993, No. 82), India
(Disabled Persons Act), and Israel (Disabled Persons Act, 1998). Id.
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A ROSE BY ANY OTHER NAME: SCHOOL PRAYER




Views on prayer in public schools have been sharply divided ever
since the Supreme Court affirmed the separation of church and state in
that setting.' Various political interest groups have repeatedly attempted
to "return God to the classroom" by introducing legislation aimed at re-
storing prayer to public schools.2 Since the terrorist attacks of September
11 th, 2001, there is a renewed interest in school prayer.3  Many state
governments are considering passing legislation mandating a "moment of
silence" or otherwise promoting prayer in public schools.4 The issue of
f Lee Ann Rabe: law clerk to the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo, U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois; B.A. in English, The Ohio State University; J.D., The Ohio State Uni-
versity Moritz College of Law, Class of 2003. I dedicate this article to my husband, Bryan Bowen,
who has ceaselessly supported and encouraged me throughout this process. I would also like to thank
Louis Jacobs and James Brudney for their support and guidance in developing this topic and this
article.
1. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435 (1962). Justice Black, writing for the majority, held
that use of a brief, non-denominational prayer each morning in the New York public schools was a
clear violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Id. at 424. The majority opinion
reminded us that freedom from government-imposed religion was one of the reasons colonists had
come to America in the first place. Id. at 425. The Court noted that the First Amendment was
adopted as a safeguard, "to stand as a guarantee that neither the power nor the prestige of the Federal
Government would be used to control, support or influence the kinds of prayer the American people
can say .. " Id. at 429.
The following year, the Court also prohibited Bible readings in public schools. Sch. Dist.
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963). The Court noted that the First Amendment was written to
ensure "a complete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority
by comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or support for religion." Id. at 217 (citing
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1947)).
2. See infra Part IV (A).
3. See, e.g., Jodie Morse, Letting God Back In; Prayer, Long Banned from Schools, Is Mak-
ing a Post-terror Comeback, TIME, Oct. 22, 2001, at 71 (noting that "[s]ome teachers are broadcast-
ing morning blessings over the p.a. system or praying with distraught students."); Howard Fineman:
One Nation, Under... Who?, NEWSWEEK, July 8, 2002, at 20 (noting the resurgence of religious
speech by political leaders since the attacks).
4. Examples of this legislation include (but are not limited to): the Religious Speech
Amendment, H.R.J. Res. 81, 107th Cong. (2001) (introduced in December 2001 by U.S. Rep. Ernest
Istook); H.R. 1142, 146th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2002); Idaho H.J.M. 17; H.C.R. 5050, 79th
Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2002); H.C.R. 19, 91st Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2002);
H.J.R. 635, 102d Gen. Assem. (Tenn. 2002); H.J.R. 682, 102d Gen. Assem. (Tenn. 2002) (all calling
on Congress to pass a constitutional amendment allowing voluntary school prayer); H.C.R. 22, 91st
Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2002) (calling for federal legislation allowing voluntary school
prayer); Missouri H.C.R. 30 (proposing a constitutional amendment allowing voluntary school
prayer); H.B. 1446, 157th Gen. Ct., 2d Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2001) (requiring students to recite the
Lord's Prayer at the beginning of each day); H.B. 676, 185th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2001)
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prayer in public schools has also re-emerged in the federal court system,
in the guise of objections to the words "under God" in the Pledge of Al-
legiance.5 Also, at least one candidate for state governor wants to make
returning prayer to public schools a major plank in his campaign.6 In
Wallace v. Jaffree,7 the Court held that laws creating a moment of silence
are unconstitutional if the purpose is to promote religion; however, the
Court seemed to leave open the possibility that moment of silence laws,
enacted without such motivations, might be constitutional.
For a movement that has been seeking to reintroduce prayer in
schools for more than 40 years, the potential loophole left open by the
Court in Jaffree appears to be a golden opportunity when combined with
increased popular support for prayer in general following the September
1 lth attacks. 8 How much of an opportunity actually exists depends on the
exact parameters of the Court's view on moment of silence laws. Since
Jaffree, however, the Court has declined to clarify its position by taking
another case on these laws.9 Given the Court's silence, interested parties
can only attempt to infer the direction of the Court from other sources
including the Court's recent related Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
The recent case Doe v. School Board of Ouachita Parish1° in Louisiana
illustrates the connection between moment of silence laws and school
prayer, and also serves as another guidepost in the murky landscape left
by the Supreme Court.
This Article explores the possible direction of the Court in this area.
Part II analyzes Wallace v. Jaffree, the seminal Supreme Court case
striking down legislation requiring religiously motivated moments of
silence in schools. Part III examines some of the state challenges to
moment of silence laws since Jaffree and the rationales courts have used
(requiring the Department of Education to request all school districts to begin each school day with
prayer or a short period of meditation); H.B. 541, Biennium Adj. Sess. (Vt. 2002) (requiring schools
to begin each day with a short prayer).
5. See Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussed more fully infra
note 132 and accompanying text).
6. Governor Rick Perry, re-elected in 2002 to a full four-year term as Texas governor, sup-
ports a return to public school prayer, at least partially in response to the terrorist attacks. He sees
"no problem with ignoring the U.S. Supreme Court ban on organized school prayer 'at this very
crisis moment in our history."' Meighan, Editorial, Perry's Stand on Prayer Sends a Bad Message,
CORPUS CHRIST[ CALLER-TIMES, Nov. 3, 2001, at A15. Senator David Scott (D-Ga.) was elected in
2002 to represent Georgia's 13th Congressional District. Scott campaigned on the issue of restoring
prayer to public schools through legislation making the requirement of a moment of silence legal.
Ready to Represent Georgia, JET, Sept. 16, 2002, at 34.
7. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
8. See infra Part IV for a more detailed explanation of the road from school prayer to mo-
ment of silence statutes.
9. Most recently, the Court denied certiorari to a case challenging the Virginia moment of
silence statute, Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265, 270 (4th Cir. 2001) (affirming holding that the
statute did not unconstitutionally establish religion), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 996 (2001).
10. 274 F.3d 289 (5th Cir. 2001) (striking down a Louisiana statute validating vocal prayer in
public schools, which had formerly contained the word "silent," but was recently modified to allow
vocal prayer).
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for sustaining or striking down these statutes." Finally, Part IV outlines
why public school moment of silence statutes, as stand-ins for school
prayer, must be unconstitutional as a violation of the Establishment
Clause.
II. THE COURT SPEAKS: WALLACE V. JAFFREE12
The Supreme Court's first, and only, statement about moment of si-
lence laws came in 1985. Wallace v. Jaffree13 settled a challenge to a
1981 Alabama statute 14 authorizing a one-minute period of silence in
public schools "for meditation or voluntary prayer."' 5  The plaintiff,
Ishmael Jaffree, on behalf of his school-age children, sought an injunc-
tion against the application of this statute, claiming it violated the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. 16  The defendants argued that the First
Amendment, and therefore the Establishment Clause, did not apply to the
states but only to the federal government.' 7 Further, the State argued that
the Fourteenth Amendment did not and was never intended to subject the
states to the restrictions of the First Amendment.'
8
After a lengthy trial, with testimony from state officials including
the primary sponsor of the amendment, State Senator Donald G.
Holmes, 19 the District Court reviewed the history of the First and Four-
11. Four state "moment of silence laws" have been challenged since Jaffree. Two were
upheld-Bown v. Gwinnett Sch. Dist., 112 F.3d 1464 (1 1th Cir. 1997), and Brown v. Gilmore, 258
F.3d 265 (4th Cir. 2001)-and two were struck down as unconstitutional-May v. Cooperman, 780
F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1985), and Doe v. Ouachita Sch. Rd., 274 F.3d 289 (5th Cir. 2001).
12. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
13. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 38.
14. ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984).
At the commencement of the first class of each day [in all grades] in all public schools
the teacher in charge of the room in which each such class is held may announce that a
period of silence, not to exceed one minute in duration, shall be observed for mediation,
and during any such period of silence shall be maintained and no other activities shall be
engaged in.
Id. Two other statutes-ALA. CODE §§ 16-1-20 & 20.2 (Supp. 1984) were also challenged in the
original complaint. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 41-42. The plaintiffs dropped their claim that section 16-1-
20, which provided for a period of silence for meditation, was unconstitutional. Id. Section 16-1-
20.2, which provided for teacher-led prayers at the start of the school day, was held to be unconstitu-
tional by both the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and by the Supreme Court, and was not
at issue in Jaffree. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 41-42.
15. ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984). The 1984 amendment actually added the words
"voluntary prayer" to the statute, which had previously only called for a moment of silence for
meditation.
16. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 42-43 (stating that the original complaint simply asked that the school
be enjoined from imposing religious services and prayers on the public school students, while a later
amendment to the complaint specified the portions of the Alabama Code at issue).
17. Jaffree v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1113 (S.D. Ala. 1983).
18. Id. The defendants also argued that if religion were to be banned from public schools, so-
called "secular humanism" would also need to be removed from the curriculum. Id. Since "[s]uch a
purge" would be difficult if not impossible, the defendants argued that other religions must also be
permitted to remain. Id.
19. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 43. Senator Holmes testified that he had no secular purpose in mind
when he introduced the amendment adding "voluntary prayer" to the Alabama statute in question.
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teenth Amendments. 20  The District Court held that the Establishment
Clause does not prevent states from establishing a religion and upheld
the moment of silence law.21  The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the District Court.22 The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that
the First Amendment did apply to the states as well as to the federal gov-
ernment and that the law was unconstitutional as a violation of the Estab-
lishment Clause.23
Writing for a five-Justice majority, Justice Stevens affirmed the
holding below that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment,
through the Fourteenth Amendment, applied to the states, as well as to
the federal government.24 He stressed the central importance of the idea
that individuals must be free not only to worship as they choose, but also
to refrain from worshipping at all, if they so choose. 2 5  Governments,
both state and federal, must respect this "basic truth"-that individuals
cannot be forced by the State to either abandon or embrace religion.
26
Justice Stevens applied the Lemon test, formulated to evaluate Es-
tablishment Clause challenges, to the Alabama law. 27 This test consists
Id. His sole intention was an "effort to return voluntary prayer to our public schools ... it is a be-
ginning and a step in the right direction." Id.
20. Jaffree, 554 F. Supp. at 1113, 1125 (concluding that the purpose of the First Amendment
was to ensure that the federal government would not interfere with the states' right to establish
official religions, and that the Fourteenth Amendment was never intended to apply the First
Amendment to the states).
21. Id. at 1128 (acknowledging that its decision was against the force of Supreme Court
precedent, but felt that the previous decisions were wrongly made and felt "a stronger tug from the
Constitution which it ha[d] sworn to support and to defend" than from adherence to precedent). Id. at
1126-28.
22. Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526 (1983). The court of appeals chastised the district court
for acting against Supreme Court precedent, emphasizing the doctrine that lower courts are bound by
the decisions of higher courts:
The district court attempted to justify its actions by discussing the limited exceptions to
the doctrine of stare decisis. The doctrine of stare decisis pertains to the deference a court
may give to its own prior decisions. The stare decisis doctrine and its exceptions do not
apply where a lower court is compelled to apply the precedent of a higher court.
Id. at 1532 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The court of appeals also noted that the Supreme
Court had rejected the narrower interpretation of the Establishment Clause that the district court
clung to. Id. at 1530. It also noted the Court's unanimity "regarding the history of the first amend-
ment's applicability to the states through the fourteenth amendment." Id. at 1531.
23. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 61.
24. Id. at 48-49. The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the portion of the appellate deci-
sion that overturned the district court's holding that the First Amendment did not restrict the states.
Id. Stevens briefly elaborated on this affirmation, citing a long string of Supreme Court cases that
have held the First Amendment applicable to the states as well as to the federal government. Id.
25. Id. at 53 (stating that "[this] Court has unambiguously concluded that the individual
freedom of conscience protected by the First Amendment embraces the right to select any religious
faith or none at all.").
26. Id. at 55 (quoting Justice Jackson, "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constella-
tion, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.").
27. Id. at 55 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)). The Establishment
Clause test first articulated in Lemon has been modified slightly by later cases, including Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (modifying the criteria used to assess whether aid to religion has an
impermissible effect).
A ROSE BY ANY OTHER NAME
of three prongs: first, that there is a secular purpose for the law; second,
that the primary effect of the law must not be to advance or inhibit relig-
ion; and third, that the law not cause excessive entanglement between the
government and religion.28 Justice Stevens only examined the first prong
of the three-prong test, however, as the Court found that the Alabama
law had no secular purpose.29  Both the text of the statute30 and state-
ments by State Senator Donald G. Holmes, the bill's sponsor,31 indicated
that the statute had a purely religious purpose-returning prayer to public
schools. For the majority of the Court, the fact that the statute clearly
and solely had a religious purpose eliminated the need to examine the
second and third prongs of the Lemon test.32  Thus, the Court struck
down the Alabama statute as a violation of the First Amendment.
33
In reaching this conclusion, the majority also noted the importance
of the special setting involved-the public schools. Justice Stevens
stated that the "indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to
conform" is of special concern in the public school setting. 34  He ex-
panded on the special significance of the public school setting by citing
several previous cases where the Court acknowledged the role peer pres-
sure plays in school settings. 35 Justice Stevens especially worried about
the potential impact of peer pressure, citing Justice Frankfurter's earlier
concerns, "That a child is offered an alternative may reduce the con-
straint; it does not eliminate the operation of influence by the school in
matters sacred to conscience and outside the school's domain. The law
of imitation operates, and non-conformity is not an outstanding charac-
teristic of children.,
36
Both Justice O'Connor and Justice Powell concurred in the majority
decision, but separately maintained that some moment of silence laws
might well be constitutional.37 Justice O'Connor explained that moment
28. Id. at 55-56 (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13). The Lemon test is discussed in more
detail infra in Part IV.
29. Id. at 56.
30. Id. at 60 (finding the text of the Alabama statute problematic because it calls for "volun-
tary prayer" from the students and that the addition of the word "prayer" to the statute was seen as an
attempt by the legislature to promote "prayer as a favored practice").
31. Id. at 43 (quoting Senator Holmes' explanation "that the bill was an 'effort to return
voluntary prayer to our public schools... it is a beginning and a step in the right direction'). Sena-
tor Holmes also made it clear that he "had no other purpose in mind," other than restoring prayer to
public schools. Id. at 57.
32. Id. at 56 (stating that this factor was dispositive).
33. Id. at 61.
34. Id. at 61 n.51 (citing Engel, 370 U.S. at 430).
35. Id. (citing Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 227) (1948) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring) (noting that when governmental support is given to a specific religious belief,
there is pressure put on religious minorities to conform); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 290 (voicing concern
that students might participate in religious activities to avoid being stigmatized); Marsh v. Cham-
bers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (distinguishing between adults not being very susceptible to 'reli-
gious indoctrination' and children who are subject to peer pressure).
36. Id. at 61 (quoting McCollum, 333 U.S. at 227) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
37. Id. at 62, 72 (Powell, J., concurring) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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of silence laws were not inherently unconstitutional: first, they are not
"inherently religious;" 38 second, a moment of silence does not coerce a
student into "compromis[ing] his or her beliefs. '39 The primary concern
according to O'Connor was whether the state "has conveyed or at-
tempted to convey the message that children should use the moment of
silence for prayer."40  To determine if the state has done this, Justice
O'Connor would look to the circumstances surrounding the enactment of
the moment of silence law, specifically, "the history, language, and ad-
ministration of a particular statute." '' Justice Powell largely agreed with
Justice O'Connor, and would also find a moment of silence law constitu-
tional if there was a clear secular purpose for the law.42
While the Court's decision in Jaffree settled the question of Ala-
bama's statute, the more general question of moment of silence statutes
was left at least partially open. Since 1985, the Court has refused to de-
finitively answer that question, denying certiorari in moment of silence
cases. Part 11H of this Article examines the four appellate moment of
silence decisions since Jaffree; two circuit courts have upheld such stat-
utes, and two have invalidated them. Part IV considers the potential un-
constitutionality of all moment of silence laws, attempting to read be-
tween the lines and determine the future of the Court's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence.
III. INTO THE FUTURE: STATE CHALLENGES SINCE JAFFREE
The overall picture of the constitutionality of moment of silence
laws remains murky. Since Jaffree was decided in 1985, only a few
states have had constitutional challenges to their own moment of silence
laws. Two of these states upheld the moment of silence laws as constitu-
tional,43 and two struck down the law as unconstitutional." Because the
Supreme Court has yet to take a moment of silence case since Jaffree,
these lower court rationales serve as the only guideposts for the constitu-
tionality, or lack thereof, of such laws.
38. Id. at 72.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 73.
41. Id. at 74.
42. Id. at 66.
43. The statutes of both Georgia (1997) and Virginia (2001) were upheld by the circuit courts.
Bown v. Gwinnett County Sch. Bd., 112 F.3d 1464, 1474 (1lth Cir. 1997); Brown v. Gilmore, 258
F.3d 265, 282 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 996 (2001).
44. The statutes of both New Jersey (1985) and Louisiana (2001) were struck down by the
circuit courts for violating the Establishment Clause. May v. Cooperman, 780 F.2d 240, 253 (3d Cir.
1985); Doe v. Sch. Bd., 274 F.3d 289, 295 (5th Cir. 2001).
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A. Sustained-Georgia and Virginia
Both the Fourth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals have up-
held moment of silence laws.45 In doing so, both Courts focused on the
first prong of the Lemon test, finding secular purposes for the laws.46 No
religious purpose was given for the Georgia statute. A religious purpose
was given for the Virginia statute, but it was accompanied by several
secular purposes. The secular purposes in both statutes are similar: both
claim to provide students with a quiet moment to start the school day,
allowing them to collect their thoughts. The Virginia statute also claims
the purpose of promoting the values of the Free Exercise clause of the
47First Amendment, which the court claims is a secular purpose.
Despite the courts' holdings regarding secular purposes for these
statutes, suggestions of an underlying religious purpose remain. Geor-
gia's statute, while specifically stating that the moment of silence is not
religiously motivated, also expressly ensures that no voluntary student
prayer is prevented and suggests that the first two provisions must impli-
cate student prayer.48 The court dismissed the concerns over this provi-
sion, characterizing it simply as a preventative measure against misinter-
45. The text of the Georgia statute reads:
§ 20-2-1050. Brief period of quiet reflection authorized; nature of period
(a) In each public school classroom, the teacher in charge shall, at the opening of school
upon every school day, conduct a brief period of quiet reflection for not more than 60
seconds with the participation of all the pupils therein assembled.
(b) The moment of quiet reflection authorized by subsection (a) of this Code section is
not intended to be and shall not be conducted as a religious service or exercise but shall
be considered as an opportunity for a moment of silent reflection on the anticipated ac-
tivities of the day.
(c) The provisions of subsections (a) and (b) of this Code section shall not prevent stu-
dent initiated voluntary school prayers at schools or school related events which are non-
sectarian and nonproselytizing in nature.
GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-1050 (1996).
The text of the Virginia statute reads:
§ 22.1-203. Daily observance of one minute of silence
In order that the right of every pupil to the free exercise of religion be guaranteed within
the schools and that the freedom of each individual pupil be subject to the least possible
pressure from the Commonwealth either to engage in, or to refrain from, religious obser-
vation on school grounds, the school board of each school division shall establish the
daily observance of one minute of silence in each classroom of the division.
During such one-minute period of silence, the teacher responsible for each classroom
shall take care that all pupils remain seated and silent and make no distracting display to
the end that each pupil may, in the exercise of his or her individual choice, meditate,
pray, or engage in any other silent activity which does not interfere with, distract, or im-
pede other pupils in the like exercise of individual choice.
The Office of the Attorney General shall intervene and shall provide legal defense of this law.
VA. CODE. ANN. § 22.1-203 (2000).
46. While both courts do go on to examine the second and third prongs of the Lemon test,
neither court dwells very long on those issues. Bown, 112 F.3d at 1472-74; Brown, 258 F.3d at 277-
78.
47. The court observed that "the Establishment Clause [does not] preclude a government from
,accommodating' religious scruple .... Brown, 258 F.3d at 274. The court held that the intent to
accommodate religious practices is a secular purpose, not a religious one. Id. at 276.
48. GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-1050(c) (1996).
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pretation of the first two provisions in the statute. 49 The legislative his-
tory surrounding the statute also provided evidence of latent religious
motivations.50 However, the court downplayed these motivations, draw-
ing a distinction between "the legislative purpose of the statute... [and]
the possibly religious motives of the legislators who enacted the law. 51
Drawing such a distinction seems disingenuous,5 2 as the court appeared
willing to look past even the type of motivations that the Jaffree Court
held unconstitutional.5 3
Virginia, too, appears to have religious motives lurking behind its
moment of silence statute. The plain language of the statute mentions
prayer as a potential exercise during the minute of silence. 4 When the
Fourth Circuit analyzed the statutory language, it dismissed the mention
of prayer as just one of a list of potential practices. Additionally, the
legislative history suggested a religious motivation for the statute, which
was also swept away by the court. The court focused on the aspects of
the legislative history that support a secular purpose,56 while ignoring
those aspects that support a religious purpose.5 7 The court even looked
past the fact that the same Virginia legislature passed a joint resolution
opposing the holding of Engel v. Vitale and calling for a constitutional
amendment to restore prayer to the public classroom. 58  Although the
49. Bown, 112 F.3d at 1474.
50. The original bill was to create a time for prayer in the classroom, not merely a moment of
quiet reflection. Several legislators also spoke fervently about the reintroduction of prayer into the
public schools, and an amendment referring specifically to school prayer was "overwhelmingly
supported." See Larry R. Thaxton, Silence Begets Religion: Bown v. Gwinnett County School Dis-
trict and the Unconstitutionality of Moments of Silence in Public Schools, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1399,
1430-31 (1996).
51. Bown, 112 F.3d at 1471-72.
52. If legislative purpose is not a composite of the individual motives of those legislators who
enact a statute, what is it?
53. Now that the Eleventh Circuit has upheld Georgia's statute as constitutional, state legisla-
tors seem more willing to explicitly encourage prayer during the mandated moment of silence. On
January 31, 2002, Georgia legislators introduced a bill that would "clarify" the uses of the moment
of silence, reminding students that their First Amendment rights entitle them to pray during that
moment if they so choose. See H.B. 1171, 146th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2002). See also S.B.
402, 146th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2002) (providing for similar clarification). The Georgia
Senate has also introduced a bill that would provide a three-minute period for students to voluntarily
speak about their religious beliefs. This "educational period" would be held immediately before the
mandated moment of silence. See S.B. 331, 146th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2002).
54. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-203 (2000).
55. Brown, 258 F.3d at 276.
56. Id. at 277 (emphasizing the use of a moment of silence to settle students before starting
the day).
57. The sponsor of the bill firmly stated that his intent was not to return prayer to public
schools, while maintaining that "[t]his country was based on belief in God." Brown, 258 F.3d at 271.
Other senators also voiced concerns about the religious nature and purpose of the statute. Id. at 271-
72.
58. Brown, 258 F.3d at 284 (King, J., dissenting). The court also ignored the fact that the
Virginia legislature provided for legal defense of the moment of silence statute as a provision of that
statute. This provision suggests that the legislature was aware of the Establishment Clause issues
inherent in these statutes and intended to press the issue with the courts. Id. Combined with the
joint resolution, this provision suggests that the legislature was willing to try a number of different
tactics to restore prayer to the public classroom. Id.
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religious motives behind the statute seemed clear, the court found them
irrelevant and upheld the statute.59
Both circuit courts espoused a high level of deference to the legisla-
tive decision-making process when evaluating the stated secular purpose
of these moment of silence statutes.60 The willingness of these circuit
courts to turn a blind eye to legislative purpose 61 and to the history from
which these laws were born6 2 signals a frightening turn of events. While
legislatures are due some level of deference as a co-equal branch of gov-
ernment, an overly deferential approach robs the courts of their role in
upholding the constitutional rights of all citizens.
63
B. Invalidated-New Jersey and Louisiana
In contrast, two other courts of appeals have invalidated moment of
silence statutes as unconstitutional violations of the Establishment
Clause.64 In addition to representing the bookends of post-Jaffree mo-
ment of silence jurisprudence, 65 these cases also dealt with two very dif-
ferent statutes. While the wording of the statutes may not seem to be
59. Id. at 270-72. As in Georgia, the Virginia legislature seems willing to test the limit of
school prayer jurisprudence. Once certiorari was denied for Brown, the Virginia legislature intro-
duced a bill that would amend the statute to require school officials to expressly inform students of
the purpose of the moment of silence. The purpose, as stated by the statute, is to guarantee "the right
of every pupil to the free exercise of religion." See H.B. 135, 2002 Leg. (Va. 2002). Both houses of
the Virginia state legislature have also passed bills that would require public schools to post signs
reading "In God We Trust." See H.B. 108, 2002 Leg. (Va. 2002); S.B. 608, 2002 Leg. (Va. 2002).
These bills have now passed both Houses and were signed into law by Virginia's governor on May
17, 2002.
60. Bown, 112 F.3d at 1469; Brown, 258 F.3d at 276 (referring specifically to the level of
deference espoused by Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Jaffree).
61. The legislative history for both statutes has several examples of the religious motivations
of the sponsors and other supporters. State Senator Warren Barry, sponsor of the Virginia statute,
was asked about his intent for the moment of silence statute. He answered that "[t]his country was
based on belief in God, and maybe we need to look at that again." Brown, 258 F.3d at 271. An
unofficial transcript of the Georgia General Assembly reveals that a number of House members took
positions, for and against the statute, based on a belief that it would institute school prayer. Bown,
112 F.3d at 1467.
62. See infra Part IV.
63. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the courts have a duty to look into
legislative decisions in Free Exercise and Establishment Clause claims, to distinguish legitimate
secular purposes from ones that are merely a smokescreen for religious purposes. See, e.g., Santa Fe
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536
(1997) (stating that "Congress' discretion is not unlimited ... and the courts retain the power.., to
determine if Congress has exceeded its authority under the Constitution.").
64. May v. Cooperman, 780 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1985); Doe v. Sch. Bd., 274 F.3d 289 (5th Cir.
2001).
65. May was decided only months after Jaffree was decided, and School Board was just
decided in December 2001.
66. The text of the New Jersey statute provided:
§ 18A:36-4. Period of silence
Principals and teachers in each public elementary and secondary school of each school
district in this State shall permit students to observe a one minute period of silence to be
used solely at the discretion of the individual student, before the opening exercises of
each school day for quiet and private contemplation or introspection.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36-4 (West 1985).
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very different, their enactment was. The New Jersey statute, as chal-
lenged, was enacted as a whole; however, the Louisiana statute was
amended before passing.
Jaffree had only been law a few months when the Third Circuit
found that the New Jersey statute violated the Establishment Clause un-
der the Lemon test.67  While the court examined all three prongs of the
Lemon test, it found that the New Jersey statute only violated the first
prong, because it lacked a secular purpose.68  Unlike the courts that con-
sidered the Georgia and Virginia statutes, the Third Circuit was willing
to look beyond the purported secular legislative motive. The court held
that the secular purpose, "to provide a transition from nonschool life to
school life," was pretextual and therefore insufficient to save the statute
from an Establishment Clause challenge.69  In prior years, the New Jer-
sey legislature had attempted to reintroduce prayer into the public
schools a number of different ways, and the court took that history into
account when evaluating the stated purpose for the moment of silence
statute.
70
While the court did not find a legislative intent to encourage prayer
over other activities during the mandatory moment of silence, it did con-
clude that the "purpose of accommodating the religious beliefs of some
students is itself a religious purpose.' In the end, the court asked if it
was permissible for "the state .... while not endorsing prayer in prefer-
ence to other forms of silent activity, [to provide] for a minute of silence
for the purpose of permitting prayer by those who want to pray. 72 The
answer from the Third Circuit was a solid "no. 7 3
The text of the Louisiana statute provided:
§ 2115 [Silent prayer] Prayer or meditation; pledge of allegiance
A. Each parish and city school board in the state shall permit the proper school authorities
of each school within its jurisdiction to allow an opportunity, at the start of each school
day, for those students and teachers desiring to do so to observe a brief time in [silent]
prayer or meditation. The allowance of a brief time for [silent] prayer or meditation shall
not be intended nor interpreted as state support of or interference with religion, nor shall
such time allowance be promoted as a religious exercise and the implementation of this
Section shall remain neutral toward religion.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 17:2115(A) (West 1999) (emphasis added) (bracketed material deleted by
amendment).
67. May, 780 F.2d at 253.
68. Id. at 241 ("[This] appeal requires that we assess the impact on the district court's ruling
of the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Wallace v. Jaffree") (citation omitted).
69. Id. at 251. The Third Circuit accepted the district court's finding that the purpose was
pretextual. Id.
70. Id. at 251-52. The court also considered testimony from educational experts and wit-
nesses at the legislative hearings before concluding that the stated purpose was but a sham. Id. at
252.
71. Id. at 252. The court goes on to state that a finding that the New Jersey statute was in-
tended to promote prayer was not sustainable, but that the purpose of accommodation of certain
religious beliefs was sufficient to render the statute unconstitutional. Id.
72. Id. at 252.
73. Id. at 253.
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In contrast to the New Jersey statute, the Louisiana statute originally
created a moment of silence, but was amended in an effort to restore
prayer to public classrooms. The statute was amended twice, first to add
the words "prayer or " 74 to the possible uses for the moment and later to
remove the word "silent ' 75 to allow for vocal prayer.76 In Doe, the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the statute as amended was un-
constitutional. 7 Drawing a comparison to Jaffree, the court found that
the only viable purpose for the 1999 amendment removing the word "si-
lent" was to "authorize verbal prayer in schools."78  Because the court
found no secular purpose for the statute, it did not consider the other
prongs of the Lemon test.
79
These four cases provide some guidance as to the constitutionality
of moment of silence statutes. However, the lack of clarity left after
Jaffree remains and the tension between two ideals endures. Although
courts must show appropriate deference to legislative decisions, they
must also fulfill their duty to ensure that those decisions are not based on
impermissible motives. The history of these statutes weighs heavily on
them, and courts must work harder to ignore that history than to consider
it. Part IV illustrates how, even with appropriate deference to legisla-
tures, courts must find moment of silence statutes unconstitutional.
IV. CAN A MOMENT OF SILENCE BE CONSTITUTIONAL: WHY JAFFREE
GOT IT RIGHT-AND HOW IT GOT IT WRONG
Jaffree seems to leave the constitutional door ajar concerning mo-
ment of silence laws. While the Court clearly stated that such laws are
unconstitutional when enacted for solely religious purposes, it does not
speak to laws with both religious and secular purposes. 80  The Court, in
both majority and concurring opinions, seems to suggest that such laws
might pass constitutional muster if they had a secular motive for their
74. Doe, 274 F.3d at 291 (citing the 1992 amendment).
75. Id. (citing the 1999 amendment).
76. The text of the Louisiana statute provided:
§ 2115 [Silent prayer] Prayer or meditation; pledge of allegiance
A. Each parish and city school board in the state shall permit the proper school authorities
of each school within its jurisdiction to allow an opportunity, at the start of each school
day, for those students and teachers desiring to do so to observe a brief time in [silent]
prayer or meditation. The allowance of a brief time for [silent] prayer or meditation shall
not be intended nor interpreted as state support of or interference with religion, nor shall
such time allowance be promoted as a religious exercise and the implementation of this
Section shall remain neutral toward religion.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 17:2115(A) (West 1999) (emphasis added) (bracketed material deleted by
amendment). The Louisiana State Legislature has since amended and re-enacted § 17:2115(A),
restoring the word "silent" to the statute. See Act of April 18, 2002, No. 56, § 17:2115(A), 2002 La.
Sess. Law Serv. 1 st Ex. Sess. (West) (amended and reenacted).
77. Doe, 274 F.3d at 290. Both the language of the statute and the legislative history of the
amendment supported this holding.
78. Id. at 294.
79. Id. at 293. The court also did not consider any endorsement or coercion issues.
80. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 66 (1985).
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enactment. 81 The Court does not, however, address the role the history
of moment of silence laws might play in the determination of whether
such laws are constitutional. As the Court does not squarely address the
issue, the question remains as to what fate such a law would face if a
clearly stated secular purpose were given for its enactment, either alone
or in tandem with a religious purpose.
While there might have been a time when moment of silence laws
could have been enacted in a constitutional manner, that time is past.
Regardless of any stated meaning by the legislature, the history of mo-
ment of silence laws is too uncomfortably blurred with school prayer.
This Part addresses the difficulties in applying the motivational test the
Court implies, as well as concerns of free exercise and the special role of
children in Establishment Clause issues. As the Court has yet to select a
single test for evaluating all Establishment clause challenges, this Article
will examine three of the "leading contenders:" the Lemon test, the en-
dorsement test, and the coercion test.
A. The Lemon Test: Silence with a Secular Purpose?
For more than 30 years, the Court has used a test, originally set
forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman,82 that examines three aspects of a statute
challenged as violating the Establishment Clause.83 The Court has con-
tinued to use this test, despite criticism from both within and outside the
Court, ever since.84 In Jaffree, the Court applied the Lemon test, but only
examined the first prong of the test-whether a statute has a secular pur-
pose for enactment. 85 The majority found that the clearly stated purpose
for the Alabama moment of silence law was to return prayer to the public
classroom. 86
81. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 66.
82. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
83. First, the statute must have a secular purpose; second, the statute cannot have the primary
effect of advancing or inhibiting religion; third, the statute cannot cause excessive entanglement
between religion and government. Id. at 612-13.
84. The Lemon test has indeed come under a great deal of fire from within the Court, with
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia being two of its more outspoken critics. See Lamb's
Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398-400 (1993) ("Like some ghoul in
a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeat-
edly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again .... "). But
see Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 63 (Powell, J., concurring) ("It [the Lemon test] is the only coherent test a
majority of the Court has ever adopted."); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 314
(2000) (citing Lemon as justification for examining the purpose of a policy); Steven G. Gey, Reli-
gious Coercion and the Establishment Clause, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 463, 470 (1994) (arguing that
the "operative terms" of Lemon would serve to maintain church-state separation).
85. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 55-56. The second and third prongs of the Lemon test are not exam-
ined by courts in the same detail as the first prong when considering moment of silence laws. See Id.
Therefore, I will only examine the first prong in this Article.
86. Id. at 59-60.
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In applying the Lemon test, the Court first looks to see if the chal-
lenged statute has a secular purpose."' If a statute has both secular and
religious purposes, the secular purpose must be the primary purpose and
not merely pretextual. 88 However, the secular purpose need not be ex-
clusive; the Court has held that the government may "[recognize] the
important part that religion or religious organizations may play in resolv-
ing certain secular problems."8 9 Once the legislature establishes a secu-
lar purpose for a program or policy, the government's claim is generally
given deference.90 However, the secular purpose must be "sincere and
not a sham."9' If challenged, the validity of the secular purpose may be
evaluated by considering events surrounding the initial decision to enact
the statute.92
Moment of silence laws face a real problem concerning their pur-
pose of enactment. Jaffree has already established that if the statute is
passed solely to satisfy a religious purpose, such as returning prayer to
public schools, it cannot pass constitutional muster. But what about stat-
utes where the legislature claims a dual purpose for the statute-both
religious and secular-or even a purely secular purpose? The majority in
Jaffree seems to say that dual secular and religious purposes may pre-
serve the constitutionality of a moment of silence law.9 3 And if the legis-
lature claims solely a secular purpose for the statute, the first prong of the
Lemon test seems to be met.
But the secular purpose must not be a pretexual purpose, a sham, or
a cloth drawn over the eyes of the court. Courts have the duty to investi-
gate the stated secular purpose to ensure that it is a true purpose for the
statute. Although Congress (as well as state legislatures) must be given
deference in its decision-making, that deference cannot not be complete
if courts are to fulfill their duties. When examining or interpreting a
piece of legislation, the courts must consider the circumstances surround-
ing the creation of that statute as well as the stated goals of the legisla-
ture.94 Recently, the Court has shown its willingness to look beyond the
surface motivations of school officials to examine the true intent of pro-
87. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
88. Id.
89. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 607 (1988).
90. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 596 (1987).
91 Id. at 587.
92. Id.
93. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 56. The majority does not make a clear statement about the constitu-
tionality of such a statute. Justice Stevens mentions the possibility of a secular motivation saving the
statute before moving on to definitively invalidate such statutes if motivated solely by religious
reasons. id.
94. See United States v. Champlin, 341 U.S, 290, 297 (1951) (stating that "[t]he statute cannot
be divorced from the circumstances existing at the time it was passed, and from the evil which
Congress sought to correct and prevent. The circumstances and the evil are well-known."). The
circumstances of any moment of silence law must necessarily include the ongoing struggle by some
political factions to restore prayer to public schools. See supro notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
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moting prayer in public schools in other related situations.95 The Court
must surely take the same care in probing behind stated purposes for the
legislative intent for moment of silence laws.
From the moment that prayer in public schools was held to be un-
constitutional, certain interest groups have been fighting for reinstate-
ment.96  On the federal level, numerous statutes and constitutional
amendments have been introduced that would restore prayer to public
schools in one form or another.97 These bills started by reintroducing
"prescribed prayer in public schools, [then moved] to prayer, to nonsec-
tarian prayer, to nondenominational prayer, to voluntary prayer, to a vol-
untary moment of silence.' 98 A proposed House amendment from 1971
shows the evolution of these bills from a call for a restoration of prayer
in schools to a moment of silence (intended for prayer).99 Congress has
also attempted to restrict the Supreme Court's jurisdiction in this area
with bills that would strip the Court of the power to hear "any case aris-
ing out of any state statute ... which relates to voluntary prayers in the
public schools and public buildings.
'1°°
On a state and local level, governments have supplemented federal
attempts to restore prayer to public classrooms. State legislatures con-
tinued to enact statutes mandating prayer in public schools, ignoring the
95. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 305-06. School officials attempted to allow student prayer before
each football game, claiming that the content of the message was up to the student. Id. The student
who was to deliver the message was elected by his or her peers, supposedly separating the potential
religious message and the school officials even further. Id. However, the Supreme Court refused to
allow the claim that the school was merely trying to "promote good sportsmanship" and invalidated
the program. Id.
96. The reaction to the school prayer decisions was sudden and vigorous. See Abington
Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 436 (1962). The
day Engel was handed down was dubbed "Black Monday" in some quarters, and one senator went so
far as to say that "[tihe Supreme Court has made God unconstitutional." LYNN R. BUZZARD,
SCHOOLS: THEY HAVEN'T GOT A PRAYER 44 (1982). After Schempp was decided, numerous school
officials and state superintendents announced their decision to ignore the Supreme Court and pro-
ceed with various forms of prayer in their schools, calling those who supported the decision "athe-
ists, free thinkers, ultraliberals, a bunch of crackpots, and inverse bigots." Id. at 57.
97. These statutes and amendments have called for non-denominational prayers, voluntary
prayers and silent prayers, among other variations. Examples include the 1966 Dirksen Amendment
("providing for or permitting the voluntary participation of students or others in prayer"); the 1971
Wylie Amendment (supporting first nondenominational, then voluntary, prayer in public buildings);
and the 1981 Voluntary School Prayer Act (withdrawing jurisdiction from the Supreme Court in
claims relating to voluntary school prayers). Id. at 60-61, 67.
98. ROBERT S. ALLEY, SCHOOL PRAYER: THE COURT, THE CONGRESS, AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 172 (1994). Two of the ncwcst forms this impulse has taken are moments of silence
and student-initiated, nondenominational, nonproselytizing prayers at events such as graduation. Id.
99. The original text of the 1971 amendment, introduced by Rep. Chalmers Wylie (Ohio),
was:
Section 1. Nothing contained in this Constitution shall abridge the right of persons law-
fully assembled, in any public building which is supported in whole or in part through the
expenditure of public funds, to participate in nondenominational prayer.
Id. at 169.
100. Donald E. Boles, Religion and the Public Schools in Judicial Review, in RELIGION: THE
STATE AND EDUCATION 49 (James E. Wood, Jr. ed., 1984).
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unconstitutionality of such statutes.1"' A number of state legislatures
also called for Congress to enact a "voluntary prayer amendment.
102
Some courts and commentators would infer that Jaffree stands for
the proposition that a moment of silence law is constitutional so long as
the legislature does not acknowledge its intent to restore prayer to public
schools. Among others, Justice O'Connor has voiced her concern of
courts giving too little deference toward legislative decisions.,0 3  While
Justice O'Connor may have "little doubt' 1°4 that the courts will be able to
winnow out the sham secular purposes from the legitimate ones, the ex-
treme level of deference she suggests for this investigation will hobble
most judges. This rationale forces a questionable situation on legisla-
tures and courts. If the Court really means to allow moment of silence
laws, on the condition that the legislature itself is silent about any reli-
gious purpose for the law, this creates an awkward and easily exploitable
situation for legislatures. Given the long history of the battle over prayer
in public schools, this rationale is absurd if moments of silence are but
the newest battlefield in that war.10 5 To uphold such statutes so long as
no religious purpose is stated, or at least is accompanied by a secular
purpose, encourages legislators to wink at the requirements of the Estab-
lishment Clause and bring school prayer back in disguise.
Even some commentators who argue that moment of silence laws
are or can be constitutional admit that the "political origin" of these laws
was the war over prayer in public schools. 10 6 While states may claim any
number of secular purposes for moment of silence laws, 107 it is unlikely
that states would pass any of these laws if the history of school prayer
were different or nonexistent.'0 8 These admissions, along with the his-
101. David Z. Seide, Daily Moments of Silence in Public Schools, 58 N.Y.U.L. REv. 364, 366-
67(1983).
102. See id. at 366. By 1983, six states had called for such an amendment-Illinois, Kansas,
Nevada, North Carolina, Virginia, and Washington. More have called for such an amendment since
then. See supra note 4.
103. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 74 ("[Tlhe inquiry into the purpose of the legislature in enacting a
moment of silence law should be deferential and limited.").
104. Id. at 75.
105. Douglas Laycock observes that "many legislatures and teachers have used these moments
of silence to officially encourage prayer," arguing that the problem with the laws is in the implemen-
tation, not the enactment. Douglas Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal
Status of Religious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1986).
106. Laycock, for example, freely admits the origins of the moment of silence in public
schools, seeing them as direct "resistance to the Supreme Court's ban on school-sponsored prayer."
Id. at 5-6. He argues that despite this origin such laws can still be constitutional. Id.
107. Examples of secular purposes given for such laws include: to provide time for quiet re-
flection on the day ahead, to combat the problem evidenced by the violence at Columbine, to main-
tain order in the classroom, or to focus students on the coming day. See, e.g., Bown v. Gwinnett
County Sch. Dist., 112 F.3d 1464, 1472 (1 1th Cir. 1997) (stating that the secular purpose of the law
is "to provide students with a moment of quiet reflection to think about the upcoming day"); May v.
Cooperman, 780 F.2d 240, 244 (3d Cir. 1985) (suggesting a secular purpose of "providing a calm
transition from nonschool life to school work").
108. Laycock notes that these laws are clearly passed "in order to accommodate religious
thouht." Laycock, supra note 105, at 62.
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tory of these laws, make it difficult to see how a legislature could legiti-
mately claim a secular purpose. While a brief moment of silence at the
beginning of the school day may serve many purposes, legislators would
not attempt to mandate one if prayer had not been removed from public
schools.
B. Free Exercise Concerns
Proponents of moment of silence laws argue that without such laws,
public school students will be unable to pray during the school day, in
violation of their Free Exercise rights guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment. 10 9 However, this is a specious argument. Nothing in the Supreme
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence prevents a public school
student from silently praying during a lull in school activities. Many
such moments occur during the regular school day-lunchtimes, the
moments between classes or lessons, the bus ride or walk to school. A
specially created moment is not required for students to have a chance to
exercise their right to silently pray."1
0
The Court has also held that when the Establishment and Free Exer-
cise clauses of the First Amendment come into conflict, the Establish-
ment Clause must predominate.' 1 ' Arguably, the combination of the two
clauses means that religious beliefs and practices are "altogether pri-
vate," making their intrusion into the public world of education im-
proper.112  Also, citizens claiming that their right to free exercise has
been violated must show how the government, through the enactment of
laws, has infringed on that right." 3 Public school students are expected
to keep their minds on their studies throughout the structured part of the
school day; they are allowed neither to pray nor to read the daily news-
paper. The free exercise of their religious practices is not singled out for
special treatment. On the other hand, students are permitted to engage in
109. In fact, at least one Justice in the Jaffree decision felt that this was a real danger. Justice
O'Connor voiced concerns about balancing the competing demands of the Free Exercise and Estab-
lishment Clauses. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 81-84 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
110. In fact, some might argue that more prayer occurs as a test is being handed out than during
any state-mandated moment. See Herdahl v. Pontotoc County Sch. Dist., 933 F. Supp. 582, 599
(N.D. Miss. 1996); T.C. Mattocks, Reflections on Santa Fe v. Doe: Is Student Prayer at Graduation
Still an Option?, 150 ED. LAW REP. 333, 334 (2001).
111. "[T]he Amendment embraces two concepts-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The
first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be." Cantwell v. State of Conn., 310
U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940). The Establishment Clause embodies the first concept; the Free Exercise
Clause the second.
112. Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 52 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Rutledge, joined by Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, and Burton, argues that the word "religion" in
the First Amendment means just that-religious teaching, training, or practices-and is not to be
confused with a church. Id. This definition supports the theory that the prohibition that the Found-
ing Fathers sought to impose was broader than simply banning the establishment of an official
church by the government. Thus, encouraging prayer by students in public schools is just as forbid-
den as establishing one church as "official." Id.
113. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223 ("[l]t is necessary in a free exercise case for one to show the
coercive effect of the enactment as it operates against him in the practice of his religion.").
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any non-disruptive activity that they choose during the non-structured
parts of the day (i.e., the lunch period). Students who choose to pray or
read religious texts are certainly free to do so at these times; no specially
created "moment of silence" is needed to give students an opportunity
for these activities during the school day.
114
Claims that public students will be isolated from their religious be-
liefs are also difficult to credit. Supporters of moment of silence laws, or
of an actual return of vocal prayer to public classrooms, claim that stu-
dents are taught that their religion is false or unimportant by its lack of
presence in their daily curriculum.' 15 However, if parents and religious
institutions are unable to impart lasting religious instruction without the
presence of religion in a child's daily school life, it is unlikely that a mi-
nute of prayer each day is likely to alter that result."
16
C. Endorsement
Beyond the lack of a secular purpose, another problem with moment
of silence laws is the appearance of government endorsement of religion.
The Court sometimes uses an endorsement test," 7 instead of or in addi-
tion to the Lemon test.' 18 Under this test, the government cannot promote
or favor religion or give the appearance of promoting or favoring religion
in the eyes of a reasonable and informed observer." 9 Such endorsement
is prohibited because it would tend to express the idea that non-religious
114. One fallacy promoted by those who would restore prayer to public schools is that, as the
law now stands, students are prevented from silently praying on their own time during the school
day. Nothing in any of the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause decisions prevents a student from
silently praying at lunch, between classes, or at other free moments during the day. See, e.g., Robert
M. O'Neil, Who Says You Can't Pray?, 3 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 347, 366 (1996) (stating "individ-
ual students may not be prevented from bowing their heads and praying during the school day");
John M. Swomley, Myths About Voluntary School Prayer, WASHBURN LJ. 294, 297 (1996) (stating
that the Supreme Court "did not attempt to prohibit individual silent prayer, or grace before meals or
audible prayer in informal settings such as a cafeteria").
115. Andrew W. Hall, A Moment of Silence: A Permissible Accommodation Protecting the
Capacity to Form Religious Belief, 61 IND. L.J. 429, 431-32 (1986). Hall suggests that students will
reject their religious beliefs if those beliefs are not reinforced by the public schools. He calls the
removal of religion from the public school curriculum "a negative form of religious training" and
fears that the public school children will have but an "ideological void" in their moral development.
Id. He discards the possibility that parents, in conjunction with religious institutions, can and should
be the source of more "positive" religious training, not the public schools. Id. Rather, he states that
without the presence of religious training in the public schools, students will be at the mercy of "the
beliefs of the instructor or the creation of a secular ideology" in forming their moral compass. Id. at
433.
116. The Court has specifically noted that the "preservation and transmission of religious
beliefs and worship is a responsibility and a choice committed to the private sphere." Santa Fe, 530
U.S. at 310 (citing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 589 (1992)).
117. First articulated in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688-92 (1984) (O'Connor, J., con-
curring).
118. In fact, the endorsement test has been used as recently as 2000 by a majority of the Court
to examine an Establishment Clause challenge. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 308.
119. See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 776-77 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that "when the reasonable observer would view a government
practice as endorsing religion .... it is our duty to hold the practice invalid").
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citizens, or citizens not of the faith being endorsed, are "outsiders, not
full members of the political community.' 20  Often, the Court looks to
"expression by the government itself ... or else government action al-
leged to discriminate in favor of private religious ... activity"'121 to de-
termine whether there has been an unconstitutional endorsement of relig-
ion. Justice O'Connor states the test for endorsement as "whether an
objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and im-
plementation of the statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement of
prayer in public schools."' 22  While Justice O'Connor feels that moment
of silence laws, properly enacted, 23 could pass this test, such confidence
may be misplaced.
Silence can speak louder than legislators. Despite a hypothetical
legislature's silence as to any religious motive for a moment of silence
law, an objective observer can easily make the connection. With a long
history directly linking the emergence of these laws with the abolition of
prayer from the public schools,124 an objective observer cannotfhelp but
conclude that the legislative purpose behind these laws is to restore
school prayer. As students are already free to pray silently during any
momentary lull in the school day, setting aside a moment of silence spe-
cifically to accommodate prayer sends the message that religious belief,
or at least some forms of it, will be accommodated. 25 That the majority
of the community embraces the religious belief or practice that is favored
does not remove the constitutional concern and may in fact enhance it;
those in the community who do not embrace that, or any, religious belief
are also entitled to protection. 126 The very history of moment of silence
laws may make the appearance of government endorsement inevitable.
D. Coercion and Kids-a Special Situation
Under a third theory of evaluating Establishment Clause cases, the
Court looks to see if there is any sort of government coercion of religious
120. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
121. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 764.
122. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 76.
123. For the statute to be properly enacted, it would have to permit prayer but not specifically
endorse it. Id.
124. See supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text.
125. See Walter Dellinger, The Sound of Silence: An Epistle on Prayer and the Constitution, 95
YALE L.J. 1631, 1637 (1986). Dellinger, in this open letter to Congress, draws the connections
between the history of school prayer and moment of silence statutes. He sees the connection as even
clearer when the statute specifically mentions prayer as a possible activity during that moment. Id.
at 1636.
126. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 312. Protection of adherents of minority religions grows more
important each day, given our increasingly multi-cultural society. Ironically, this very diversity of
beliefs threatens some who would return prayer and other religious practices to our public schools.
After all, "the real problem is that Jews and atheists are pushing Christianity out of the public
schools." Marc W. Brown, Christmas Trees, Carols and Santa Claus, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 145, 163-64
(1999).
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practices. 27  No one may be forced to "support or participate in religion
or its exercise."'' 28 Even when individual choices appear to be involved,
the government must be careful that hidden coercion does not exist.,
29
Santa Fe recognized the powerful role that peer pressure can play in de-
termining the presence or absence of coercion. 130  Moment of silence
laws, especially when combined with the force of student peer pressure,
carry the risk of such coercion.'
31
The concern about the potential coercive effect of moment of si-
lence statutes takes on deeper nuances because of the audience in-
volved-children. The Court has repeatedly voiced concerns about the
potential for government coercion when the challenged statute involves
schools and/or children, 132 and has even considered mandatory school
attendance coercive government action.1 33 Government action need not
involve direct coercive pressure to participate in religious practices, but
may instead be more subtle, indirect coercion. 34 In decisions as early as
Lemon, the Court focused on "[the] process of inculcating religious doc-
127. Justice Kennedy has been a recent champion of a coercion test in the Court's Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence. He first articulated this view in Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 660-
63 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As part of this test, Justice Ken-
nedy states that government may not advance religion through coercive action. Id. This test remains
in use, as recently as 2000. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 302.
128. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 314.
129. Coercion does not always need to be overt; the circumstances surrounding a given act
might result in coercion even if none is obvious or intended. "When the power, prestige and finan-
cial support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pres-
sure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain."
Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,431 (1962).
130. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 317 ("[T]he government may no more use social pressure to enforce
orthodoxy than it may use more direct means.").
131. Justice Kennedy has noted the special problems inherent in dealing with students, realiz-
ing that the "line between voluntary and coerced participation may be difficult to draw." Bd. of
Educ. Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 261-62 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part). Other courts have also noted the difficulty in establishing that participation in religious activi-
ties is truly voluntary, when the participants are minors. See, e.g., Doe v. Porter, 188 F. Supp. 2d
904, 913 (E.D. Tenn. 2002).
132. The Ninth Circuit recently noted the Supreme Court's special attention to Establishment
Clause cases involving public schools and children. See Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597,
605 (9th Cir. 2002). The court is concerned that the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance, including
the phrase "under God," will have a coercive effect on the children forced to either recite or at least
listen to the Pledge on a daily basis. The "age and impressionability of schoolchildren, and their
understanding that they are required to adhere to the norms set by their school, their teacher and their
fellow students" are of especial concern to the court. Id. at 611. The Ninth Circuit found that the
inclusion of the words "under God" in the Pledge was unconstitutional under all three tests the
Supreme Court has used to evaluate Establishment Clause cases, including the Lemon test. Id. at
611. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that Newdow lacked standing to chal-
lenge the Pledge on his daughter's behalf. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct.
2301, 2312 (2004).
133. Lisa Ness Seidman, Religious Music in the Public Schools: Music to Establishment
Clause Ears?, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 466, 482 n.127 (1997) (citing Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 584;
McCollum, 333 U.S. 212). The Court has also taken notice of the special role public schools play in
our society, pointing out the need for education free of divisive elements such as religious tenets. Id.
at n. 125.
134. Id. at 483-84. She notes that the Court has held indirect coercion-specifically the re-
quirement to attend school-to be enough for a governmental practice to violate the Establishment
Clause. Id. at 484 n.150 (citing Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223).
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trine [being] enhanced by the impressionable age of the pupils, in pri-
mary schools particularly."' 35 In Jaffree, both the majority 36 and Justice
O'Connor's concurrence' 37 raise concerns about the special challenges of
mixing religion, government, and children.'
38
This concern for the special coercive pressure faced by students
should not be lightly dismissed. While Justice O'Connor may "discern
[no] serious threat to religious liberty"'139 from the creation of a daily
moment of silence, the impressionability of school children cannot be
discounted when evaluating these statutes. Supporters of moment of
silence statutes argue that there is no coercive effect and therefore no
Establishment Clause issue with them because silence is not inherently
religious in nature. 14  While pure silence may not be inherently reli-
gious, the history of these statutes lends an association between prayer
and silence that dooms these statutes regardless of their exact wording.
141
As explained above, the road that legislatures have traveled to arrive at
moment of silence laws has been a long one-one directly linked to re-
storing prayer in public schools. 142 Such laws were never even consid-
ered until the Supreme Court held that mandatory prayer in public school
classrooms was unconstitutional. 14
135. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 616. The Court continues to stress the importance of taking great care
when evaluating Establishment Clause issues that involve children. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S. 577, 592 (1992); School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390 (1985) ("The symbolism of a union
between church and state is most likely to influence children of tender years, whose experience is
limited and whose beliefs consequently are the function of environment as much as of free and
voluntary choice."); Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 583-84.
136. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 61 n.51.
137. Id. at 81.
138. Concern about religious coercion of public school students also arises in a number of
other settings. For example, the role of religious music in public school choirs and music classes has
provided a battleground for those who would restore prayer to public schools. See, e.g. Seidman,
supra note 133. Seidman explores the role of religious music in public schools, especially the case
of Bauchman v. West High Sch., 900 F. Supp. 254 (D. Utah 1995). She draws an analogy to moment
of silence laws. Siedman, supra note 133, at 485. The Supreme Court has yet to decide how reli-
gious music and public schools may intersect the Establishment Clause, specifically denying certio-
rari n the Bauchman case. See also Skarin v. Woodbine Community Sch. Dist., 204 F. Supp. 2d
1195 (S.D. Iowa 2002) (challenging the school's practice of having students sing the Lord's Prayer
during graduation ceremony). Student-led prayers at the beginning of high school football games
have, however, already drawn the censure of the Court. Santa Fe, 520 U.S. at 317.
139. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 73. Commentators have also drawn on O'Connor's language to
downplay any potential coercion from a moment of silence. See, e.g. Johnson, School Prayer and
the Constitution: Silence is Golden, 48 MD. L. Rev. 1018, 1037-39 (1989). Of course, some of the
individuals striving to return prayer to public schools tend not to see any religiously motivated act as
much of a threat and may be somewhat biased in their appraisal of a moment of silence. See, e.g.,
Brown, supra note 126, at 160 (noting that members of a group opposed to the removal of religious
celebrations from the public schools didn't see that "singing 'Silent Night' [in the public schools]
puts you on the radical edge").
140. Johnson, supra note 139, at 1037-39.
141. See supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text.
142. See supra Part IV(A).
143. See BUZZARD, supra note 96, at 58 (noting a total of 147 amendments introduced in
Congress to overturn Engel alone). Further, moment of silence laws in their current forms did not
even become a possibility until legislatures had tried a number of mandatory and voluntary vocal
prayer statutes, most of which were struck down as unconstitutional. See, e.g., ALLEY, supra note
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Finally, the implementation of moment of silence laws may inad-
vertently coerce students. While most statutes allow students to do
whatever they wish during that moment, some students will receive the
message that the time is set aside for them to pray. Whether they receive
that message from their parents or their preacher, those students may
look askance at a fellow student who instead chooses to spend one more
minute catching up on his math homework, who pulls out her Harry Pot-
ter book to read a few more pages, or who steps into the hall to avoid
feeling coerced to pray.144 Some students may even receive the message
that prayer is the favored way to spend the minute from their teachers or
other school officials, lending weight to the idea that any student who
visibly chooses not to pray is doing something wrong. 145  Peer pressure
from these students will make those who choose not to pray uncomfort-
able and may force them into doing something they would rather not-
pray or, at least, pretend to pray. t46 Finally, state legislatures in Virginia
and Georgia have already begun to send the message that prayer is the
favored activity during the mandatory moment of silence, lending more
coercive weight to the implementation of these laws. 1
47
The threat of student coercion resulting from a moment of silence in
the morning may be small, but even small threats to the values embodied
in the Constitution must be taken seriously. 148 Peer pressure among stu-
98, at 175 (noting an attempt to change voluntary prayer to a moment of silence in a proposed
amendment). This progression suggests that some legislators who seek to circumvent Engel and
related decisions are willing to take small steps backward, until they find the maximum amount of
school prayer that is permitted by the Constitution.
144. Some students are already feeling the coercive effects of moment of silence statutes.
Jordan Kupersmith, a Virginia high school student, spends the beginning of each day in his princi-
pal's office rather than participate in the moment of silence. Kupersmith feels that the law is "un-
fair" and promotes prayer as a favored classroom activity. See Gotta Minute? Virginia Enacts Min-
ute of Silence in Schools, WEEKLY READER, Jan. 26, 2001, at 3.
145. After the Supreme Court denied certiorari for Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265 (4th Cir.
2001), the Loudoun County Virginia School Board decreed that students must be told "at least twice
a year that they may pray ... during the state-mandated daily minute of silence." See Rosalind S.
Helderman, Principals Must Explain Moment of Silence Rights, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2001, at TO1.
The motion to require this emphasis on the right to pray was inspired by the September 11 th terrorist
attacks. Id. One board member said that the time was right for this emphasis, given the "calls to
meditation and prayer by all of our leaders" following the attacks. Id.
146. Religious activities associated with the school outside the moment of silence lend weight
to the peer pressure in the classroom. In Florida, after a student organized a "religious-outreach
opportunity" at his school, he found that his "biggest reward" was that "[k]ids who used to crack
jokes during the daily moment of silence now hold their tongues." Jodie Morse, Letting God Back
In, TiME, Oct. 22, 2001, at 71. The implication in this new silence is that the school has sent the
message that prayer is the appropriate or favored way to spend the moment of silence, and that
dissenters may face consequences.
147. See supra notes 53 and 59.
148. The Court has expressed concern over the idea that small violations of the Constitution are
somehow less important, or that they do not cause any great damage to our national values. Justice
Black cited James Madison, the author of the First Amendment, who wrote:
(I)t is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties .... Who does not see
that the same authority which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other Relig-
ions, may establish with the same ease any particular sect of Christians, in exclusion of
all other Sects? That the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute three
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dents is a powerful force, and the underlying history of these moments of
silence may lead to pressure--overt or covert-on students to pray dur-
ing these moments. The fact that moment of silence laws do not support
or denounce any particular religion does not mean that the general gov-
ernment support for religion should be ignored.
V. CONCLUSION
Our Constitution guarantees that individuals will not be forced to
participate in religious activities against their own beliefs. It also guaran-
tees that the government-both at the state and federal levels-will not
use its power to establish an official religion, nor to favor religion over
non-religion. This constitutional guarantee must be at its strongest in our
public schools. Without a firm separation between church and state,
impressionable students may feel coerced into religious activities and
beliefs.
Moment of silence laws are but the current waypoint on the long
school-prayer journey that started with Engel.149 To uphold these laws,
with their roots in mandatory prayer, as constitutional is a serious crack
in the wall separating church and state, and for courts to look the other
way, while legislators obscure their religious motivations, is to promote a
farce that damages our constitutional guarantees.
pence only of his property for the support of any one establishment, may force him to
conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever?
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 436 (1962). The Court has also expressed concern about a whittling
down of our constitutional protections in other instances. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 29 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (concerned that "with time the most solid freedom stead-
ily gives way before continuing corrosive decision").
149. Other contemporary challenges to the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on public life and
prayer include school voucher programs and displays of the Ten Commandments. In Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002), the Supreme Court upheld a Cleveland, Ohio voucher
program. The Court held that the program was neutral with respect to religion, and therefore did not
violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 2473. While most voucher systems permit the use of the
funds in both secular and sectarian schools, Justice Souter's dissenting opinion pointed out that the
vast majority of voucher students, and therefore voucher money, go to sectarian schools. Id. at 2494-
95 (Souter, J., dissenting). Another current tactic for those who would restore prayer to public life is
the posting of the Ten Commandments in public buildings, such as courthouses. Numerous chal-
lenges to such postings have arisen across the country. See, e.g., Glassroth v. Moore, 229 F. Supp. 2d
1290 (M.D. Ala. 2002) (challenging the installation of a monument engraved with the Ten Com-
mandments in the Alabama State Judicial Building); ACLU v. Mercer County, 219 F. Supp. 2d 777
(E.D. Ky. 2002) (challenging the posting of a framed copy of the Ten Commandments in the county
courthouse).
IN SEARCH OF TRADITION: GOODRIDGE V. DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC HEALTH
INTRODUCTION
On November 18, 1863, Abraham Lincoln sat in his train on the
way to Gettysburg.' As he contemplated the speech he was about to give,
he surely realized that he was "giving people a new past to live with"
when he "altered [the Constitution] from within, by appeal from its letter
to the spirit."2 Yet the lawyer in Lincoln might have been surprised to see
the ways in which he was about to change the nation beyond the imme-
diate struggle for union and emancipation.3  The Gettysburg Address
would be in large part the foundation of the Fourteenth Amendment.4
From that text, much of the Bill of Rights was applied to the states. 5 A
right to contract would be discovered, and then discarded.6 A right to
privacy would be found, limiting the states' abilities to interfere with a
7
person's choices of contraception, abortion, and marriage.
This Comment addresses Goodridge v. Department of Public
Health,8 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts' response to same-
sex couples seeking marriage licenses. Part I gives the facts and proce-
dural history of the case, and Part II provides background to put Good-
ridge in its historical context. Part III summarizes the majority, concur-
ring, and dissenting opinions. Part IV suggests that the court did not ad-
dress the true issue presented by the case, which is whether laws prohib-
iting same-sex marriage should receive the strict judicial scrutiny that
accompanies a fundamental right, and argues that strict scrutiny is the
proper standard.9 This Comment concludes that protecting same-sex
marriage as a fundamental right is in fact consistent with American his-
tory and tradition.
1. GARRY WILLS, LINCOLN AT GETTYSBURG, 29-30 (Simon & Schuster 1992).
2. Id. at 38.
3. For an in-depth analysis of the Gettysburg Address, see WILLS, supra note I.
4. Id.; see generally KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
414-15 (Foundation Press 2001) (discussing the origins of the Civil War Amendments).
5. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
6. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
7. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
8. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
9. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 971 (Greaney, J., concurring).
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I. FACTS OF GOODRIDGE V. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH
During a five-week period beginning in March 2001, numerous
same-sex couples applied for marriage certificates in the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts.' As required by General Laws c. 207 (hereinafter
"G.L. c. 207"), the couples presented their "completed notices of inten-
tion to marry ... forms to a Massachusetts town or city clerk, together
with the required health forms and marriage license fees."" The parties
agreed that all of the facial requirements necessary to receive the licenses
were met. 
12
In all cases, the marriage licenses were denied "on the ground[s]
that Massachusetts does not recognize same-sex marriage."' 3 In re-
sponse, plaintiffs filed a complaint on April 11, 2001, alleging "the ex-
clusion of the [p]laintiff couples and other qualified same-sex couples
from access to marriage licenses, and the legal and social status of civil
marriage, as well as the protections, benefits and obligations of marriage,
violate[d] Massachusetts law." 14 Each side sought summary judgment.15
The Superior Court granted summary judgment for the Common-
wealth. 16 The judge held that there was no fundamental right to same-sex
marriage and accordingly applied rational basis review.' 7 He found that
plaintiffs' constitutional rights were not violated under such a standard.
1 8
Plaintiffs appealed, and the Supreme Judicial Court considered the con-
solidated case of Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.19
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Evolution of the Fundamental Rights Doctrine
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health unfolds in the context of
the debate that has continued since the nation's inception: does the Con-
stitution offer only the protections that it specifically states, or are there
rights not enumerated that enjoy similar protections? 20 The early discus-
sion is well captured in the 1798 case of Calder v. Bull. 21 Justice Chase
wrote: "There are certain vital principles in our free Republican Gov-
ernment, which will determine and overrule an apparent and flagrant
abuse of legislative power ... an ACT . . . (for I cannot call it a law)
10. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941, 949 (Mass. 2003).
11. Goodridge, 798 N.E. 2d at 949-50.





17. Id. at 951.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 960.
20. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 452.
21. 3 U.S. 386 (1798).
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contrary to [this] principle ... cannot be considered a rightful exercise of
legislative authority." 22 Justice Chase's position drew on the idea of natu-
ral law, viewing "a written constitution not as the initial source [of a law]
but as a reaffirmation of a social compact preserving pre-existing funda-
mental rights-rights entitled to protection whether or not they were ex-
plicitly stated in the document. 2 3 Dissenting in Calder, Justice Iredell
stated: "Some speculative jurists have held, that a legislative act against
natural justice must, in itself, be void ... , [however] the ideas of natural
justice are regulated by no fixed standard: the ablest and purest men have
differed on the subject ... ,24
Justice Chase's ideas had origins within the highest tradition of
English Law. 5 Sir William Blackstone had written: "Thus, when the
Supreme Being formed the universe, and created matter out of nothing,
he impressed certain principles upon that matter ... so, when he created
man .. he laid down certain immutable laws . . . and gave him the fac-
ulty of reason to discover the purport of those laws." 26 Winston Churchill
described the views of Chief Justice Sir Edward Coke in a similar way:
"Coke himself was reluctant to admit that law could be made, or even
changed. It existed already, merely awaiting revelation and expostula-
tion.
, ,9 7
The debate continued upon enactment of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in 1868. The initial case law took a narrow approach similar to Jus-
tice Iredell's, viewing the Fourteenth Amendment as merely having a
purpose to end slavery and ensure racial equality.28 For example, initial
attempts at the Incorporation Doctrine, whereby the Bill of Rights was
applied to the states, failed. 29 In The Slaughter-House Cases, Justice
Miller wrote:
When the effect [of the Fourteenth Amendment] is to fetter and de-
grade the state governments by subjecting them to control of Con-
gress, in the exercise of powers heretofore universally conceded to
them of the most ordinary and fundamental character; when it in fact
radically changes the whole theory of the relations of the state and
federal governments to each other and of both these governments to
the people; the argument [opposing such a view] has a force that is ir-
resistible, in the absence of language which expresses such a purpose
too clearly to admit of doubt. We are convinced that no such results
22. Calder, 3 U.S. at 388.
23. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 452.
24. Calder, 3 U.S. at 398-99 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
25. JOHN C. MILLER, ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 216 (Little, Brown and Co.
1943).
26. SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE ENGLISH LAW § II, at 38-40 (Grigg
Duyckink Long Collins, Chitty ed., 1827).
27. 2 WINSTON CHURCHILL, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH SPEAKING PEOPLES 125 (Dodd,
Mead & Co. 1956).
28. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
29. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 36.
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were intended by the Congress which proposed these amendments,
nor by the legislatures of the States which ratified them.
30
An examination of the plain language of the Fourteenth Amendment
supports Justice Miller:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
3
1
There is no language contained in this amendment that expresses a
purpose of changing the relationship between State and Federal govern-
ment "too clearly to admit of doubt.,
32
Yet as time passed, law not in the text would be discovered "by ap-
peal from its letter to the spirit.' 33 In Lochner v. New York,34 the Court
indicated a willingness to move past a literal interpretation of the word
"liberty" in the Due Process Clause.35 The Court held that liberty created
a fundamental right to contract, and the state of New York was not al-
36lowed to interfere with labor contracts. Justice Holmes' dissenting
comment that "The Fourteenth Amendment did not enact Mr. Herbert
Spencer's Social Statics"37 would eventually prevail, and the right to
38contract is no longer considered fundamental. However, other cases
would emerge that applied Lochner's broad concept of liberty to other
rights that were considered fundamental.39 In Skinner v. Oklahoma,4 ° the
court invalidated a mandatory sterilization law, holding that the right to
procreate was fundamental.4 ' In Meyer v. Nebraska,42 the Court ex-
panded on these rights, stating: "[Liberty] denotes not merely freedom
from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to.. . engage in
any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to
marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according
30. Id. at 78 (emphasis added).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
32. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 78.
33. WILLS, supra note 1, at 38; Lawrence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The Fundamental
Right That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1938 (2004); see generally
SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 452 (discussing the rise of substantive due process).
34. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
35. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64; Tribe, supra note 33, at 1938.
36. Id.; Tribe, supra note 33, at 1938.
37. Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics was an economic
treatise advocating a laissez-faire approach that was popular at the turn of the century. Id.
38. See generally SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 4 (detailing the end of the Lochner
regime); Tribe, supra note 33, at 1938.
39. See generally SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 508-594 (discussing the evolution
of the fundamental rights doctrine); Tribe, supra note 33, at 1938.
40. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
41. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541-43.
42. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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to the dictates of his own conscience .... Justice Goldberg stated the
evolving view in his concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut:'
"[T]he concept of liberty protects those personal rights which are funda-
mental, and is not confined to the specific terms of the Bill of Rights...
there are additional fundamental rights which exist alongside those...
specifically mentioned." 45 As this line of jurisprudence developed, the
Court would hold that fundamental rights included the right to control
one's body46 and mind,47 the right to travel,48 to marry,49 to vote,5" and
perhaps most controversially, the right to privacy.5 !
In 1973, the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade,52 which used this
privacy right, "founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of per-
sonal liberty," to protect a woman's right to an abortion. Although lim-
ited to abortion, "Roe has proved to be key to subsequent decisions not
limited to reproductive rights. 53 Nineteen years later, the Court ex-
panded on Roe in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,54 holding that traditions
"afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to mar-
riage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education. '55
In 2003, the Court indicated the broadest protection yet, holding in
Lawrence v. Texas5 6 that a state may not criminalize same-sex sodomy
and that the constitutional guarantees of personal liberty and privacy
protect "freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate con-
duct . . .beyond spatial bounds [of the home]. 57 In dissent, Justice
Scalia noted that as a result of the holding, "laws against ... same-sex
marriage . . . [are] called into question."58 The Goodridge plaintiffs
agreed.59
43. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
44. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
45. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486-88 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
46. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 535.
47. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 390.
48. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505 (1964).
49. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978).
50. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,639 (1993).
51. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
52. Roe, 410U.S. at 113.
53. Brenda Feigen, Same-Sex Marriage: An Issue of Constitutional Rights Not Moral Opin-
ions, 27 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 345, 345 (2004).
54. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
55. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
56. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
57. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
58. Id. at 2490 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
59. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 960.
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B. The Impact of the Fundamental Rights Doctrine on Legislation
A judicial by-product of the fundamental rights doctrine is the vary-
ing standards of review by which the Court reviews legislation. 6° When a
fundamental right is present, the Court uses "strict judicial scrutiny"; a
law must have a "compelling goal" and be "narrowly tailored" toward
that goal.61 Absent a fundamental right, the Court uses "rational basis" or
"minimum rationality" review; a law must only have a "legitimate goal"
and be "rationally related" toward that goal.62 The naming of a standard,
"a point somewhere on the spectrum from minimum rationality to per se
prohibition in order to signal the appropriate level of judicial deference
* . . the legislature should expect, is a recent addition to the Court's
methodology 64 It is often criticized as being more "conclusory than in-
formative," 65 leaving commentators to suggest that it "has not shown
itself worthy of being enshrined as a permanent fixture in the armament
of constitutional analysis.
' 66
Worthy or not, varying levels of judicial scrutiny might be here to
stay; sometimes it is harder to put jurisprudential genies back in the bot-
tles whence they came than the more magical kind.67 Clearly, an entire
case can turn on the presence of a fundamental right.68 Goodridge should
have.
69
III. GOODRIDGE V. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH70
A sharply divided court issued the opinion.71 The majority held that
there was no rational reason to treat same-sex couples differently than
opposite-sex couples.72 Accordingly, the majority held that Massachu-
setts could not exclude same-sex partners from receiving marriage li-
censes.73 Justice Greaney concurred with the result but wrote separately
to indicate that he believed the decision should have been reached by
applying a higher level of judicial scrutiny.74 Justices Spina, Sosman, and
60. Tribe, supra note 33, at 1916; see generally Lynn Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitu-
tional Claims for Same Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L. REV. 1, 14, 28 (discussing the impact of strict
scrutiny).
61. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 960,976.
62. Id. at 983.
63. Tribe, supra note 33, at 1916.
64. Id. at 1916-17.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See generally id. (commenting on the merits of varying levels of judicial review).
68. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 970 (Greaney, J., concurring); see generally Wardle, supra note
60 (discussing the impact of strict scrutiny).
69. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 970 (Greaney, J., concurring); see generally Wardle, supra note
60.
70. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
71. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 941.
72. Id. at 948.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 970 (Greaney, J., concurring).
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Cordy each wrote separate dissents. 5 Justice Spina argued that the court
had taken on a legislative role.76 Justice Sosman suggested that the court
had misapplied the minimum rationality standard." Justice Cordy wrote
that the opinion ignored the fact that the traditional definition of marriage
was "between a man and a woman. 78 Each dissenting justice joined the
dissents of the other two.
7 9
A. The Majority Opinion: Applying Rational Basis Review
Chief Justice Marshall announced the opinion of the court, which
was joined by Justices Ireland and Cowin.80 The court recognized that
legislative intent, along with history and tradition, defined marriage as a
"union between a man and woman."8' Nevertheless, noting the impor-
tance of marriage in a community, and the many benefits that flow only
to married couples, the court held that to deny same-sex partners a mar-
riage license violated their rights under the Massachusetts Constitution.82
As Articles 1, 7, 10, and 12 of the Massachusetts Constitution draw lan-
guage from the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
the opinion relied heavily on federal Constitutional case law.
83
In reaching its conclusion, the court examined the legislative ration-
ales offered by the state: "(1) providing a favorable setting for procrea-
tion; (2) ensuring the optimal setting for child rearing, which the depart-
ment defines as a two-parent family with one parent of each sex; and (3)
preserving scarce State and private financial resources." 84 Ultimately, the
court found that there was no rational relationship between these goals
and the policy of excluding same-sex partners from receiving a marriage
license. 85 Therefore, the majority declined to reach the issue of whether
75. Id. at 979 (Sosman, J., dissenting); id. at 975 (Spina, J., dissenting); id. at 983 (Cordy, J.,
dissenting).
76. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 975 (Spina, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 979 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 983 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 983 (Cordy, J., dissenting); id. at 979 (Sosman, J., dissenting); id. at 975 (Spina, J.,
dissenting).
80. Id. at 948.
81. Id. at 952.
82. Id. at 968-70.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 961.
85. Id. at 948. Pointing out that the rationality review is not "toothless," id. at 960, the court
noted:
If total deference to the Legislature were the case, the judiciary would be stripped of its
constitutional authority to decide challenges to statutes pertaining to marriage, child rear-
ing, and family relationships, and, conceivably, unconstitutional laws that provided for
the forced sterilization of habitual criminals; prohibited miscegenation; required court
approval for the marriage of persons with child support obligations; compelled a pregnant
unmarried minor to obtain the consent of both parents before undergoing an abortion; and
made sodomy a criminal offense, to name just a few, would stand.
Id. at 966 n.31.
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same-sex marriage was a fundamental right demanding strict scrutiny.
86
The decision of the Superior Court was vacated.87
B. Justice Greaney's Concurrence: Laws Prohibiting Same-Sex Mar-
riage Should Receive Heightened Scrutiny
Justice Greaney filed a concurring opinion, agreeing with both the
outcome and the remedy. 88 However, he suggested that a fundamental
rights analysis was the correct approach to the case: "The withholding of
relief from the plaintiffs, who wish to marry, and are otherwise eligible
to marry, on the ground that the couples are of the same gender, consti-
tutes a categorical restriction of a fundamental right.",89 Accordingly, he
advocated the strict scrutiny that accompanies such a right.90 He further
noted that given the fact that marriage is "the cornerstone of our social
structure, as well as the defining relationship in our personal lives,"
9'
none of the state's rationales for interpreting G.L. c. 207 to exclude
same-sex partners were sufficiently compelling to withstand strict scru-
tiny.92
Justice Greaney also argued that interpreting G.L. c. 207 to exclude
same-sex partners was an equal protection violation of both the federal
and state Constitutions based on sex.9 3 He disagreed with those who sug-
gested that there was no gender discrimination at all, pointing out:
"Hillary Goodridge cannot marry Julie Goodridge because she (Hillary)
is a woman. Likewise, Gary Chalmers cannot marry Richard Linnell
because he (Gary) is a man." 94
C. The Dissents: Courts Should Not Act As A Legislative Body
The dissents attempted to discredit the majority opinion by pointing
out its lack of deference to the legislature, the total lack of scientific evi-
dence considered, and the majority's misapplication of the minimum
rationality standard. 95 These justices also suggested that there was no
right to same-sex marriage, fundamental or not.
96
Justice Spina dissented on the grounds that the court had usurped
the responsibilities of the legislature. He wrote "What is at stake in this
86. Id. at 961.
87. Id. at 969.
88. Id. at 970 (Greaney, J., concurring).
89. Id. (Greaney, J., concurring).
90. Id. (Greaney, J., concurring).
91. Id. at 973 n.5 (Greaney, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 972 (Greaney, J., concurring).
93. Id. (Greaney, J., concurring).
94. Id. at 971 (Greaney, J., concurring).
95. Id. at 979 (Sosman, J., dissenting); id. at 975 (Spina, J., dissenting); id. at 983 (Cordy, J.,
dissenting).
96. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 979 (Sosman, J., dissenting); id. at 975 (Spina, J., dissenting);
id. at 983 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
97. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 975 (Spina, J., dissenting).
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case is not the unequal treatment of individuals or whether individual
rights have been impermissibly burdened, but the power of the Legisla-
ture to effectuate social change without interference from the courts. 98
Justice Sosman dissented, arguing that the majority had misapplied
the rational basis standard.99 He additionally objected to the lack of atten-
tion given to scientific study, noting that "studies to date reveal that there
are still some observable differences between children raised by oppo-
site-sex couples and children raised by same-sex couples."
100
Finally, Justice Cordy dissented on the grounds that the very defini-
tion of marriage was "a union between a man and woman," and that
when the majority held this to be "merely conclusory," it was a "seman-
tic sleight of hand."'' While acknowledging that a classification based
on sex should receive heightened review, he disagreed with Justice Gre-
aney that this was such a case, based on the idea that people of neither
sex were prohibited from marrying a person of the opposite sex.'
0 2
IV. ANALYSIS
This analysis suggests that the Goodridge v. Department of Public
Health court did not address the true issue presented by the case, which
is whether laws prohibiting same-sex marriage should receive the strict
judicial scrutiny that accompanies a fundamental right. 10 3 Section (A)
explains why the court was incorrect when it chose the rational basis
standard of review.i °4 Section (B) maintains that this standard was incor-
rectly applied. 0 5 Section (C) argues that same-sex marriage should be
analyzed as a fundamental right,' °6 by demonstrating that the true tradi-
tion at issue is the fundamental right of controlling "choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, [which] are central to the liberty pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment."' 07 Section (D) concludes by ap-
plying the strict scrutiny that would accompany such a right.
A. Choosing Rational Basis Review
By choosing rational basis review, the Goodridge court used the
wrong standard. 10 8 In Skinner v. Oklahoma,'0 9 the United States Supreme
98. Id. at 974 (Spina, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 979 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
100. Id. (Sosman, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 984 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
102. Id. (Cordy, J., dissenting).
103. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 970 (Mass. 2003) (Greaney, J.,
concurring).
104. Goodridge, 798 N.E. 2d at 970 (Greaney, J., concurring).
105. Id. at 978 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
106. Tribe, supra note 33, at 1945.
107. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
108. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 972 (Greaney, J., concurring); id. at 983 (Cordy, J., dissenting);
id. at 976 (Spina, J., dissenting); see Karen Loewy, The Unconstitutionality Of Excluding Same-Sex
Couples From Marriage, 38 NEw ENG. L. REV. 555, 560-61 (2004).
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Court held that "Marriage is one of the basic civil rights of man, funda-
mental to our very existence and survival."11  The Court confirmed in
Loving v. Virginia'11 that marriage is a fundamental right, "one of the
vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness." 12 And
in Zablocki v. Redhail,"3 the Court held that marriage is "part of the
'fundamental right of privacy' implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause.' 1 4 Yet the Goodridge court held that because "no
fundamental right or 'suspect' class is at issue here ... rational basis is
the appropriate standard of review."" 5 Despite citing language that con-
firms that marriage is a fundamental right, it proceeded to hold: "The
right to marry is different from rights deemed fundamental for equal pro-
tection and due process purposes . . .116 If the court is referring to tradi-
tional marriage, this is an incorrect statement of the law." 7 If the court is
referring to same-sex marriage, it is undermining the legal foundation of
its conclusion. 118 The opinion is replete with language, and rests on the
principle, that same-sex partners applying for marriage licenses should
be treated no differently than opposite-sex partners. 119 Loving, Zablocki
and Skinner dictate that laws restricting opposite-sex marriage receive
strict scrutiny.
120
Certainly, state law may provide greater protection to its citizens
than does the federal Constitution.' 21 The Goodridge court noted that
"Fundamental to the vigor of our Federal system of government is that
,state courts are absolutely free to interpret state constitutional provisions
to accord greater protection to individual rights than do similar provi-
sions of the United States Constitution."' 22 However, a state may not
provide less protection than the federal Constitution mandates. 23 In other
words, federal cases "set the floor.. . but not the ceiling."' 24 Since the
court held that same-sex and opposite-sex couples should be treated the
same, it was bound by federalism to apply strict scrutiny.
125
109. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
110. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942)) (internal citations omitted).
111. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
112. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
113. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
114. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 957 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978)).
115. Id. at 961.
116. Id. at 957.
117. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 972 (Greaney,
J., concurring).
118. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 972 (Greaney, J., concurring); id. at 983 (Cordy, J, dissenting).
119. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948.
120. Loving, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Skinner, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Zablocki, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
121. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 30 (1995).
122. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d 941 (citing Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. at 7).
123. Loewy, supra note 108, at 556.
124. Id. at 558.
125. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 972 (Greaney, J., concurring).
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The Goodridge court concluded that Massachusetts' ban did not
survive rational basis review for either due process or equal protection. 2
6
Accordingly, the court did not consider plaintiffs' arguments that the
case merited strict judicial scrutiny.127 Undoubtedly, if a law fails rational
basis review, afortiori it fails strict scrutiny. 28 If G.L. c. 207 truly failed
rational basis review, the choice of the wrong standard would be irrele-
vant. 129 However, as demonstrated below, G.L. c. 207 should in fact
withstand rational basis review, leaving the question of whether it would
survive strict scrutiny unanswered. 1
30
B. Applying Rational Basis Review
The court asked the wrong question when it applied the rational ba-
sis test.13' The real question under that test is not whether excluding
same-sex marriages will achieve the goals set forth by the state, but
whether it might.132 While it is true that the rational basis test is "not
toothless," it is the lowest standard of judicial review; a statute will
survive if it addresses a legitimate state goal, and a rational legislator
could think that the statute might advance the goal.
134
Since "[t]he rational basis standard applied under the Massachusetts
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution is the same," federal case law illustrates the point well. 135 In Wil-
liamson v. Lee Optical,136 Justice Douglas confirmed that the mere theo-
retical possibility that a law would advance a goal was sufficient to with-
stand rational basis review. 137 He wrote:
The legislature might have concluded that the frequency of occasions
when a prescription is necessary was sufficient to justify this regula-
tion .... The legislature might have concluded that one was needed
often enough to require one in every case. Or the legislature may
have concluded that eye examinations were so critical . .. that every
change should be accompanied by a prescription from a medical ex-
126. Id. at 941.
127. Id. at 961.
128. Id. at 972 (Greaney, J., concurring).
129. Id. (Greaney, J., concurring).
130. Id. (Greaney, J., concurring).
131. Goodridge, 798 N.E. 2d at 978 (Sosman, J., dissenting); id. at 983 (Cordy, J., dissenting);
id. at 975 (Spina, J., dissenting); id. at 972 (Greaney, J., concurring).
132. Goodridge, 798 N.E. 2d at 978 (Sosman, J., dissenting); id. at 983 (Cordy, J., dissenting);
id. at 975 (Spina, J., dissenting); id. at 972 (Greancy, J., concurring).
133. Goodridge, 798 N.E. 2d at 960.
134. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 978
(Sosman, J., dissenting); id. at 983 (Cordy, J., dissenting); id. at 975 (Spina, J., dissenting); id. at 972
(Greaney, J., concurring).
135. Goodridge, 798 N.E. 2d at 983 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
136. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
137. Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487.
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pert. The law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its
aims to be constitutional.' 
38
The first legislative rationale in Goodridge is that marriage provides
a "favorable setting for procreation."' 39 The majority held that it failed
minimum rationality because "[t]he consummation of a marriage by coi-
tion is not necessary to its validity," and "impotency does not render a
marriage void, but only voidable at the suit of the party conceiving him-
self or herself to be wronged."'' 40 This argument misses the point. 141 Just
because some married people may not have children does not mean that
marriage is not a "favorable setting for procreation."'' 4 2 If it might be
such a setting, G.L. c. 207 survives rational basis review.
143
The second legislative rationale is "ensuring the optimal setting for
child rearing."' 144 The court simply stated: "The 'best interests of the
child standard' does not turn on a parent's sexual orientation or marital
status."' 145 Yet, as noted in Justice Sosman's dissent, for several thousand
years, there has been a popular opinion that living in a home with a
mother and father is in fact the optimal setting for a child. 146 This does
not mean that this belief is necessarily true, but it does mean that it
would not be irrational for a legislator to think that it is true.147 That is all
that the standard requires. n4
The third legislative rationale is "preserving scarce State and private
financial resources."'149 The court's contention that "an absolute statutory
ban on same-sex marriage bears no rational relationship to the goal of
economy"' 50 is somewhat undermined by the extensive list of state bene-
fits that are denied single people:
[J]oint Massachusetts income tax filing; entitlement to wages owed
to a deceased employee [public employees]; preferential options un-
der the Commonwealth's pension system; preferential benefits in the
Commonwealth's medical program; access to veterans' spousal bene-
fits and preferences; financial protections for spouses of certain
138. Id. (emphasis added).
139. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961; Loewy, supra note 108, at 559.
140. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961 (citing Franklin v. Franklin, 28 N.E. 681 (Mass. 1891) and
Martin v. Otis, 124 N.E. 294 (Mass. 1919)); Loewy, supra note 108, at 559.
141. Loewy, supra note 108, at 559.
142. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961.
143. Id. at 978 (Sosman, J., dissenting); id. at 983 (Cordy, J., dissenting); id. at 972 (Greaney,
J., concurring); Loewy, supra note 108, at 559.
144. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961.
145. Id. at 963.
146. Id. at 979 (Sosman, J., dissenting); id. at 996 (Cordy, J., dissenting); William C. Duncan,
The State Interests In Marriage, 2 AVE MARIA L. REV. 153, 158 (2004).
147. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 1000 (Cordy, J., dissenting); see Duncan, supra note 146, at
157.
148. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 1000 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 961.
150. Id. at 964.
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Commonwealth employees (fire fighters, police officers, and prose-
cutors, among others) killed in the performance of duty).'l
5
It is arguably bad, mean-spirited policy to save money by denying
certain people the right to marry, but it is not irrational to think that it
will save money. 1
52
C. Considering Fundamental Rights
1. In Search of Tradition
The true issue of this case is the question the Goodridge court left
unanswered: whether marriage is a fundamental right for same-sex as
well as opposite-sex couples. 53 A right is considered fundamental if it is
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."'' 54 Discerning such
tradition is a treacherous endeavor. 55 In the history of marriage, many
practices have been sustained over long periods of time, later to be re-
jected as wrong.156 Although the practices became traditions, they have
no place in a fundamental rights analysis.
157
The ancient common law Right of Coverture stated that a husband
had the sole right to control his wife's real property, and that he was the
true owner of his wife's personal property.' 8 For centuries, a wife could
not sue her husband based on the common law idea that "a husband and
wife are one, and he is the one."'159 The Goodridge court noted the tradi-
tional inequity between husband and wife:
Thus, one early Nineteenth Century jurist could observe matter of
factly that, prior to the abolition of slavery in Massachusetts, 'the
condition of a slave resembled the connection of a wife with her hus-
band, and of infant children with their father. He is obliged to main-
tain them, and they cannot be separated from him.
'160
John Winthrop confirmed this view, stating a "husband is [a wife's]
lord, and she is to be subject to him ... a true wife would not think her
condition safe and free but in her subjection to her husband's author-
151. Id. at 955; Loewy, supra note 108, at 559.
152. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 978 (Sosman, J., dissenting); id. at 972 (Greaney, J., concur-
ring).
153. Id. at 972 (Greaney, J., concurring).
154. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
155. Tribe, supra note 33, at 1937; see generally Mark Strasser, Sodomy, Adultery and Same-
sex Marriage; On Legal Analysis and Fundamental Rights, 8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 313 (1998)
(discussing traditions in relation to a fundamental rights analysis).
156. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 968; see generally Strasser, supra note 155.
157. See generally Strasser, supra note 155.
158. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 968.
159. Chief Justice Joseph R. Greenhill, Remarks at the memorial service for Justice James P.
Hart, Texas Supreme Court (Apr. 25, 1988) (commenting on Worden v. Worden, 224 S.W.2d 187
(Tex. 1949)); see also Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 968.
160. Goodridge 798 N.E.2d at 967 (citing Winchendon v. Hatfield, 4 Mass. 123, 129 (1808)).
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ity."'16 1 The law did not allow interracial marriage in many states before
Loving. 162 Yet in 1780 the law allowed future Chief Justice John Mar-
shall to marry 14-year-old Mary Ambler.
1 63
Each of the unfortunate practices above has been "deeply rooted in
this Nation's history,"' 64 but is not a fundamental right. 165 Perhaps the
most distilled expression of the folly of blindly relying on tradition was
observed by Oliver Wendell Holmes in 1897: "It is revolting to have no
better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of
Henry IV.
' 66
If the task of weeding out practices not properly part of a search for
fundamental rights is difficult, harder yet is the task of conceiving the
whole of what is left; to avoid seeing the "dots but not the path that
passes through them." 167 Various members of the Court have insisted on
the dots only, finding a fundamental right by determining which "activi-
ties belong to the historically venerated catalog of privileged acts and
which do not." 168  In Washington v. Glucksberg,169 Justice Rehnquist
wrote that a fundamental right existed only if it could be found in a
"careful description" of "concrete example[s]" throughout history. 7 In
Michael H. v. Gerald D.,'7 ' Justice Scalia stated that "we refer to the
most specific level at which a[n] . . . asserted right can be identified.
General traditions provide imprecise guidance. .. [and] a rule of law that
binds neither by text nor any particular, identifiable tradition, is no rule
of law at all."'
172
Many voices fall into this trap over same-sex marriage; they search
in vain for a specific tradition of same-sex marriage, missing the true
tradition that is right in front of them. 73 Dissenting in Lawrence v.
Texas, in which he noted that the door to same-sex marriage was now
open, Justice Scalia observed that surely a thing that was once criminal
cannot be considered a fundamental right:
161. JOHN WINTHROP, THE HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND FROM 1630-1649 228-30 (Boston:
Little, Brown and Co. 1853).
162. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
163. 1 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LtFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 151 (Houghton Mifflin Co.
1916).
164. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503; Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 990 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
165. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 991 (Cordy, J., dissenting); see generally Strasser, supra note
155 (discussing traditions in relation to a fundamental rights analysis).
166. Greg Bailey, Blackstone in America: Lectures by an English Lawyer Become a Blueprint
for a New Nation's Laws and Leaders, The Early American Review, at http://earlyamerica.com/
review/spring97/blackstone.htm (March 8, 2005).
167. Tribe, supra note 33, at 1936-37.
168. Tribe, supra note 33, at 1924.
169. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
170. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722-23; see also Tribe, supra note 33, at 1924.
171. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
172. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127.
173. Tribe, supra note 33, at 1937.
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Proscriptions against that conduct have ancient roots. Sodomy was a
criminal offense at common law and was forbidden by the laws of the
original 13 States when they ratified the Bill of Rights. In 1868, when
the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, all but 5 of the 37 States in
the Union had criminal sodomy laws. In fact, until 1961, all 50 States
outlawed sodomy, and today, 24 States and the District of Columbia
continue to provide criminal penalties for sodomy performed in pri-
vate and between consenting adults. Against this background, to
claim that a right to engage in such conduct is 'deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty' is, at best, facetious.
174
This misses the rather obvious point that in 1868, it was also illegal
for whites and African-Americans to marry, illegal for women to vote,
and for all but three years of the nation's history, African-Americans
were property. 175 Each of these examples today would violate a funda-
mental right. 176 Dissenting in Goodridge, Justice Spina followed the ex-
ample of Justice Scalia: "Same-sex marriage is not 'deeply rooted in this
Nation's history,' . . . same-sex marriage is not a right, fundamental or
otherwise, recognized in this country."'177 Finding same-sex marriage
absent from the history books, Justices Spina and Scalia declared it not a
part of our tradition.
178
Sir William Blackstone taught that a judge reveals, rather than
makes the law. 179 In revealing a tradition, it is more important to consider
the principles that emerge, rather than the combination of facts of indi-
vidual cases.180 To view traditions as a list of specific acts is to endanger
"not just ... substantive due process but also ... the nature of liberty
itself." 81 Justice Harlan noted this truth in his concurrence in Griswold v.
Connecticut:'82 "[T]radition is a living thing. The full scope of liberty...
cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of specific guarantees
... . Liberty is not a set of isolated points . . . but a rational contin-
uum."'' 83 Lawrence Tribe provides the example that "[i]f the liberty
174. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 596 (2003) (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
192-94 (1986)).
175. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 958, 967; John G. Culhane, Uprooting The Arguments Against
Same Sex Marriage, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1119, 1165 (1999); Strasser, supra note 155, at 319
(discussing Justice Scalia's test for a fundamental rights analysis).
176. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 990 (Cordy, J., dissenting); Culhane, supra note 175, at
1165; Strasser, supra note 155, at 319; Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
177. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 976 (Spina, J., dissenting).
178. Id. (Spina, J., dissenting); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 596; see generally Tribe, supra note 33
(arguing against viewing fundamental rights as a set of specific acts).
179. BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, § I, at 38-40.
180. See Tribe, supra note 33, at 1937. The article offers a detailed discussion of the impor-
tance of seeing the principles that connect the cases rather than facts that make up the individual
cases. Id.
181. Tribe, supra note 33, at 1923.
182. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
183. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479.
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claimed by the dying patients in Glucksberg184 could be flattened into an
ostensible 'right' to an overdose of some barbiturate, then the claim in
the flag-burning cases ... could be flattened into a putative right to set
fire to a painted cloth." 85 Reduced to its basic facts, a fundamental right
can be read out of any act.
18 6
Each case that supports the plaintiffs in Goodridge can be distin-
guished.187 Meyer v. Nebraska was about education, 188 and Skinner dealt
with sterilization.1 89 Griswold was about contraception, 90 and Roe v.
Wade about abortion. 191 Zablocki192 and Loving193 concerned the right to
marry, not redefining it. 194 Lawrence was a case about private acts, not a
demand for a government issued license.
195
But the principle that unifies these precedents is the true tradition at
issue; the inherent right of people to control "choices central to personal
dignity and autonomy." 196 This idea is stated ably by Justice O'Connor in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attrib-
utes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the
State. 1
97
Goodridge is "no more a case about a fundamental right" to same-
sex marriage than Loving "was a case about a fundamental right" to in-
terracial marriage, or Bowers "was a case about a 'fundamental right to
sodomy.' 198 Laws restricting same-sex marriage deserve to be held to
strict judicial scrutiny, because they implicate the fundamental right of
184. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 702 (holding that Washington's prohibition against assisted
suicide does not offend the Fourteenth Amendment).
185. Tribe, supra note 33, at 1923-24.
186. Id.
187. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 985 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
188. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
189. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 535.
190. 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 985 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
191. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 985 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
192. 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 985 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
193. 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 985 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
194. Loving, 388 U.S. at 1; Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 985 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
195. 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 986 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
196. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
197. Id.
198. Wardle, supra note 60, at 43 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 at 192-94
(1986)); see generally Tribe, supra note 33 (arguing against viewing fundamental rights as a set of
specific acts).
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controlling "choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, [which]
are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."'"
2. The Traditions from which America Broke
The right to define one's own concept of life, free from the compul-
sion of the state, is not only "deeply rooted in this nation's history and
tradition." 2°° It is the defining characteristic of the American experi-
ence.20' This becomes evident when one examines "the traditions from
which [America] developed as well as the traditions from which it
broke. 20 2 Neither tradition can be understood without the presence of the
other.20 3 The European tradition from which the American settlers broke
used the compulsion of a person's identity as an organizing principle.2°
This principle was so pervasive that it could be found in the religious,
intellectual, social and economic realities of Seventeenth Century Euro-
205pean life. In every way, people's identities were dictated to them the
moment they were born.
20 6
a. Religious and Intellectual Compulsion
The right to control one's identity by way of religious and intellec-
tual freedom was not granted to Seventeenth Century Europeans.2 7 In
England, James I and Charles I carried on the persecution of Catholics
that had started the moment Henry VI1 withdrew from the church.20 8
The Test Act provided that no Catholic could hold office. 209 James I had
Unitarians burned alive for doubting the divinity of Christ.2 '0 William
Prynne had his ears cut off for publishing Histriomatrix, a series of blas-
phemous plays.21' Jews had not been allowed in the country since the
time of Edward 1.212 After the ascension of Oliver Cromwell in 1642, the
control of the Puritans substituted itself for the control of the Church of
England.213 Gambling and betting were outlawed, and adultery was pun-
199. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851; Tribe, supra note 33, at 1951.
200. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503.
201. Id. at 503-04.
202. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
203. Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
204. See generally WILL & ARIEL DURANT, THE AGE OF REASON (Simon & Schuster 1961)
[hereinafter DURANT I] (offering an in depth analysis of the relationship between government poli-
cies and private life in seventeenth century Europe).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. CHURCHILL, supra note 27, at 150-5 1.
208. Id. at 151-52.
209. WILL & ARIEL DURANT, THE AGE OF LOUtS XIV 291 (Simon & Schuster 1963) [hereinaf-
ter DURANT I1].
210. DURANT I, supra note 204, at 140.
211. Id. at 193.
212. CHURCHILL, supra note 27, at 315.
213. Id. at 312.
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ishable by death.214 Drinking, swearing, walking on the Sabbath, and
athletic sports were also banned.2 15
If things improved under William and the Glorious Revolution of
1688, it was not as much as is popularly believed.216 The Toleration Act
was passed in 1689, but tolerance did not extend to Catholics, Unitarians,
Jews, and Pagans.2 17 Dissenters were not allowed to attend university and
21could not seek elective office. 18 In 1697, the strengthened legislature
passed a law against blasphemy mandating prison for criticism of the
church.21 9 In 1699, laws were passed imposing life imprisonment for
saying mass, and rewards were waiting for those who turned in viola-
tors. 2 A person not taking a loyalty oath to the Church of England lost
the right to purchase or devise land.22 1 Even Locke's Epistola de Toler-
antia, urging tolerance as a principle, excluded atheists, Moslems, Catho-
lics and Unitarians.222 On the continent, the same situation existed.223
224
Jews had been expelled from Spain and Portugal, the Huguenots com-
pelled to leave France, and the Pietists unwelcome in Germany.225
If a person were fortunate enough to find a secular government that
would tolerate dissent, the church, which often acted as a sacred gov-
ernment, may not have been so understanding.2 26 The parents of the phi-
losopher Spinoza, expelled from Spain and Portugal, found refuge in
Holland.2 27 Spinoza's heretical beliefs were tolerated by the Dutch gov-
228emnment. Yet that which the government allowed, the church elders
would not; Spinoza was expelled from the synagogue for his beliefs. 29
Other churches were equally intolerant. On February 26, 1616, Galileo
was forced to appear before Urban VIE to recant his Copernican theories
published in De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium.230 Feeling that the
connection between his head and body was but tenuous, he spoke the
words: "With a sincere heart and unfeigned faith I abjure, curse, and de-
test the said errors and heresies ....,,23. The idea of defining one's con-
214. ld. at 311-12.
215. Id.
216. DURANT II, supra note 209, at 301-02.
217. Id. at 301, 589.
218. Id. at 301-02.
219. Id. at 302.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 589-90.
223. Louis M. HACKER, THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN TRADITION 17 (Columbia Univer-
sity Press 1947).
224. WILL DURANT, THE STORY OF PHILOSOPHY 162 (Simon & Schuster 1926) [hereinafter
DURANT Ill].
225. HACKER, supra note 223, at 17.
226. See DURANT I, supra note 224 at 167 (recounting the excommunication of Spinoza).
227. Id. at 162.
228. Id. at 167.
229. Id.
230. DURANT 1, supra note 204, at 607-08.
231. Id. at 610.
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cept of life free from government compulsion must have seemed very far
away.
b. Economic Compulsion
Economic life offered no greater freedom.232 The economic world
into which people were born was the world where they lived and died,
and where their children lived and died.233 In England, wages were stag-
234nant by law, fixed since 1585 by the Statute of Apprentices. The wages
averaged around one shilling a day, yet life's essentials were as expen-
sive in 1685 as they would be 200 years later.235 Any attempt to increase
pay would result in harsh penalties for employers and employees alike.236
Not only how much a person was paid, but also who worked, was dic-
tated by government policy; the freedom to make employment decisions
was restricted by the Statute of Laborers.
237
238The situation elsewhere in Europe was no better. In France, rem-
nants of the feudal system remained as late as the mid-18th Century.
239
As little as two percent of landowners outside of the noble class or the
church owned land franc-alleu, or "free from feudal dues." 24° Up to one
million people were still bound in literal serfdom. 241 These peasants were
"adscripti glebae (bound to the soil). '242 They had no legal rights to de-
vise or sell land--one of the primary ways of building wealth for a fam-
243ily over generations. So onerous were the taxes owed that survival was
lucky; improvement was impossible.244 These "legal, feudal and guild
hindrances" controlled people's economic identities.245 Will Durant notes
that "It was in this clamor of entrepreneurs to be freed from legal and
moral restraints that the modem ideology of liberty began."24
232. DURANT IL supra note 209, at 257-58.
233. Id. at 258.
234. Id. at 257-58.
235. Id. at 258.
236. Id. at 257-58.
237. WILLIAM HARLAN HALE, THE MARCH OF FREEDOM 37 (Harper & Brothers 1947).







244. Id. at 259-60.
245. DURANT n, supra note 209, at 258.
246. Id.
2004]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
c. Social Compulsion
The ability to shape one's identity by social class was equally lim-
ited.247 The family into which a person was born defined his social class
for life.248 Regardless of how much talent a person might possess, or how
hard a person might work, a lower class crib meant a lower class coffin.
In addition, such accidents of birth were determinative in the profes-
sional options open to a person.249 Access to office was determined not
by talent, but according to the identity of one's parents.250 James VI of
Scotland had nothing more to recommend him as Elizabeth's successor
than bloodline. 25 The House of Lords was (and is) equally blind to merit.
Even faculty appointments at universities were determined by parent-
252age. At the anatomical division of the University of Edinburgh, the
hereditary reign of the Monro dynasty lasted 126 years.253 No one who
had a different name needed to apply.254 Inevitably, talent was dissipated
over subsequent generations, and it was noted that in comparison to Pro-
fessors Monro primus and secondus, Professor Monro tertius was "also,
,,255but not likewise.
3. The Tradition from which America Developed
256
From all this the settlers fled. The specific reasons were different,
covering the spectrum from religious to economic, from social to politi-
cal, but in common was the freedom they sought to define their lives free
from government compulsion. 257 In almost every way, the old world had
said 'this is who you are;' the new world would allow people to say 'this
is who I am.'
258
a. Legal Foundations
The natural law theories of John Locke provided an intellectual and
legal framework. 259 Although Locke's Two Treatises on Government2 60
had been intended as a defense of the Glorious Revolution of 1688, gen-
erations of settlers drew on his ideas freely. 261 In this view of the world,










256. DURANT I, supra note 204, at 158.
257. Id.
258. See generally DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMs (2001) (discussing the attitudes of
colonial Americans).
259. MILLER, supra note 25, at 170.
260. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT (George Routledge & Sons 1884).
261. MILLER, supra note 25, at 170.
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"there was a state of nature in which men enjoyed complete liberty.
' 262
Government existed only to ensure that people be free to control their
own lives.263 Created by "God and Nature," these natural freedoms of
mankind to control his own life could not be restricted by govern-
ments.264 These ideas drew heavily from the philosophy of Coke and
Blackstone, which later supplied authority for Justice Chase in Calder v.
Bull.26 5 Upon this solid footing, the unifying principle of the colonies
was that people had a natural right to make decisions defining their lives
free from government compulsion.266
That the ideas of Locke, Coke and Blackstone are in fact "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history" is further evidenced by an examination of
political rhetoric over the years. Locke's ideas on the limited nature of
government were echoed by Charles Pinckney, who believed that gov-
ernment existed to ensure that citizens received the "blessings of civil
and religious liberty" that were their due.26 7 The notion of pre-existing
law espoused by Blackstone and Coke was confirmed by notable voices
at the Constitutional Convention.268 Thomas Jefferson wrote: "We hold
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among
these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. '269 George Mason
suggested that "all men are born equally free and independent, and have
certain inherent natural rights.., among which are the enjoyment of life
and liberty. 270 Pennsylvania delegate James Wilson agreed that "All
men are, by nature equal and free. ,,271 One hundred and eighty five
years later, John F. Kennedy confirmed that "[T]he rights of man come
not from the generosity of the state, but from the hand of God.' 272 Within
this framework, the American nation evolved.
b. Religious and Intellectual Freedom
One manifestation of the idea that people were free to define their
own concept of life free from the compulsion of the state was that colo-
nial Americans were free to form their own religious identity without
government compulsion.273 To be sure, it was not an instant success; the
settlers brought strains of the virus with the antidote.274 The Puritans of
262. Id.
263. Id. at 170-71.
264. Id. at 171.
265. 3 U.S. 386 (1798).
266. MILLER, supra note 25, at 171.
267. PAGE SMITH, THE SHAPING OF AMERICA 78 (1980).
268. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 258, at 121.
269. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
270. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 258, at 121.
271. Id.
272. President John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1961).
273. WINSTON CHURCHILL, THE GREAT REPUBLIC 31-32 (Random House 1956).
274. Id. at 31.
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Massachusetts were as oppressive as their English counterparts. 275 The
Salem witch trials were onerous by European medieval standards. Bap-
tists were persecuted in Virginia and North Carolina.276 But the historical
line that culminated in the separation of church and state and freedom of
speech reached back to 1636, when Roger Williams set up the colony of
Rhode Island.277 Winston Churchill notes that Rhode Island was "the
only centre at that time in the world where there was complete religious
toleration. '" 278 This historical path traveled through Jefferson's Virginia
Statute of Religious Liberty, stating in part:
Be it enacted by the general assembly, that no man shall be com-
pelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place or ministry
whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened
in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his re-
ligious opinions or belief; but that all men shall be free to profess...
their opinion in matters of religion .... 279
This historical trend culminated in the First Amendment, ensuring
freedom of both religion and speech.28° People would be free to hold and
express sacred and secular views free from government compulsion.28'
c. Social Freedoms
A second manifestation of the idea that people should define their
own concept of life free from the compulsion of the state was that colo-
282nial Americans were free from the hereditary constraints of Europe.
The idea that a person's social identity was formed, and professional
identity limited, at the moment of birth was anathema to the idea of
America.283 Jefferson believed in a "natural aristocracy" based on "merit
and talent" rather than a hereditary one based on "connections and influ-
ence. '' 2m John Adams used the phrase "natural aristocracy" in a similar
way in his Defence of the Constitutions.2 85 The founders believed these
ideas so strongly that Article I of the Constitution forbids citizens from
receiving titles of nobility.286 Even the title by which the President would
be addressed received close attention; most members thought it impor-
275. Id.
276. MILLER, supra note 25, at 194.
277. CHURCHILL, supra note 273, at 31-32.
278. Id. at 32.
279. HACKER, supra note 223, at 218.
280. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
281. Id.
282. Isaac Kramnik, Introduction to THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 21 (Isaac Kramnik ed., Penguin
Books 1987).
283. Id. at 21-22.
284. Id. at 21.
285. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 258, at 406 (discussing JOHN ADAMS, DEFENCE OF THE
CONsTrrUTIONS (Boston Pub. 1788)).
286. U.S. CONsr. art. L § 9, cl. 8.
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tant to remove any notion of royalty.287 In 1784, John Adams attended a
production of The Marriage of Figaro at the Comedie-Francaise in
288
Paris. Adams undoubtedly appreciated Figaro's outburst in act V: "Be-
cause you are a great noble, you think you are a great genius! Nobility, a
fortune, a rank, appointments to office: all this makes a man so proud!
What did you do to earn all this? You took the trouble to get born-
nothing more.'2 8 9 Figaro spoke for the new nation.290 So did Senator
John Edwards 220 years later, accepting the vice presidential nomina-
tion: "[In America,] the family you're born into won't control your des-
tiny.' 291 People would be able to define themselves free from the heredi-
tary social compulsions of the old world.292
d. Constitutional Protections
The manifestation that most clearly establishes that making choices
free from government compulsion is a tradition deeply rooted in the na-
tion's history is the form of government the new nation chose. 29 3 The
framers formed a government in which power was highly diffused in
order to ensure against incursion of these rights.294 In Federalist 51,
James Madison wrote about the "double security" 295 of having "vertical
separation of powers between the nation and the states, along with the
horizontal separation of powers between the federal branches. 29 6 At-
tempts by one branch to invade the natural rights of people would be
checked by another.297 Restraints on the federal government were found
in the fact that it would have only those powers that were specifically
granted.298 Amendment IX stated that "The enumeration in the Constitu-
tion, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people."2 99Amendment X stated that all powers that were
not mentioned were reserved for the people.30 0 Amendments I through IV
placed specific prohibitions on federal action.30 1 It is noteworthy that the
287. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 258, at 406. It is amusing to remember that when John Adams
suggested that the title of 'His Majesty the President,' Ralph lzard suggested the title of 'His Rotun-
dity' would be an appropriate sobriquet for Adams. Id.
288. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 258, at 307.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Senator John Edwards, Address at the Democratic Convention, July 2004 (transcript
available from the Kerry/Edwards campaign).
292. Kramnik, supra note 282, at 21.
293. See generally SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 4 (offering an overview of the structures
of American government).
294. Id. at 85.




299. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
300. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
10f1 IT R CON'tT amend T-TV
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framers rejected a general grant of power as proposed (ironically) by the
Virginia delegation, reading:
That the national legislature ought to be empowered to enjoy the leg-
islative rights vested in Congress by the Confederation; and more-
over to legislate in all cases, to which the separate States are incom-
petent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be inter-
rupted by exercise of individual legislation.
30 2
Such a grant would be too easy to stretch, and the framers wanted the
limits clear.3 °3
Although states were given plenary powers, specific limits on state
power were found in Article I, section 10. 304 States would be barred from
"entering into treaties, coining money, granting titles of nobility, passing
bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, laws impairing contracts.' 3 5 States
would need congressional approval in order to "impose custom duties,
enter interstate compacts, or engage in war." 3°6 In addition, federalism
principles imposed other limits on state action, such as the dormant
commerce clause.
30 7
To be sure, there were heated differences in the framers' visions. °
James Madison and Alexander Hamilton had famous disagreements on
the strength of the federal government. Thomas Jefferson felt that the
security of people's rights lay in reserving power in the hands of the
populace.30 9 Alexander Hamilton had less confidence in the populace,
and felt that protection of people's rights lay in guarding against the
"twin specters of despotism and anarchy." 310 Yet when compared with
the world of George Il and Urban VIII, these differences seem to be of
degree rather than of kind.
In addition, the arguments were about means, not ends.31' Jefferson
felt that preserving liberties rested in a strong legislature. 31 2 Adams wrote
"people's rights and liberties... can never be preserved without a strong
executive. If the executive power, or any considerable part of it, is left in
the hands of an aristocratical or democratical assembly, it will corrupt the
legislature . . . and when the legislature is corrupted, people are un-
302. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 97.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 86.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 233.
308. Id. at 85.
309. See generally DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN (Little, Brown &
Co. 1951) (discussing Jefferson's views on liberty).
310. RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 33 (The Penguin Press 2004).
311. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 258, at 375.
312. See generally MALONE, supra note 309 (discussing Jefferson's views on liberty).
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done."313 (emphasis added.) Yet both were concerned about protecting
people's liberties. The common goal of the framers was ensuring the
inherent right of people to make decisions that "define one's own con-
cept of existence ' 14 free from government compulsion.315
It is, of course, too simple to write that the Old World was bad and
the New World was good.3 t6 The realities of European life that caused
the settlers to leave also gave rise to reform in Europe.317 The Age of
Enlightenment crossed the Atlantic; it is perhaps no coincidence that
Jefferson, Franklin, Voltaire and Mozart were contemporaries .318 In addi-
tion, the failings of American democracy fill volumes, and rightly so. Yet
the fact that a tradition is neither perfect nor exclusive does not deny its
reality.31 9 Making "choices central to personal dignity and autonomy" is
the defining characteristic of the American experience, and is therefore
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."
320
e. The American Tradition Applied to Same-Sex Marriage
Treating same-sex marriage as a fundamental right is in this
uniquely American tradition of letting people make "choices central to
321
personal dignity and autonomy" free from government compulsion.
Undoubtedly, some of the sources that may be used to sustain this argu-
ment would have been appalled to lend their name to the endeavor.322
Blackstone famously referred to sodomy as "a heinous act not fit to be
named., 32 3 Justice Harlan explicitly excluded homosexuality from pro-
324tection in Poe. But legal sources that acknowledge rights of freedoms
create a thing that is beyond their control.325 The fact that their ideas can
be used in ways of which they would not approve is perhaps the greatest
testament to their wisdom.326 It is no answer to say that same-sex couples
are free to be with each other, just not to marry.327 Being married
313. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 258, at 375 (emphasis added).
314. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
315. See generally MCCULLOUGH, supra note 258 (offering an in depth discussion of the
attitudes and goals of the framers of the Constitution).




319. See generally Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (discussing both discarded and
accepted traditions).
320. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 (1977).
321. Tribe, supra note 33, at 1951; see generally Feigen, supra note 53 (advocating a constitu-
tional right to same-sex marriage).
322. Tribe, supra note 33, at 1894.
323. Id.
324. Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Thus, I would not suggest that
adultery, homosexuality, fornication, and incest are immune from criminal inquiry ....").
325. See generally Tribe, supra note 33 (discussing the meaning of freedom as it related to a
fundamental rights analysis); see generally Loewy, supra note 108 (arguing that same-sex marriage
is consistent with American notions of freedom).
326. See generally Tribe, supra note 33; Loewy, supra note 108.
327. See generally Tribe, supra note 33; Loewy, supra note 108.
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changes how people view themselves, their relationship to each other,
and their relationship as to the rest of the world.328 To deny a marriage
license is to shape an identity.
329
Without a doubt, broad views of liberty need limiting principles.
330
In a sense, every action we take in life defines our meaning of existence;
laws against drunk driving need not be judged by strict scrutiny because
they might compel a person's identity.331 But experience and instinct tell
us that the thoughts we have, the words that we speak, the God to whom
we pray, and the people we choose to love and cast our lot in life with
surely are among the "choices central to personal dignity and autonomy,
[that] are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. ,332
D. Applying Strict Scrutiny
Accordingly, same-sex marriage should be viewed as a fundamental
right.333 However, that does not decide the question in and of itself.334 A
fundamental right is not an absolute right; its presence merely determines
the proper standard of review.335 Justice Cordy worried that allowing
same-sex marriage would open the floodgates: "If one assumes that a
group of mature, consenting, committed adults can form a marriage, the
prohibition on polygamy (G.L. c. 207, § 4), infringes on their right to
marry [and a law prohibiting it would not be allowed].",336 It would in-
fringe on their right; laws against the marriage of siblings or minors in-
fringe on their rights as well, but are constitutional. 7 Strict scrutiny does
not command that a right may not be infringed, just that it may only be
infringed for a compelling reason.338
If strict scrutiny is applied to same-sex marriage, some of the ra-
tionales clearly fail. 339 If the rationale is "providing a favorable setting
for procreation" then the law is both under- and over-inclusive; some
people who have children are not married, and not all married couples
328. See generally Tribe, supra note 33; Loewy, supra note 108.
329. See generally Tribe, supra note 33; Loewy, supra note 108.
330. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127.
331. Id.
332. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (1992); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
333. See generally Loewy, supra note 108 (arguing that same-sex marriage is a fundamental
right).
334. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 970 (Greaney, J., concurring); Strasser, supra note 155, at 329;
Wardle, supra note 60, at 60.
335. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 970 (Greaney, J., concurring); Strasser, supra note 155, at 329;
Wardle, supra note 60, at 60.
336. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 984 n.2 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
337. Id.; Strasser, supra note 155, at 32; Wardle, supra note 60, at 60.
338. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 970 (Greaney, J., concurring); Strasser, supra note 155, at 329;
Wardle, supra note 60, at 60.
339. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 996, 1004 n.35 (Cordy, J., dissenting); Loewy, supra note 108,
at 558.
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have children.34° The rationale of "preserving scarce State and private
financial resources" fails for the same reason; not all married couples are
a drain on the state budget, and some single people are such a drain.34'
Other rationales take more careful consideration.34z The rationale of
"ensuring the optimal setting for child rearing" is perhaps the most im-
portant and controversial.343 As Justice Sosman indicated, we are for all
practical purposes in the first generation of same-sex couples raising
children.344 Although there are adamant beliefs on both sides, the effect
on these children as they mature into adults is still by definition un-
known.345 Perhaps in the end, the constitutionality of a law prohibiting
same-sex marriage will turn on the answer.346 But the time to admit that
the plaintiffs in Goodridge deserve the strict constitutional protection of
a fundamental right is now.
347
CONCLUSION
There is a natural tension between two truths in American life. 48
Law is by definition a conservative institution; it necessarily relies on
precedent, history and tradition, so that people can know what it is and
understand its meaning.3 49 The law does not easily accept change.350
But the story of constitutional rights is the story of change.35' In
United States v. Virginia,352 Justice Ginsburg quoted the historian Rich-
ard Morris: "A prime part of the history of our Constitution is the story
of the extension of constitutional rights and protections to people once
ignored or excluded. 353 Condoleezza Rice has said that "when the fram-
ers wrote the Constitution, they didn't mean me. 354 Today we mean
her.
355
340. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 996, 1004 n.35 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
341. Id. (Cordy, J., dissenting).
342. Duncan, supra note 146, at 164; Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 996 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
343. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 978 (Sosman, J., dissenting); id. at 996 (Cordy, J., dissenting);
Duncan, supra note 146, at 164; see generally Culhane, supra note 175, at 1194 (discussing the
impact of same-sex marriage on children).
344. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 978 (Sosman, J., dissenting); id. at 996 (Cordy, J., dissenting);
see Duncan, supra note 146, at 164; see generally Culhane, supra note 175 at 1194.
345. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 978 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
346. Id.
347. Tribe, supra note 33, at 1951; see generally Feigen, supra note 53 (advocating a constitu-
tional right to same-sex marriage).
348. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 990, 1003 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J.,
dissenting).
349. Goodridge, 798 N.E. at 990, 1003 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
350. Id. (Cordy, J., dissenting).
351. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
352. 518 U.S. 515.
353. Loewy, supra note 108, at 556 (citing Virginia, 518 U.S. at 557).
354. Testimony of Condoleezza Rice before the 9/11 Commission (April 8, 2004) (transcript
available from New York Times).
355. Id.
2004]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
If, in the search for fundamental rights, one looks to specific past
traditions rather than principles, constitutional rights would never have
been expanded.356 In 1865 there was no tradition of free African-
Americans in the south. In 1955 there was no tradition of inter-racial
seating on buses and in theatres. In 1975 (in a battle that is still not won)
there was no tradition of women getting paid as much as men. Today
there is no tradition of same-sex marriage. To insist on looking at yester-
day to see who needs protection today is to ensure a static society.357
The answer to the fundamental rights question left unresolved in
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health will be found in this ten-
sion.35s All of American history points towards answering the question in
favor of the Goodridge plaintiffs. 359 The individual cases that make up
the Supreme Court's jurisprudence for fundamental rights are bright stars
indeed. 360 These cases have recognized protection for one's body361 and
mind,362 the right to travel,363 to marry, 364 to vote, 365 and the right to pri-
vacy.366 Yet it is the constellation that these stars combine to create that
has lit American history.367 When one considers "the traditions from
which [America] developed as well as the traditions from which it
broke, ' 368 Justice O'Connor's idea that we have the inherent right to con-
trol "choices central to personal dignity and autonomy" 369 free from gov-
ernment compulsion is not an American tradition, it is the American tra-
dition. 370 Viewed as such, treating same-sex marriage as a fundamental
right is simply one more contiguous chapter in the American story.371
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts chose to sidestep the
issue of fundamental rights.372 As such, it put off the real question for
another court and another day. 373 Yet, by properly holding for the plain-
tiffs, the Goodridge court forces us to address issues that "constitute the
356. See generally Tribe, supra note 33 (arguing against viewing fundamental rights as a set of
specific acts).
357. Id.
358. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 990, 1003 (Cordy, J., dissenting); see Culhane, supra note 175.
359. Tribe, supra note 33, at 1937.
360. Id.
361. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
362. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
363. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
364. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Zablocki, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
365. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
366. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153 (1973).
367. Tribe, supra note 33, at 1937.
368. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
369. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992); see generally Tribe, supra note
33 (discussing the meaning of freedom as it relates to a fundamental rights analysis).
370. Tribe, supra note 33, at 1937.
371. Id.
372. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 990, 1003.
373. Id.
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essential core of constitutionalism and the cornerstone of American lib-
erty. 374 That is no small accomplishment.375
James Hart*
374. Tribe, supra note 33, at 1899.
375. Id.
* J.D. Candidate, May 2006. The author would like to dedicate this Comment to the mem-
ory of his grandparents, Justice James P. Hart and Katherine Drake Hart.

GOODRIDGE V. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH: THE
WRONG STEP AT THE WRONG TIME FOR SAME-SEX
MARRIAGES
INTRODUCTION
Over the last ten years, states across the country have questioned the
constitutionality of excluding same-sex partners from the benefits of civil
marriage available to opposite-sex couples.' Most recently, Massachu-
setts answered the constitutionality debate by deciding that the Massa-
chusetts Constitution protects same-sex couples' right to marry. 2  The
core issues surrounding Goodridge v. Department of Public Health3 in-
clude: 1) whether same-sex marriage is a constitutionally protected right
making the regulation thereof subject to judicial scrutiny; and 2) whether
laws excluding same-sex couples from access to marriage licenses dis-
criminates solely on a suspect classification, such as sex, in violation of
due process and equality provisions of state constitutions.4
This Comment addresses the wisdom of electing to pursue legitimi-
zation of same-sex marriage through judicial action instead of through
the legislative process. Specifically, by pursuing legal recognition of
same-sex marriages in the courtroom, gay-rights groups have opened the
door to a backlash of constitutional amendments. As a result, these
amendments could preclude long-term legal equality for same-sex com-
mitted relationships in the United States.
Part I of this Comment reviews the facts of Goodridge. Part II dis-
cusses similar cases from other states that preceded Massachusetts's
landmark decision. Part Ill analyzes the majority and dissenting opin-
ions in Goodridge. Finally, Part IV catalogues the public opinion and
legislative actions generated by the decision.
1. See generally Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743,
at *6 (Alaska Feb. 27, 1998) (concluding marriage statute violated right to privacy provision in
Alaska Constitution; superseded by constitutional amendment, art. I, § 25 of the Constitution of
Alaska); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993) (concluding marriage statute implicated
Hawaii Constitution's equal protection clause; remanded case to lower court for further proceed-
ings); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999) (concluding marriage statute violated Vermont
Constitution's common benefits clause; resolved by creation of a civil union system); but see Stand-
hardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 453 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (holding marriage statute does not
violate liberty interests under either Federal or Arizona Constitution).
2. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941,948 (Mass. 2003).
3. Goodridge, 798 N.E. 2d at 941.
4. Id. at 953.
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I. FACTS OF GOODRIDGE V. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH5
On April 11, 2001, seven same-sex couples in Massachusetts filed
suit in the Superior Court against the Department of Public Health and
the Commissioner of Public Health for wrongfully denying them mar-
riage licenses.6 Procurement of a valid state-issued marriage license is a
prerequisite to civil marriage in Massachusetts. The plaintiffs argued
that by denying these couples marriage licenses, the Department of Pub-
lic Health deprived same-sex couples in the state from the obligations,
benefits, and protections of civil marriage.8 The defendants admitted to
the practice of denying marriage licenses to same-sex couples in Massa-
chusetts, but denied that this violated any law.9
The plaintiffs and defendants filed cross-motions for summary
judgment. 10 On May 7, 2002, the superior court judge entered judgment
for the defendants. The judge reasoned that the statutory language was
plainly inconsistent with the interpretation that a union between persons
of the same sex could fall under the definition of marriage. 12 In addition,
the superior court judge dismissed claims that denial of marriage licenses
to these same-sex couples violated constitutional rights.13 The court con-
cluded that the Massachusetts Constitution does not guarantee a funda-
mental right to marry a person of the same sex. 14 Moreover, the ban on
same-sex marriage did not "offend the liberty, freedom, equality, or due
process provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution."'' 5 Furthermore,
even if denying marriage licenses to same-sex couples violates their con-
stitutional rights, the court opined that the legislature could limit certain
rights if doing so rationally furthered a legitimate interest.'
6
The plaintiffs appealed the superior court's decision to grant sum-
mary judgment in favor of the defendants. 17 The Massachusetts Supreme
Court vacated the summary judgment for defendants and remanded the
case to the superior court to enter judgment for the plaintiffs. 18 However,
the Supreme Court stayed its judgment for 180 days to allow the legisla-
ture time to take any appropriate action based on the decision. 19
5. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
6. Goodridge, 798 N.E. 2d at 949-50.
7. Id. at 950.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 950-51.








18. Id. at 969-70.
19. Id. at 970.
THE WRONG STEP AT THE WRONG TIME
II. BACKGROUND
Historically, the definition of marriage is the union of one man and
one woman. 20 The concept of civil marriage in the United States is de-
rived from English common law.21 Colonists adopted the English con-
cept of marriage to regulate the procreation and care of children.22
A. Overview of Massachusetts Marriage Laws and Benefits
In Massachusetts, General Laws c. 207 (hereinafter "G.L. c. 207")
is the marriage licensing statute.23 The marriage licensing statute keeps
close relatives, persons with syphilis, persons who are already married,
24and in some cases minors from obtaining a license for civil marriage.
The statute also delineates the procedures for making the civil marriage a
matter of public record.25
The Massachusetts Constitution guarantees equality under the law
and protects due process and liberty for all persons.26 Although civil
marriage is statutorily created, arguably it is a part of the constitutionally
protected rights to equality and liberty. 27 In fact, the Massachusetts Con-
stitution protects an individual's liberty from government intrusion into
private matters to a greater extent than the Federal Constitution. 28  The
promulgation of these laws affords married couples an exhaustive list of
benefits.
Civil marriage offers many benefits in the Commonwealth of Mas-
sachusetts that domestic partnerships do not receive.29 In civil marriages,
courts and lawmakers have established predictable rules that govern sta-
bility and private responsibility for the care of children. 30 Additionally,
married couples enjoy certain unique property rights. 31 For example,
when a person dies intestate,32 the surviving spouse will automatically
inherit the deceased's property. 33 In wrongful death actions, surviving
spouses, unlike unmarried domestic partners, may sue for loss of consor-
20. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941,952 (Mass. 2003).
21. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 969.
22. See id. at 961.
23. Id. at 951.
24. Id. at 951-52.
25. Id. (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, § 20 (1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, § 28
(1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, § 40 (1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 17, § 4 (1998)).
26. See id. at 959-60.
27. See id. at 957.
28. Id. at 959 (citing Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 677 N.E.2d
101 (Mass. 1997); Coming Glass Works v. Ann & Hope, Inc., 294 N.E.2d (Mass. 1973)).
29. Id. at 955 (citing Wilcox v. Trautz, 693 N.E.2d 141 (1998)).
30. Id. at 956.
31. See id. at 955.
32. Intestate is defined in pertinent part as: "Of or relating to a person who has died without a
valid will." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 840 (8th ed, 2004).
33. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 955 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190, § 1 (2004)).
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tium. 34 Also, certain life insurance policies and social security benefits
are only available to those who are or were married.35 The right to
marry, and thereby gain access to this myriad of benefits, is considered a
"civil right., 36
B. Marriage as a "Civil Right"
With technological innovations in the area of fertility, rising divorce
rates, and changes in adoption policies, the concepts of marriage and
family in the United States have changed over the last four decades.
37
Since the late 1960s, there has been a series of cases across the United
States that classify marriage as a "civil right."38
1. Perez v. Sharp
39
In 1948, the Supreme Court of California decided Perez v. Sharp.
n°
In Perez, a mixed-race couple challenged a California law making it ille-
gal for whites and blacks to marry.41 The court ruled that the legislature
may only interfere with the right to marry if there is "an important social
objective [of public health, safety, and welfare]," and by "reasonable
means." 42 The court reasoned that it is a violation of due process and
equal protection to deny access to the fundamental right to marry based
solely on "prejudice" and "oppressive discrimination. 4 3 In addition, the
court ruled that part of the fundamental right to marry is the right to
choose whom to marry. 4 Therefore, the court concluded that the statute
was impermissible because it restricted the right of people to choose to
marry somebody of a different race.45
2. Loving v. Virginia
46
Cases challenging the constitutionality of denying same-sex couples
the right to marry often rely on the reasoning in the 1967 Supreme Court
34. Id. at 956 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 229, § 2 (2000)).
35. Id. at 955.
36. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942)); see also Milford v. Worcester, 7 Mass. 48, 56 (1810).
37. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d at 961.
38. See, e.g., Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (quoting Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541); see also Milford, 7
Mass. at 56.
39. 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948).
40. Perez, 198 P.2d at 17.
41. Id. at 17-18.




46. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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decision Loving v. Virginia.47 Like Perez, Loving addressed the constitu-
tionality of a law prohibiting interracial marriage 48 The Supreme Court
held that Virginia's anti-miscegenation statutes violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and, thus, were constitutionally
impermissible.49 Specifically, classifications in statutes cannot be "an
arbitrary and invidious discrimination." 50 Statutes that classify by race
are particularly scrutinized because the category is considered automati-
cally suspect.5  These types of classifications are only permissible if
they accomplish some state objective that is independent from racism.
52
The logic behind the Loving ruling fits nicely into same-sex marriage
cases because denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples is based
on the gender of the potential spouse. Like race, gender is an automati-
cally suspect classification. 3
3. Lawrence v. Texas
54
Advocates of same-sex marriage may have regarded the recent Su-
preme Court decision in Lawrence v. Texas55 as evidence that the United
States was ready for a case like Goodridge. In Lawrence, the Supreme
Court held that a Texas sodomy statute, making it a crime for consenting
adults of the same sex to engage in certain sexual conduct in private, was
unconstitutional.56 Lawrence overruled a prior Supreme Court decision,
Bowers v. Hardwick,57 which had held that such a statute did not violate
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.58
The Lawrence Court claimed that the liberty issue before the Court
was not merely "the right to engage in certain sexual conduct," as
claimed in Bowers, but rather the liberty allowing homosexual persons
the right to "choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their
homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free
persons."59 The Texas statute subjected consenting adult homosexuals to
criminal charges for private sexual conduct.60 According to the Court,
despite the misdemeanor nature of the crime, homosexuals convicted
under the statute would have to report a criminal record on job and hous-
47. Loving, 388 U.S. at 1; see also Baehr v. Lewin 852 P.2d 44, 63 (Haw. 1993) (concluding
marriage statute implicated Hawaii Constitution's equal protection clause); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d
at 957.
48. Loving, 388 U.S. at 3-4.
49. Id. at 12.
50. Id. at 10.
51. Id. at 11.
52. Id.
53. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961 n.21.
54. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
55. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558.
56. See id. at 578-79.
57. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558.
58. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
59. Id. at 567 (discussing framing of the issues in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
60. id. at 562-63.
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ing applications. 61 Additionally, in certain states, homosexuals convicted
of sodomy would have to register as sex offenders.62
The Lawrence Court reviewed the history of sodomy statutes in the
United States that revealed a trend toward abolishing same-sex prohibi-
tions in sodomy laws. 63 Also, the Court claimed that there was wide-
spread disapproval of the Bowers decision. 64
The Court found no permissible rational basis for Texas to convict
consenting adults acting in private under this sodomy law.65 While the
Court acknowledged that there is a deep-rooted belief in America that
homosexual relationships are morally wrong, it concluded that it is not
for the majority to impose their personal moral convictions on individu-
als.66 The Court confirmed that "our laws and tradition afford constitu-
tional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education." 67 Thus,
in the matter of engaging in private consensual homosexual acts, the
government has no right to interfere with the personal liberty of same-
sex couples.68 Although the Court used some language aimed at limiting
the holding of Lawrence to same-sex sexual conduct,69 the Court's rea-
soning could be extended to argue that same-sex marriage prohibitions
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.7°
C. Same-Sex Marriage Cases Across the Nation
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was not the first state
supreme court to encounter the constitutionality of denying access to
civil marriage to same-sex couples. In the last decade, Hawaii, Alaska
and Vermont all decided similar cases.7 1 Each case concluded that it was
impermissible under the respective state constitutions to deny state con-
61. Id. at 575-76.
62. Id. at 575.
63. Id. at 572-73.
64. Id. at 576.
65. Id. at 578.
66. Id. at 571.
67. Id. at 574 (citing Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
68. Id. at 578.
69. See, e.g., id. at 567:
The statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to
formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being
punished as criminals... [t]his, as a general rule, should counsel against attempts by the
State, or a court, to define the meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries absent
injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects.
Id.
70. Id. at 599-600 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
71. See Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CL, 1998 WL 88743 at *6
(Alaska Feb. 27, 1998) (concluding marriage statute violated right to privacy provision in Alaska
Constitution; superseded by constitutional amendment, art. 1, § 25 of the Constitution of Alaska);
Baehr, 852 P.2d at 55; Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999) (resolved by creation of civil
union system).
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ferred marital benefits to same-sex couples. 72 Yet, inevitably, the legisla-
ture in each state responded to the court's opinions by enacting legisla-
tion to expressly deny same-sex civil marriage.
1. Hawaii: Baehr v. Lewin
73
Hawaii took the first steps toward judicially recognizing same-sex
marriages in the United States.74 In Baehr v. Lewin,7 the plurality of the
Hawaii Supreme Court reasoned that a state law excluding same-sex
couples from obtaining marriage licenses may violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause and Equal Rights Amendment of Hawaii's constitution.76
The court stated that allowing opposite-sex couples access to marriage
licenses, while denying marriage licenses to same-sex couples, consti-
tuted sex discrimination.77 In looking at United States Supreme Court
decisions that addressed the right to marriage, the court concluded that
while there is a constitutional right to marriage, same-sex marriage is not
a fundamental right. Specifically, the court opined that same-sex mar-
riage was not covered by the right to privacy nor deeply "rooted in tradi-
tions.,,78 Accordingly, the court overruled the trial court's judgment on
the pleadings in favor of the defendant Health Department and remanded
the case on the theory that denying same-sex couples access to marriage
licenses might constitute a discrimination based on gender.79 Moreover,
the court requested an evidentiary hearing to decide if the statute in ques-
tion "further[ed] compelling state interests" and was "narrowly drawn to
avoid unnecessary abridgments of constitutional rights." 80 On remand,
the trial court determined that the statute violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Hawaii Constitution and required the Health Department to
issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples.81
72. See, e.g., Brause, 1998 WL 88743 at *6 (concluding marriage statute violated right to
privacy provision in Alaska Constitution; superseded by constitutional amendment, art. I, § 25 of the
Constitution of Alaska); Baehr, 852 P.2d at 55 (concluding marriage statute implicated Hawaii
Constitution's equal protection clause; remanded case to lower court for further proceedings); Baker,
744 A.2d at 886.
73. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (concluding marriage statute implicated Hawaii Constitution's
equal protection clause; remanded case to lower court for further proceedings).
74. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 68 (concluding marriage statute implicated Hawaii Constitution's
equal protection clause; remanded case to lower court for further proceedings).
75. 852 P.2d 44 (concluding marriage statute implicated Hawaii Constitution's equal protec-
tion clause; remanded case to lower court for further proceedings).
76. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 55 (concluding marriage statute implicated Hawaii Constitution's
equal protection clause; remanded case to lower court for further proceedings).
77. Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage,
1996 BYU L. REv. 1, 11 (1996).
78. Id. at 13.
79. Id. at 13-14.
80. Id. at 15.
81. Baehr v. Miike, CIV. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 at *22 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996)
(superseded by HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23).
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In response to Baehr, the Hawaii legislature amended the Hawaii
Constitution in 1998 to reserve marriage for opposite-sex couples.
82
However, in exchange, the legislature agreed to provide a benefits pack-
age for couples who were not married, including same-sex couples.83
The same year that the Hawaii legislature amended Hawaii's constitution
to exclude same-sex couples from the definition of marriage, the Su-
preme Court of Alaska decided a case similar to Baehr.
2. Alaska: Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics
84
In 1998, Alaska became the second state to address the constitution-
ality of statutes banning same-sex marriage.85 The court in Brause v.
Bureau of Vital Statistics86 held that the Alaska marriage code limiting
civil marriage to unions between one man and one woman violated the
right to privacy and equal protection provisions of Alaska's constitu-
tion.87 The court equated the right to privacy with the right to be free
from government intrusion into "intimate personal decisions of the indi-
vidual. 88  Accordingly, because the Alaska marriage code interfered
with the "intimate personal decision" of whom to marry, the court deter-
mined that the code violated an individual's right to privacy. 89 The court
further reasoned that to ensure equal protection of fundamental rights, a
state statute that discriminated based on sex should be subjected to the
highest level of scrutiny. 90 Therefore, the court ruled that the parties
needed to engage in further hearings to determine whether the state had a
compelling interest in denying same-sex partners the fundamental right
to marry. 9 1
Although the court recognized the discrepancies between the rights
of same-sex couples and those of opposite sex couples, subsequent legis-
lation silenced this opinion. Like Baehr, an amendment to the Alaska
constitution superseded the Brause decision.92 Once again the legislature
recognized marriage as "exist[ing] only between one man and one
woman."
93
82. HAW. CONST. art. L § 23.
83. David Orgon Coolidge, The Hawai'i Marriage Amendment: It's Origins, Meaning and
Fate, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 19, 116 (2000).
84. No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743 at *6 (Alaska Feb. 27, 1998) (concluding marriage
statute violated right to privacy provision in Alaska Constitution; superseded by constitutional
amendment, art. I, § 25 of the Constitution of Alaska).
85. Brause, 1998 WL 88743 at *3-*4, *6.
86. Id.
87. Id. at *1.
88. Id. at *6.
89. Id. at *5.
90. Id. at *6.
91. Id.
92. ALASKA CONST. art. L § 25.
93. Id.
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3. Vermont: Baker v. State94
One year later, the Vermont Supreme Court ruled that denying
same-sex couples access to marriage licenses was impermissible under
the state's constitution.95 Unlike Hawaii, Alaska, and Massachusetts,
Vermont's constitution includes a Common Benefits Clause distinct from
equal protection. 96 The core of the Common Benefits Clause is the in-
clusion of all political groups.97 Specifically, no one person or group can
receive special benefits and advantages from the government that are not
available to other groups.98 The court concluded that because marriage
came with certain unique benefits, the state could not arbitrarily exclude
a group of persons from these state-conferred benefits.
99
After Baker, the Vermont legislature had the choice to either in-
clude same-sex couples under the existing marriage laws or create a par-
allel statutory relationship to ensure equal benefits to same-sex cou-
ples. 1° ° Not surprisingly, the state legislature responded by codifying a
system of civil unions that give all of the state benefits of marriage to
same-sex committed partnerships without conferring on them the status
of civil marriage.
101
The federal government immediately reacted to the success of
same-sex marriage cases. In 1996, following Baehr, Congress approved
a bill to allow states to not recognize same-sex marriages performed in
other states. 10 2 Additionally, the Defense of Marriage Act sought to de-
fine federally marriage as a union between one man and one woman.10 3
On September 21, 1996, President Clinton signed the bill into law.1°4
The federal government, faced with the possibility of same-sex marriage
gaining recognition in certain states, enacted legislation on civil mar-
riage, a subject traditionally left to the states to regulate.
94. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
95. Baker, 744 A. 2d at 886.
96. See VT. CONST. art. VII, ch. 1:
That government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection, and se-
curity of the people, nation, or community, and not for the particular emolument or ad-
vantage of any single person, family, or set of persons, who are a part only of that com-
munity; and that the community hath an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right,
to reform or alter government, in such manner as shall be, by that community, judged
most conducive to the public weal.
Id.
97. Baker, at 874-75.
98. VT. CONST. art. VII, ch. 1; see also Baker, 744 A.2d at 867.
99. Baker, 744 A.2d at 886.
100. Id. at 869.
101. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 (2003).
102. Charles Bierbauer, Anti Gay Marriage Act Clears Congress, CNN.com, (Sept. 10, 1996),
at http://www.cnn.com/us/9609/1Ogay.marriage.
103. Louise Schiarone, Amendments Tie Up Anti Gay-Marriage Bill, CNN.com, (Sept. 5,
1996), at http://www.cnn.comlus/9609/05/gay.marriages/index.htmt.
104. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996); see also Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, H.R. 3396, 104th Cong. §
2-3 (1996).
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In summary, the fate of past court decisions from other states on the
same-sex marriage issue were indicators that: 1) public opinion did not
support same-sex marriage; and 2) if a court ruling threatened to force a
state to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples contrary to public
opinion, legislatures would act on behalf of constituents to prevent it.
Despite this backdrop, seven same-sex couples brought a case similar to
Baehr, Brause, and Baker in Massachusetts.
III. GOODRIDGE V. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH'
°5
Notwithstanding the failure of the previous state cases to enact
longstanding change, seven same-sex couples in Massachusetts turned to
the judicial system to grant them access to civil marriage. In Goodridge
v. Department of Public Health, °6 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts found that: 1) same-sex couples were statutorily denied marriage
licenses; and 2) this denial violated the Massachusetts Constitution." 7
First, the court dissected the literal and textual meaning behind the
Massachusetts marriage license statute, G.L. c. 207, and concluded that it
excluded same-sex couples from obtaining marriage licenses.108 Next,
the court analyzed whether G.L. c. 207 violated the state constitution's
due process and equal protection provisions. 109 Using a rational basis
standard of review, the majority concluded that the marriage license stat-
ute violated the state constitution. 10 Alternatively, the concurring justice
felt that the court did not need to consider due process and equal protec-
tion arguments because the statute impermissibly discriminated on the
basis of sex in violation of Article I of the Declaration of Rights as
amended by Article 106 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts
Constitution."' Finally, the dissenting justices disagreed that the
marriage license statute violated the state constitution.
A. Majority Opinion: Rejecting the Defendants' Rational Basis Argu-
ments to Find G.L. c. 207 Violated the State Constitution
The defendants first claimed that G.L. c. 207 was rational because it
promoted procreation. 12 Although the procreation of future generations
was of great importance in early American history, the majority reasoned
that fertility was no longer the core purpose of marriage.' The majority
105. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
106. Goodridge, 798 N.E. 2d at 941.
107. Id. at 953, 963.
108. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 207, § 1 (Law. Co-op. 2004); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 951,
953.
109. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 960-61, 963.
110. Id. at 960-61.
111. Id. at 970 (Greaney, J., concurring).
112. Id. at 961.
113. Id.
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based their assessment on the facts that: 1) not all married couples can or
do have children;'1 4 2) marriage is not a prerequisite to bearing children;
and 3) lack of fertility is not a valid ground for dissolving a marriage.1 15
Thus, the majority disagreed with the defendants' procreation rationale
by noting that procreation is not the central defining goal of the institu-
tion.' 1
6
The majority also discarded the defendants' second claim that the
statute was permissible because it guaranteed the "optimal" setting for
child rearing." 7 The majority found this claim baseless. The fact that
same-sex couples could already legally adopt children in the state un-
dermined this argument." 18 In addition, the majority reasoned there was
a lack of sufficient research to prove definitively that a household with
parents of the opposite-sex was the best setting for child rearing. 119 The
majority further suggested that the classification of same-sex couples as a
less desirable child-rearing unit may have, in part, been based on the fact
that same-sex couples were denied the benefits of civil marriage in the
first place. 120 Therefore, the defendants failed to convince the court that
the marriage license statute furthered a legitimate government interest in
the welfare of children.
Finally, the majority rejected the defendants' third argument that the
statute was rationally permissible because it safeguarded state and pri-
vate resources.12' The majority reasoned that many of the Goodridge
same-sex couples had dependants who needed the same state protections
afforded to dependants of opposite-sex couples. 122 Also, the majority
explained that the decision to provide married couples with certain bene-
fits was not based on a demonstration of financial dependence of one
partner. 123 Thus, the majority reasoned that even if same-sex couples
were financially less dependant on one another, their independent finan-
cial stability was not a reason to deny them the benefits of civil mar-
riage. 124
In conclusion, the defendants failed to provide a rational basis for
the legislature to deny same-sex couples access to civil marriage. As a
result, the majority found that the marriage license statute was impermis-




117. Id. at 961, 963.
118. Id. at 962.
119. Id. at 962-63.
120. Id. at 963.
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B. Justice Greaney's Concurring Opinion: G.L. c. 207 Impermissibly
Discriminates Based on Gender
In his concurrence, Justice Greaney opined that the court could re-
solve the issue based on constitutionally impermissible sex discrimina-
tion alone.1 26 Justice Greaney asserted that the court need not look be-
yond Article I of the Declaration of Rights as amended by Article 106 of
the amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, which prohibits dis-
crimination based on "sex, race, color, creed, or national 
origin.'' 127
Simply put, Justice Greaney reasoned that because the right to marry was
part of a fundamental right to enjoy life and that discriminating against
same-sex couples was a discrimination based on the sex of the marital
partner, the marriage licensing statute was unconstitutional.' 28
Justice Greaney further stated that the court was not limited to the
traditional definition of marriage as being between one man and one
woman. 129 Specifically, he suggested that the court should scrutinize the
validity of that definition in light of Article 1.130 According to Justice
Greaney, "neither the mantra of tradition, nor individual conviction, can
justify the perpetuation of a hierarchy in which couples of the same sex
and their families are deemed less worthy of social and legal recognition
than couples of the opposite sex and their families."
131 In fact, Justice
Greaney likely would have included same-sex committed couples in the
definition of marriage despite the literal and textual meanings of mar-
riage derived by the majority.
C. Justice Spina 's, Justice Sosman 's, and Justice Cordy's Dissents: The
Court Misapplied the Rational Basis Standard and, thus, Usurped
Legislative Power
Justices Spina, Sosman, and Cordy dissented. 132 The dissenting jus-
tices in Goodridge did not agree that the Massachusetts marriage statute
violated the state constitution. Justice Spina expressed concern with: 1)
the court usurping legislative power; 33 2) the court misconstruing the sex
discrimination element of the equal protection argument; 1
34 3) the char-
126. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 971 (Greaney, J., concurring).
127. Id. at 970 (citing MASS. CoNsT. art 1 (2004), amended by MASS. CONST. art. CVL Art. 1).
All people are born free and equal and have certain natural, essential and unalienable
rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and
liberties; that of acquiring, possessing and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and
obtaining their safety and happiness. Equality under the law shall not be denied or
abridged because of sex, race, color, creed or national origin.
Id.
128. Id. at 970-71 (Greaney, J., concurring).
129. Id. at 972-7 3 (Greaney, J., concurring).
130. Id. at 973 (Greaney, J., concurring).
131. Id. (Greaney, J., concurring).
132. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 974.
133. Id. at 974 (Spina, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 975 (Spina, J., dissenting).
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acterization of the fundamental right to marry as including same-sex un-
ions; 35 and 4) the revising of the statute to be gender neutral. 36 Justice
Sosman, on the other hand, feared that the court did not properly apply
the rationality standard of review.' 37 Finally, Justice Cordy shared Jus-
tice Spina's concerns regarding redefining marriage to include same-sex
unions, and deciding the same-sex marriage debate in court instead of
through the legislative process. 138 Justice Cordy also opined that there
was no fundamental right to privacy issue at stake.'3 9
1. Justice Spina's Dissent
Justice Spina expressed concerns that the majority overstepped its
judicial boundaries. 40 Simply put, the power to regulate marriage is held
by the legislature and, therefore, Justice Spina argued that the court was
usurping that power.14
1
According to Justice Spina, the Massachusetts statute does not dis-
criminate against any particular group but applies to all individuals
equally. 42 Justice Spina reasoned that the gender contemplated was the
gender of the person to whom the law applies, not the gender of that per-
son's partner. 143 Thus, the inability to marry a person of the same sex
applied equally to all persons under the law. 1  Additionally, Justice
Spina explained that the marriage statute did not discriminate based on
sexual orientation. 145 First, like a heterosexual person, a homosexual
person was free to enter into a permissible civil marriage with a person
of the opposite sex.' 46 Second, homosexual and heterosexual persons
were also equally denied the ability to marry a person of the same sex. 14 7
Despite the plaintiffs' equal protection argument, Justice Spina found
that G.L. c. 207 did not discriminate on the basis of gender.
48
Next, Justice Spina addressed the plaintiffs' due process argument.
Justice Spina reasoned that because same-sex marriage was not "deeply
rooted in the nation's history," it did not meet the test of a fundamental
right. 49 While Justice Spina conceded that people have a right to choose
whom to marry, he claimed that the choice had not traditionally involved
135. Id. at 976 (Spina, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 977 (Spina, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 978-79 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 984, 987 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 986 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 974 (Spina, J., dissenting).
141. Id. (Spina, J., dissenting).
142. Id. (Spina, J., dissenting).
143. Id. (Spina, J., dissenting).
144. Id. (Spina, ., dissenting).
145. Id. at 975 (Spina, J., dissenting).
146. Id. (Spina, J., dissenting).
147. Id. (Spina, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 974 (Spina, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 976 (Spina, J., dissenting).
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the right to choose a person of the same sex. 150  According to Justice
Spina, there was no constitutionally protected right, fundamental or oth-
erwise, at stake in this case and, therefore, the majority was wrong to
apply even a rational basis test. 151
Finally, Justice Spina reasoned that the majority's remedy of mak-
ing the statute gender neutral was outside the bounds of permissible judi-
cial discretion.152 The judiciary may only revise a legislative statute if
the legislative intent is preserved. 153 Thus, according to Justice Spina,
changing gender specific wording into gender neutral language violated
legislative intent.'
54
2. Justice Sosman's Dissent
Justice Sosman opined that the majority misused the rational basis
standard of review by holding it to too high of a threshold. 55 The ra-
tional basis standard of review requires that the statute "satisfies a mini-
mal threshold of rationality."' 5 6 Thus, the reasons given by the defen-
dants met this minimal threshold. In addition to her concerns about use
of the rational basis standard, Justice Sosman also was concerned that
there was no compelling reason for the court to force the state to give
same-sex couples the benefits singled out for opposite-sex couples.
157
According to Justice Sosman, there was insufficient evidence that same-
sex couples are essentially the same as opposite-sex couples. 58 In fact,
Justice Sosman noted that many opposite-sex couples with families are
not receiving the benefits of marriage. Hence, Justice Sosman concluded
that there was no compelling reason to single out same-sex couples to
receive benefits denied to all types of families without sufficient scien-
tific studies to back up the assertion.'
59
3. Justice Cordy's Dissent
Finally, Justice Cordy expressed concern with the majority's inter-
pretation of the definition of marriage, and believed this issue was better
left to the legislature. 160 In Justice Cordy's opinion, the majority im-
properly redefined marriage to include unions of same-sex partners so
that it could declare that the Massachusetts marriage license statute vio-
150. Id. (Spina, J., dissenting).
151. Id. (Spina, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 977 (Spina, J., dissenting).
153. Id. (Spina, J., dissenting).
154. Id. (Spina, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 978-79 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 978 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 978-79 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 979 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 981 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 984, 1004 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
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lated a fundamental right to marry. 16 1 Yet, according to Justice Cordy,
the fundamental right to marry has never included the right to marry a
person of the same sex.162 Justice Cordy argued that many of the cases
claiming that the right to marry was a fundamental right implicitly meant
that procreation with a chosen partner was a fundamental right. 163 There-
fore, Justice Cordy concluded that this case did not implicate the right to
privacy issue because the right to privacy only applies to sexual rela-
tions.164 In particular, G.L. c. 207 did not interfere with the ability to
have a homosexual relationship; it merely meant that the state did not
want to single out such relationships for these types of benefits.165 Fur-
thermore, Justice Cordy advised that the court should hesitate to make
decisions that might create a new fundamental right when public opinion
on same-sex marriage was unknown. 16 6 According to Justice Cordy, the
best way to determine public opinion is to leave it to the legislature to
decide the same-sex marriage issue.
167
The majority and dissenting opinions in Goodridge disagreed about
whether the case involved determining the constitutionality of a state
statute or deferring a political decision to the legislature. However, even
if the court agreed that the case was about the constitutionality of the
Massachusetts statute, the majority and dissent disagreed about how to
apply the rational basis standard of review to the statute. Because the
majority deemed the case to be a determination of the constitutionality of
a state statute, it was properly decided by the court and not by the legisla-
ture. However, the plaintiffs' wisdom in bringing the case rather than
pursuing legislative action was dubious in light of the backlash of consti-
tutional amendments that similar cases in other states had sparked.
IV. ANALYSIS
The Goodridge dissents' concern that the issue of same-sex mar-
riage should have been left to the legislature is well founded. Although
marriage is a civil institution, it also has deep religious and traditional
meanings to Americans that are inconsistent with the inclusion of same-
sex partnerships. Such an emotionally charged issue should be left to the
representatives of popular opinion to decide. This analysis will cover
several of the issues related to deciding this question in court instead of
through the legislative process. First, there is recent legislative and judi-
cial action indicating that Americans on the whole favor a definition of
marriage limited to unions between one man and one woman. Second,
161. Id. at 984 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
162. Id. (Cordy, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 985 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
164. Id. (Cordy, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 986-87 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 1004 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
167. Id. (Cordy, J., dissenting).
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the bans on same-sex marriage, anti-miscegenation laws, and sodomy are
not so analogous as to indicate a need for judicial action to override con-
stitutional violations. Third, polls of public opinion indicate a more fa-
vorable political environment for same-sex civil unions with marriage-
like benefits than for same-sex marriages. Finally, by resolving the issue
in court, Goodridge has resulted in pre-emptive strikes against same-sex
marriages in both state and federal forums that leave persons granted
same-sex marriages in Massachusetts in a tenuous legal position.
A. Legal Action Indicates Resistance to Same-Sex Marriage
Legal recognition of committed domestic relationships and equal
access to benefits regardless of sexual orientation undoubtedly is desir-
able. However, forcing recognition and access through a state supreme
court decision may not be the best route to achieving this goal. Without
the support of popular opinion, a state supreme court decision leaves the
door open for constitutional amendments that would definitively exclude
same-sex couples from ever having access to the institution of marriage.
In fact, a similar holding in the Supreme Court of Alaska led to exactly
that result.
68
Following the landmark decision in Baehr v. Lewin' 69 in 1993, the
Republican dominated Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act.
170
This act defined marriage at the federal level as being the union of one
man and one woman. 17  In addition, this legislation gave states permis-
sion to give no credit to same-sex marriages solemnized in other states.
172
President Clinton signed the bill into law in 1996.173 State legislatures
across the country followed suit and enacted state Defense of Marriage
Acts to: 1) define marriage as a union between one man and one woman;
and 2) express their intentions to hold as invalid any same-sex marriage
solemnized in other states.
17 4
Thirty-eight states have current statutes defining marriage as the un-
ion between one man and one woman. 175 In addition, in Minnesota, one
of the states without such a statute, the supreme court ruled in 1971 that
168. See Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743 at *4
(Alaska Feb. 27, 1998) (concluding marriage statute violated right to privacy provision in Alaska
Constitution; superseded by constitutional amendment, ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25).
169. 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993) (concluding marriage statute implicated Hawaii Constitu-
tion's equal protection clause; remanded case to lower court for further proceedings).
170. See Charles Bierbauer, Anti Gay Marriage Act Clears Congress, CNN.com, Sept. 10,
1996, at http://www.cnn.com/us/9609/10/gay.marriage.
171. See Louise Schiavone, Amendments Tie Up Anti Gay-Marriage Bill, CNN.com, Sept. 5,
1996, at http://www.cnn.com/us19609/05/gay.marriageslindex.html.
172. Schiavone, supra note 171.
173. Bierbauer, supra note 170.
174. See B.A. Robinson, Same Sex Marriages (SSM) and Civil Unions, REUGIOUS
TOLERANCE.ORG, at http://www.religioustolerance.org/hon_marr.htm (last updated March 8, 2005).
175. Robinson, supra note 174.
[Vol. 82:1
THE WRONG STEP AT THE WRONG TIME
same-sex marriage is not allowed under the statute and that the statute
does not deprive these couples of any fundamental right.
76
Cases similar to Goodridge and previous same-sex marriage dis-
putes have been unsuccessful in Arizona and the District of Columbia.
17
Of the four state supreme courts that have declared state statutes limiting
marriage to opposite-sex couples to be a violation of state constitutions,
only the decision in Massachusetts resulted in an order to grant marriage
licenses to same-sex couples. 178 Of the three remaining states, Alaska
and Hawaii passed amendments to the state constitutions defining mar-
riage as the union between one man and one woman. 179 These constitu-
tional amendments rendered the state statutes at issue in the cases consti-
tutionally valid. Finally, Vermont created a parallel institution to grant
state benefits and the responsibilities of marriage to same-sex couples
without giving them the status of being married.8 0
In 2004, courts in both New York and California decided cases
brought against public officials for solemnizing same-sex marriages in
violation of state statutes.'18  While the Justice Court of New York dis-
missed the charges, because the court determined the statute refusing
marriage licenses to same-sex couples violated equal protection laws,'
82
the case from California resulted in invalidation of all same-sex mar-
riages obtained in violation of the state statute.1
8 3
These court decisions, statutory enactments and proposed constitu-
tional amendments demonstrate a lack of cohesion across the United
States in opinions about same-sex marriage. However, the fact that to
date no state has enacted a law or constitutional amendment declaring
same-sex marriage legal is a clear indicator that public opinion does not
strongly support same-sex couples having the right to marriage. 184 In
fact, the myriad of Defense of Marriage Acts and amendments to state
constitutions specifically excluding same-sex couples from the definition
of marriage, demonstrate a greater tendency of Americans to vote against
marriage for same-sex couples when given the choice. 85 The plaintiffs
176. See Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186-87 (Minn. 1971).
177. See Standhardt v. Super. Ct. of Ariz., 77 P.3d 451, 465 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003); Dean v.
Dist. of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 361 (D.C. 1995) (per curiam).
178. See ALASKA CONST. art.1, § 25; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23; Brause, 1998 WL 88743 at *4
(Alaska Feb. 27, 1998) (concluding marriage statute violated right to privacy provision in Alaska
Constitution; superseded by constitutional amendment, ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25); Baehr v.
Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993) (concluding marriage statute implicated Hawaii Constitution's
equal protection clause; remanded case to lower court for further proceedings); Goodridge v. Dep't
of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969-70 (Mass. 2003); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 889 (Vt. 1999).
179. See ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 25; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23.
180. See Baker, 744 A.2d at 889.
181. See Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459, 464 (Cal. 2004); People v.
West, 780 N.Y.S.2d 723, 723-24 (N.Y. Jus. Ct. 2004).
182. West, 780 N.Y.S.2d at 725.
183. Lockyer, 95 P.3d at 499.
184. See generally Robinson, supra note 174.
185. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 25; HAw. CONST. art. I, § 23.
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in Goodridge obviously were undeterred by the negative history evi-
denced by the other similar same-sex marriage cases.
The plaintiffs in Goodridge may have sought access to civil mar-
riage through the court system because the United States has a history of
promoting important social change by engaging the judicial branch.
186
Arguably, the civil rights movement of the 1960s was spurred by the
Supreme Court's opinion in Brown v. Board of Education.187 In Brown,
the Court recognized the social stigma and psychic harm caused by seg-
regating school children. 88 A backlash of resistance to desegregation
followed the Brown decision, just as a backlash of resistance to inclusion
of same-sex unions in the definition of marriage followed Goodridge and
similar cases. 189 Supporters of seeking access to civil marriage for same-
sex couples through the judicial system may see the eventual acceptance
of desegregation and success of the civil rights movement as indicators
that long-term social change will result from decisions like Goodridge.
However, there is an argument that Brown was not the start of the civil
rights movement, just a step in a process already in motion.19° In fact,
there may have already been a social, economic, and political climate
that would have eventually led to the Civil Rights Act in the absence of
Brown.191 Some argue that Brown's major contribution to the civil rights
movement was motivating opponents of desegregation to violence.
92
This display of violence may have sparked otherwise unmotivated sup-
porters to take action.1
93
So far, Goodridge and similar cases have not sparked violence by
opponents, just constitutional amendments precluding the possibility of
long-term access to civil marriage for same-sex couples. 194 The continu-
ing success of these state constitutional amendments defining marriage
as the union between one man and one woman shows that the present
social, economic and political climate of the United States does not sup-
port a social change in favor of civil marriage for same-sex couples.
186. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 164-65 (1973).
187. See Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA.
L. REv. 7, 13 (1994) (citing EARL BLACK, SOUTHERN GOVERNORS AND CIVIL RIGHTS: RACIAL
SEGREGATION AS A CAMPAIGN ISSUE IN THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 109 (1976)).
188. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95.
189. Compare Klarman supra note 187, at 11 with Kavan Peterson, 50-state rundown on gay
marriage laws, Stateline.org (last updated Nov. 3, 2004), at http://www.stateline.org/stateline/
?pa=story&sa=showStorylnfo&id=353058.
190. See Klarinan, supra note 187, at 80-85.
191. See Klarman, supra note 187, at 71-76.
192. Klarman, supra note 187, at 76.
193. Klarman, supra note 187, at 11.
194. See Peterson, supra note 189.
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B. Goodridge not analogous to Lawrence v. Texas, 195 Perez v. Sharp,196
and Loving v. Virginia
t97
Despite the emergence of state constitutional amendments against
same-sex marriage, the recent Supreme Court decision in Lawrence v.
Texas 198 might be construed as an indicator of a favorable political cli-
mate for change in the treatment of homosexual couples. 99 Yet, Law-
rence dealt strictly with the right to privacy and freedom from govern-
mental intrusion into the private sexual conduct of its citizens. 200 Law-
rence did not deal with state-conferred benefits for couples engaged in
those private relationships. 20 1 While the Lawrence decision took the
government officially out of the role of actively prosecuting private inti-
mate associations, the ruling did not mandate that legislatures provide
statutory support for homosexuality. 2
At issue in Lawrence was a Texas criminal statute used to prosecute
adult homosexuals engaged in private consensual acts.2°3  At issue in
Goodridge was a civil code used to confer on heterosexual couples a
public status and to give them certain state benefits. 0° Criminalizing the
private conduct of a class of citizens is different from offering a package
of benefits to go along with a civilly conferred status. Moreover, deny-
ing same-sex couples access to civil marriage does not attach the same
stigma to homosexuals as having a criminal record for engaging in their
private intimate relationships. Additionally, unlike Lawrence, the state
did not rationalize offering civil marriage only to opposite-sex couples
by condemning the morality of same-sex relationships.2 5  Instead, the
state argued that the statute furthered legitimate government interests in
procreation, guaranteed optimal child-rearing settings, and safeguarded
state and private resources.
206
Finally, there has been no similar movement in the United States to
criticize or refuse to adhere to civil marriage statutes. Although, there
have been a few isolated legal cases, and some disobedience of control-
ling civil marriage laws, there has not been a pattern of not enforcing the
limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples. 07 In fact, the few court
195. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
196. 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948).
197. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
198. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79.
199. See id. at 599-602 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
200. See id. at 578.
201. See id.
202. Id. at 578-79.
203. Id. at 563.
204. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 950-51.
205. See id. at 961.
206. Id.
207. See, e.g., Brause, 1998 WL 88743 at *4-*6 (concluding marriage statute violated right to
privacy provision in Alaska Constitution; superseded by constitutional amendment, article I, section
25 of the Constitution of Alaska); Lockyer, 95 P.3d at 498; Baehr, 852 P.2d at 57-58 (concluding
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decisions and acts of disobedience have mostly been met with backlash
and, thus, reaffirm the disapproval of same-sex marriage. °8
Because Lawrence decided only the constitutionality of prohibiting
private sexual conduct by criminalizing it, and not promoting certain
civil relationships for legitimate government purposes, the decision does
not support the idea that civil marriage laws violate due process and
equal protection.2 9 As a result, the Massachusetts Supreme Court's de-
cision to recognize same-sex marriage may do more harm than good for
homosexuals in the United States. While Lawrence may have seemed
like an invitation by the Supreme Court to challenge the constitutionality
of denying same-sex couples access to marriage, the Court limited its
holding to criminalized private sexual conduct.2 10 Thus, state laws ban-
ning same-sex marriage are easily differentiated from those criminalizing
private adult consensual homosexual acts.
Moreover, unlike the couples in Perez v. Sharp211 and Loving v.
Virginia, 2 2 same-sex couples do enjoy a host of benefits similar to those
213enjoyed by married couples. Plaintiffs questioning the constitutional-
ity of denying same-sex couples the right to civil marriage tend to rely on
the reasoning of these two cases that struck down anti-miscegenation
laws. 214 Under the respective provisions of the statutes in Perez and Lov-
ing, mixed-race couples could not get married. z 5 In fact, prior to the
1980s, no private or governmental entities in the United States conferred
benefits on domestic partners. 216 Thus, without recognition of their civil
marriages, these mixed-race couples had no protective legal relationship
available to them.217 While same-sex couples do not qualify for civil
marriage in the majority of states, they do qualify for many domestic
218partner benefits similar to those offered to married couples. Overall,
the political standing of same-sex couples in the United States today is
marriage statute implicated Hawaii Constitution's equal protection clause; remanded case to lower
court for further proceedings); Baker, 744 A.2d at 886; but cf. Dean, 653 A.2d at 361; West, 780
N.Y.S. 2d at 725.
208. See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 189.
209. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
210. See id.
211. 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948).
212. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
213. Mikaila Mariel Lemonik Arthur, An Encyclopedia of Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, Trans-
gender, and Queer Culture: Domestic Partnerships (Feb. 28, 2004), at www.glbtq.com/social-
sciences/domestic-partnerships.html (last visited January 17, 2005).
214. See, e.g., Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 458; Baehr, 852 P.2d at 61-63 (concluding marriage
statute implicated Hawaii Constitution's equal protection clause; remanded case to lower court for
further proceedings); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 957-58.
215. Loving, 388 U.S. at 6; Perez, 198 P.2d at 18.
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not as perilous as the standing of mixed-race couples facing anti-
miscegenation laws prior to recognition of domestic partner benefits.2 19
C. Reactions to Goodridge
1. Popular Opinion
At this time, there are no clear indicators that popular opinion in
Massachusetts supports access to civil marriage for same-sex couples.
Specifically, popular opinion polls on same-sex marriage indicated that
Massachusetts's voters are divided on the issue. A poll taken in Massa-
chusetts following the Goodridge decision indicates that popular opinion
did support the court's ruling to legalize same-sex marriages.22 The poll
results showed that 50 percent of the 400 persons asked supported the
court's decision, while only 38 percent opposed it.221 When polled about
support for an amendment to the state constitution defining marriage to
exclude same-sex couples, 53 percent opposed passing an amendment
and only 36 percent supported it.222 While these results seem to indicate
the support of popular opinion for the social change sought by the ?lain-
tiffs, another poll taken in Massachusetts produced different results.
According to a poll conducted by RKM Research and Communica-
tions, 76 percent of Massachusetts voters believed that same-sex couples
should have access to the same marital benefits afforded to opposite sex
couples.224 However, only 49 percent of the polled individuals suported
calling the system of benefits for same-sex couples "marriage."2 The
results of this poll indicate that the political and social climate of the
state may be ready for civil unions but not for same-sex civil marriage.2 26
Recent legislative decisions in other states indicate that civil unions
have more popular support than do civil marriages for same-sex cou-
ples.227 When the Vermont legislature decided to enact a parallel system
of civil unions in place of same-sex civil marriage, the Vermont legisla-
ture explained: "Granting benefits and protections to same-sex couples
219. Id.
220. Frank Phillips & Rick Klein, Fifty Percent in Poll Back SJC Ruling on Gay Marriage,
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 23, 2003, available at http://www.glad.org/marriage/globe+herald-polls 11-
23-03.shtml (taken for Boston Globe and WBZ-TV).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. David R. Guarino, Same-Sex Benefits Get Voters' Blessings: Most OK Gay Marriage,





227. See An Act Relating to Civil Unions, Pub. Act No. 91, § 1(10), 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves
(2000), available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/2000/acts/actO91.htm (last visited March 8,
2005); David Orgon Coolidge, Same-Sex Marriage: As Hawaii Goes... 72 FIRST THINGS 33, 33-
37 (1997), available at http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft9704/articles/coolidge.html.
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through a system of civil unions will provide due respect for tradition
and long-standing social institutions, and will permit adjustment as unan-
ticipated consequences or unmet needs arise., 228  The civil union ap-
proach was also palatable to Hawaiians following the state supreme
court's ruling in Baehr.229 The amendment to Hawaii's constitution de-
fining marriage as a union between one man and one woman did not pass
until there also was a bill proposing a civil union system of benefits for
same-sex couples.23°
In an effort to recognize civil unions, an amendment excluding
same-sex couples from getting married and instead creating a Vermont-
style civil union system has already passed the first round of approval in
the Massachusetts legislature. 23' If the amendment gets re-approved in
2005, Massachusetts's voters could decide the issue in 2006.2 32 if this
amendment becomes part of the state constitution, it is unclear what
status same-sex couples married between May 17, 2004 and 2006 will
have.233 Therefore, without a clear majority in favor of the decision in
Goodridge, same-sex couples are getting married in Massachusetts ab-
sent guarantees that their marriages will be valid two years from now.
234
Despite the Massachusetts legislature's movement toward a civil
union system, the Goodridge court opined that civil unions were not
enough to satisfy the constitutional issues.235  According to the court,
only full scale civil marriage for same-sex couples would suffice.2 36 Be-
cause the Goodridge court refused to substitute civil unions for civil mar-
riage, same-sex couples in Massachusetts may only receive state-
conferred marital benefits through an institution not clearly supported by
public opinion. As a result, same-sex married couples in Massachusetts
are in a tenuous position that they would not have been in had they
sought change through legislation and not through the court system.
2. Interstate Effects
Furthermore, the Goodridge decision put other states on alert about
the constitutionality of Defense of Marriage Act laws. States have re-
acted by enacting pre-emptive state constitutional amendments preclud-
ing the possibility of widespread recognition of same-sex marriages in
the United States. An opinion poll conducted with a national sample
228. Act Relating to Civil Unions, supra note 227, at § 1(10).
229. See Coolidge, supra note 227.
230. Id.
231. See Peterson, supra note 189.
232. Id.
233. Theo Emery, Same-Sex Couples Marry in Massachusetts, GrandForksHerald.com, May
17, 2004, at http://www.grandforks.com/mld/grandforks/8682758.htm (last visited March 8, 2005).
234. See id.
235. See In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 569 (Mass. 2004) (court
responding to legislature's question about whether civil unions would suffice).
236. Id. at 571-72.
[Vol. 82:1
THE WRONG STEP AT THE WRONG TIME
showed a similar tendency to favor civil unions over civil marriage for
same-sex couples. 237 While 56 percent of people oppose or strongly op-
pose civil marriage for same-sex couples, only 32 percent favor or
strongly favor civil marriage.2 38 Only 43 percent of those polled oppose
or strongly oppose a system of civil unions and 49 percent favor or
strongly favor civil unions.239 Winning recognition of same-sex marriage
in one state does not result in federal marriage benefits for these couples,
nor does it guarantee recognition of the marriage in any other state.
24°
Forcing legal recognition of marriages between persons not fitting the
traditional definition of a married couple in one state puts other states on
alert to take pre-emptive measures to exclude these marriages from rec-
ognition in their borders. 1  Ultimately, this will impede the mobility of
same-sex married couples, because moving outside the State of Massa-
chusetts could mean losing marriage benefits.2 42
In response to Goodridge, Governor Romney of Massachusetts has
revived a turn-of-the-century miscegenation law preventing couples that
are not legally eligible to marry in their own states from getting married
in Massachusetts.2 43 The majority of states already have Defense of Mar-
riage Acts in their statutory schemes.2 4 A number of these statutes make
clear that states that have banned same-sex marriage will not recognize
same-sex marriages formed in states like Massachusetts.24' The Federal
Defense of Marriage Act of 1996 granted these states the power to ignore
same-sex civil marriages formed outside the state, despite the Constitu-
tion's requirement of states to give full faith and credit to contracts
formed in other states.2 6 The Federal Defense of Marriage Act led to a
body of law across the country largely unwelcoming to married same-sex
couples. 247  Therefore, in addition to having a tenuous future status in
237. See Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, Pew Forum on Religion & Public




240. Arthur, supra note 213.
241. See Peterson, supra note 189.
242. id.
243. See, e.g., Scott S. Greenberger, Reilly Says Curb on Gay Marriage Blunts Backlash,
BOSTON GLOBE, July 13, 2004, available at http://www.equalmarriage.org/press.php.
244. See Peterson, supra note 189 (for example, CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (West 2004) states
that "[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California."); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 517.03 (West 2004):
Subdivision 1. General. (a) The following marriages are prohibited: ... (4) a marriage
between persons of the same sex. (b) A marriage entered into by persons of the same
sex, either under common law or statute, that is recognized by another state or foreign ju-
risdiction is void in this state and contractual rights granted by virtue of the marriage or
its termination are unenforceable in this state.
Id.
245. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-1-19 (2004); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-208 (2003).
246. See Robinson, supra note 174.
247. See Peterson, supra note 189.
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Massachusetts, same-sex married couples also risk losing recognition of
their union should they decide to move to a different state.
3. Constitutional Amendments
Various states are already taking pre-emptive action against future
248cases like Goodridge by amending their constitutions. In November
2004, the public in eleven states voted for constitutional amendments
restricting the definition of marriage to apply only to opposite-sex cou-
ples. 249 Additionally, the voters in Missouri passed such an amendment
to the state constitution in early August 2004.250
The ruling in Goodridge sparked a pre-emptive reaction from the
251federal government. ' Senator Wayne Allard of Colorado introduced a
federal marriage amendment that would ban same-sex marriages but
leave room for civil unions.52 The proposal was the third attempt to pass
such an amendment since 2002 and was defeated on July 14, 2004.253
An ABC News/Washington Post survey of public opinion across the
United States about same-sex marriage indicated that more Americans
oppose same-sex marriage than support it.254  However, the poll also
showed that most people also oppose a pre-emptive federal constitutional
amendment to settle the issue.
2 55
4. Colorado
Colorado has a history of rejecting the legislative protection of ho-
mosexuals. In the early 1990s, Colorado voters passed an amendment to
the state constitution that prohibited state and local governments from
enacting any measure to protect homosexuals from discrimination.256
The Supreme Court struck down the Amendment because it persecuted a
specifically targeted group of people and had no rational state interest. 57
Despite this landmark decision, Colorado continues to stifle homosexu-
als' rights. For instance, Colorado has a statute defining marriage as the
248. Id.
249. Peterson, supra note 189 (the eleven states are: Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan,
Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon and Utah).
250. Peterson, supra note 189.
251. See, e.g., Marriage Will Be Defined Nationally-but How?, USA TODAY, Feb. 17, 2004,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2004-02-17-marriage x.htm.
252. Id.
253. See, e.g., Alan Cooperman, Gay Marriage Ban in MO May Resonate Nationwide,
WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Aug. 5, 2004, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A38861-2004Aug4.html.
254. See David Morris & Gary Langer, Same Sex Marriage: Most Oppose It, but Balk at
Amending Constitutiont ABCNEWS.COM, Jan. 21, 2004, at http:llabcnews.go.comlimageslpdf/
945a2GayMarriage.pdf.
255. Id.
256. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,623-24 (1996).
257. See id. at 636.
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union between one man and one woman.258  Moreover, a private non-
partisan polling company reported that as of 2003, 56 percent of Colora-
doans opposed the legalization of same-sex marriages.2 59 While represen-
tatives and senators from Colorado have been instrumental in introducing
federal marriage amendments to Congress, there was no such amendment
on the ballot in Colorado for November 2004.26
Because same-sex couples do enjoy a variety of marriage-like bene-
fits in most states, they can afford to bide their time and wait for a favor-
able political climate to seek recognition of their right to marry through
the legislative process. In the end, the backing of the legislature and
popular opinion would more likely result in long-term widespread accep-
tance of same-sex marriages in the United States.
CONCLUSION
Over the last ten years, same-sex couples have launched cases
around the country challenging the constitutionality of denying them
access to civil marriage. 261 In most states, same-sex couples certainly do
not receive benefits under the law equal to those of opposite-sex married
couples. 262 However, the goal of equality is not best met through state
supreme court decisions in the absence of a socially, politically and eco-
nomically favorable climate.263
Before the court decided Goodridge, there was already a trend of
victory for same-sex marriage in state court followed by a rush to amend
the state constitution, or otherwise permissibly exclude same-sex couples
from civil marriage. 264 Not only have these cases inspired voters in the
affected states to enact restrictive legislation, but the outcome of the
cases has also prompted other states to take pre-emptive legislative ac-
258. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-104(b) (West 2004).
259. Floyd Ciruli, Colorado Voters Support Gay Rights but Not Gay Marriage, CIRULI
AssoclAES, Dec. 8, 2003, at http://www.ciruli.comlpolls/gay1203.htm.
260. See Peterson, supra note 189.
261. See generally Brause vs. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 Cl, 1998 WL
88743, at *6 (Alaska Feb. 27, 1998) (concluding marriage statute violated right to privacy provision
in Alaska Constitution; superseded by constitutional amendment, article I, section 25 of the
Constitution of Alaska); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993) (concluding marriage statute
implicated Hawaii Constitution's equal protection clause; remanded case to lower court for further
proceedings); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 889 (Vt. 1999) (concluding marriage statute violated
Vermont Constitution's common benefits clause); but see Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451,
465 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (marriage statute does not violate liberty interests under either Federal or
Arizona Constitution).
262. Robinson, supra note 174.
263. See Klarman, supra note 187.
264. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25 (2003); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 (2003); Brause, 1998
WL 88743, at *4-5 (concluding marriage statute violated right to privacy provision in Alaska Con-
stitution) (superseded by constitutional amendment, art. I, § 25 of the Constitution of Alaska);
Baehr, 852 P.2d at 68 (concluding marriage statute implicated Hawaii Constitution's equal protec-
tion clause; remanded case to lower court for further proceedings); Baker, 744 A.2d at 888-89
(resolved by creation of civil unions).
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tion against same-sex marriage. 2 65 Despite this backdrop, same-sex cou-
ples brought their action to court instead of using the legislative proc-
ess.266
Although the Massachusetts Constitution is open to the interpreta-
tion that the right to choice of marital partner, regardless of gender, is
protected, 267 because judges are not elected officials, their decisions to
recognize same-sex rights to marry do not necessarily reflect public opin-
ion. Because of the resulting backlash of constitutional amendments that
foreclose the possibility of long-term equality for homosexuals,268 same-
sex couples married in Massachusetts are now in limbo, waiting to see if
their state will pass an amendment to the constitution invalidating their
unions.269 In the case of same-sex marriage, bad timing and choice of
forum may have stunted rather than promoted social change.
Mary Ellen Rayment*
265. See Peterson, supra note 189.
266. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941,949 (Mass. 2003).
267. See id. at 966-67.
268. Peterson, supra note 189.
269. See B.A. Robinson, Same Sex Marriages in Massachusetts: A Lawsuit: Goodridge v.
Department of Public Health. A Proposed Amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution,
RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE.ORG, May 29, 2004, at http://www.religioustolerance.org/hommarm.htm.
* J.D. Candidate, May 2006. The author would like to thank Professor Julie Nice and
Denver University Law Review Comments Editor Sara Lewis for all of their assistance.
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LEARNING FROM RED SKY AT MORNING: AMERICA AND THE
CRISIS OF THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT:1 How "JAZZ" AND
OTHER INNOVATIONS CAN SAVE OUR SICK PLANET
INTRODUCTION
Red sky at night,
A sailor's delight.
Red sky at morning,
A sailor's warning.
This old mariners' adage has been used for centuries as a simple
way to observe environmental signs and warn sailors of dangerous
storms. A red dawn is alarming-it signals impending violent weather.
Red Sky at Morning: America and the Crisis of the Global Environment
also is alarming-it warns of catastrophic environmental degradation.
2
The situation is truly urgent. As the author warns: "it is now an under-
statement to say that we are running out of time.",
3
James Gustave Speth is a professor and dean of the practice of envi-
ronmental policy and sustainable development at Yale University. 4 Speth
founded the World Resources Institute and co-founded the Natural Re-
sources Defense Council . He also served as an environmental advisor
for President Carter and President Clinton.6 Decades of detailed attention
to environmental issues make Speth a well-credentialed expert on global
health.
His assessment, analysis and admonitions regarding the current en-
vironmental crisis are resounding and authoritative. Many world leaders,
expert scientists, renowned scholars and other published commentators
1. JAMES GUSTAVE SPETH, RED SKY AT MORNING: AMERICA AND THE CRISIS OF THE
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT: A CITIZEN'S AGENDA FOR ACTION (2004).
2. Id. at xiv. "This volume focuses on the looming disaster and how to avoid it." Id.
3. Id. at9.
4. Id. at xiii.
5. Id. at xi.
6. Id. at 2. Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter endorses Speth's work, "[h]is extraordinary
new book is an impassioned plea to take these issues seriously before it is too late. We owe it to our
children and grandchildren to read Red Sky at Morning and take action while we can." id. at back
cover.
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agree with Speth.7 These affirmations of his ideas also reiterate his call
for immediate and truly influential action. 8 Red Sky at Morning: America
and the Crisis of the Global Environment (hereinafter "Red Sky") is
more than an educated evaluation of the global health crisis-it is an
impassioned call to arms and a detailed plan of action. 9
Unfortunately, the planet is in need of intensive care. As Speth ex-
plains, "[m]ajor changes are in order, changes that must be driven by a
profound sense of urgency."' 0 So take what action? And how? Until now,
Speth says, the "primary focus of the international community has been
international environmental law, including so-called 'soft law,' the non-
binding international policy declarations.""1 Although soft law reflects
diplomatic successes,' a dire situation calls for stronger laws. The global
health crisis needs improved and enforceable international law, but laws
are only part of the complex solution for such large problems. 13
As Speth explains, "efforts to protect the global environment have
largely failed in the sense that the trends in environmental deterioration
have not improved and that more of the same will not get us where we
want to be in time to head off an era of unprecedented environmental
decline."' 4 Tangible-and desperately needed-solutions will require
unconventional approaches, innovative ideologies and shifts in cultural
paradigms. 15 Red Sky warns: "we need very different international insti-
tutions, procedures, and core understandings."'
' 6
Part I of this Book Review considers the impacts of the twentieth
century's explosions in population and technology. Part II investigates
the most pressing current environmental issues and their causes. Part III
contemplates solutions, considering economic incentives and sustainable
7. Throughout this paper, the author will reference the views of other scholars whose work
reinforces Speth's concerns about global environmental health. Investigation into the issues Speth
has addressed finds the majority of experts in agreement with Speth's assessment.
8. SPETH, supra note 1, at 95. "[T]he threatening environmental trends highlighted a quarter-
century ago have continued, so that today the problems are deeper and more urgent." Id.
9. Id. at 203. Red Sky's final section is a detailed blueprint for individual activism entitled
"Resources for Citizens." Id.
10. Id. at9.
11. Id. at 91.
12. LAKSHMAN D. GURUSWAMY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
WORLD ORDER viii (2d ed., West Group 1999). "Although not binding, [soft laws] nevertheless
provide the basis for voluntary cooperation, which enables the action processes to proceed, and
paves the way for negotiation of binding agreements." Id.
13. SPETH, supra note 1, at xii. "The current system of international efforts to help the envi-
ronment simply isn't working. The design makes sure it won't work, and the statistics keep getting
worse. We need a new design, and to make that happen, civil society must take the helm." Id.
14. Id. at xi.
15. Id. at 171. "Many solutions to today's environmental challenges lie outside the established
'environmental sector.' Environmental objectives now need to be incorporated into corporate plan-
ning, energy strategy, technology policy, R & D funding, tax policy, international trade and finance,
development assistance, and other matters that once seemed far removed." Id.
16. Id. at 173.
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development. Also, Part mI outlines Speth's eight transitions to global
sustenance.
Part IV explores the far-reaching implications of Speth's directive
to rethink and reform culture and consciousness. This reformation incor-
porates innovative theories from postmodern philosophy, Eastern tradi-
tions, socio-economics, psychology, literature, and feminism (in its vari-
ous forms). Throughout Part IV, and also throughout Red Sky, a new
paradigm of dialectic synthesis, cooperation, reconciliation and inclusion
emerges. Finally, Part V considers how Speth's new consciousness could
impact the legal world.
I. FROM TELEGRAPHS TO TEXT MESSAGING: IMPACTS OF THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY'S EXPLOSIONS IN POPULATION AND
TECHNOLOGY
Preceding generations have presented us with a highly developed
science and technology, a most valuable gift which carries with it
possibilities of making our life free and beautiful to an extent no pre-
vious generation has enjoyed. But this gift also brings with it dangers
to our existence as great as any that have ever threatened 
it.
17
A. Assessing Global Environmental Health Reveals a World of Wounds'
8
Author and biologist Aldo Leopold noticed by the mid-twentieth
century that profound changes were overtaking the natural world.' 9 By
1900, all of human history had produced a global population of one and a
half billion people. However, the twentieth century facilitated an enor-
mous population explosion-there are now six billion people on earth.2°
Leopold and other environmentalists have tracked the drastic impacts of
population explosion. Speth outlines four major concerns that have re-
sulted from this massive human expansion and its accompanying
changes in culture and technology. 2' Section A considers the increase in
population and recent globalization, the expansive nature of these
changes, and ultimately the ethical consequences of growth and change.
Section B addresses the implications-for good and for ill-that techno-
logical advancements have for the future of environmental health.
17. ALBERT EINSTEIN, IDEAS AND OPINIONS 93-94 (Crown Publishers 1954).
18. SPETH, supra note 1, at 13 (citing ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC: WITH
OTHER ESSAYS ON CONSERVATION FROM ROUND RIVER 165 (Oxford University Press 1966)).
"[O]ne of the penalties of an ecological education is that one lives alone in a world of wounds." d
19. Id. at 15.
20. Id. at 13.
21. Id. at 13-22.
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1. Concern #1: A Rapidly Expanding Population on a Finite
Planet
22
Speth's first concern is the seemingly limitless growth of people in
a limited world. Population growth and improved standards of living
23have come at the expense of the environment. Millions more people
radically increase consumption and pollution, which are destroying the
natural world.24 A growing number of consumers are ferociously devour-
ing resources. 25 While industrial and human wastes have massively in-
creased, technological advances have created new hazards, such as toxic
and radioactive waste.26
The earth's atmosphere now has increased levels of greenhouse
gases, causing global warming and depletion of the planet's stratospheric
ozone la 'er.27 Also, the oceans and fresh water habitats are being de-
stroyed.2  Environmental degradation in the twentieth century also has
threatened the biodiversity of plant and animal species. As scientist Stu-
art Primm explains, "the rate of species extinction today is estimated to
be a hundred to a thousand times the normal rate at which species [natu-
rally] disappear.
29
2. Concern #2: Globalization: Interdependent International
Megasytems
Second, the expansion of the twentieth century has globalized eco-
nomic and environmental issues. The problems that Speth outlines in Red
Sky are world-wide.
30
New institutions such as the European Union and the World Trade
Organization wield enormous power and are creating a hugely interde-
pendent global economy.31 Yet, there is no "World Environmental Pro-
22. Id. at 17. Speth quotes a convention of 1,500 preeminent scientists, the majority of whom
are Nobel laureates:
The earth is finite. Its ability to absorb wastes and destructive effluents is finite. Its ability
to provide food and energy is finite .. . Current economic practices which damage the
environment, in both developed and underdeveloped nations, cannot be continued with-
out the risk that vital global systems will be damaged beyond repair.
Id.
23. Id. at 119. "Our economic activity, in the largest sense, is consuming nature and pouring
out products and pollution." Id.
24. Id.
25. Susan Headden, A Heavy Footprint, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, July 6, 2004, at 4.
"[W]e are sapping our resources at a ferociously gluttonous pace." Id.
26. SPETH, supra note 1, at 46. "Paralleling the dramatic growth in the volume of older pol-
lutants . .. has been the introduction since World War n of new chemicals and radioactive sub-
stances." Id.
27. Id. at 16.
28. Id.
29. SPETH, supra note 1, at 15 (citing Stuart L. Primm et al., The Future of Biodiversity,
SCIENCE 269, 347 (1995); J.H. LAWTON AND R. M. MAY, ExTtNcTION RATES 73 (1995)).
30. SPETH, supra note 1, at 15-22.
31. RICHARD FALK, REvrrALIZING INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (1989). Falk explains the ironic
movement, after centuries of bloodshed to separate and autonomize individual nations, back toward
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tection Agency" with anything approaching the power or budget to ad-
dress the looming crisis.
Though humans separate themselves into different cultures, lan-
guages and ethnicities, the environmental impact of unchecked atmos-
pheric alteration transcends nationalities and sovereign states.33 As Speth
explains: "[a]ddressing environmental concerns means thinking beyond
states, nations or even continents."
34
Environmental crisis can quickly lead to political and social 
crisis. 35
As we face a brave new world of international trade, we also confront
planet-wide pollution and drastic climate alterations.36 As the problems
grow, we will need correspondingly larger solutions to prevent humani-
tarian disasters.
3. Concern #3: Growth Facilitates More Growth
37
A third consequence of the twentieth century's economic growth is
its snowballing, expansive effect. Speth explains, "the world economy's
forward momentum is large."38 More people seeking improved quality of
life means a greater draw on resources.3 One of the scarcest, but most
essential, of these natural resources is water.4°
Speth explains, "[clollectively the environmental impacts of rich
and poor have mounted as the world economy has grown, and we have
control under one central power: "The seventeenth century completed a long process of historical
movement from nonterritorial central guidance toward territorial decentralization, whereas the con-
temporary transition process seems headed back toward nonterritorial central guidance." Id.
32. SPETH, supra note 1, at 177. "Over the past decade, the leaders of France, Germany, and
other countries have called for the creation of a World Environment Organization." Id. See also Sir
Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make Environmental Law, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 259, 260 (1992). Sir
Geoffrey Palmer, P.C., K.C.M.G., A.C., is a former Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Attor-
ney General and Minister for the Environment of New Zealand. "In truth, the United Nations lacks
any coherent institutional mechanism for dealing effectively with environmental issues." Id. at 260.
See also infra Part V for a discussion of global environmental governance.
33. SPETH, supra note 1, at 193. THE EARTH CHARTER is a product of the Rio Summit and
now endorsed by "725 organizations representing 40 million people." Id. Speth calls it "[t]he most
sophisticated effort to date to frame values and principles for a sustainable future." Id. THE EARTH
CHARTER recognizes that, "[a]s the world becomes increasingly interdependent and fragile, the
future at once holds great peril and great promise. To move forward we must realize that in the midst
of a magnificent diversity of cultures and life forms we are one human family and one Earth com-
munity with a common destiny." Id. at 194.
34. SPETH, supra note 1, at 178. Speth maintains that we need "globalize[d] environmental
protection in a world where pollution knows no boundaries and where trade, deployment of technol-
ogy, and investment flows are increasingly international." Id.
35. Id. at 61. "Within societies, the disruption of water supplies or agriculture, as well as
rising sea levels and other impacts, could easily contribute to social tensions, violent conflicts, hu-
manitarian emergencies, and the creation of ecological refugees." Id.
36. Id. at 73. "[T]he more serious pollution problems are chronic, insidious, and global." Id.
37. Id. at 18. "[T]here is no reason to think that the world economy will not double and per-
haps double again within the lifetimes of today's young people." Id
38. Id. at 17.
39. See id. at 19.
40. Id. at 18. See also infra notes 117-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the global
fresh water crisis.
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not yet deployed the means to reduce the human footprint on the planet
faster than the economy expands."
41
4. Concern #4: New Global Ethical Responsibilities
42
Speth's final concern about the consequences of the twentieth cen-
tury is a product of the first three: with humanity's ability to radically
alter the global environment comes an ethical responsibility to sustain
it.43 Innovative environmentalist Aldo Leopold said, "[a] thing is right
when it tends to preserve the integrity, beauty and stability of the biotic
community."44
As Speth explains, environmental ethics promote "the protection for
their own sake of the living communities that evolved here with us and
our trusteeship of the earth's natural wealth and beauty for generations to
come."
45
Speth insists that action is urgently needed to preserve the living
systems that have been entrusted to us.46 He defines the new ethic: "Our
responsibility is to manage ourselves and our impacts on nature in a way
that minimizes our interference with the great life-support systems of the
planet." 7 This will require increasing the effectiveness of international
law,48 as well as finding unconventional new solutions.
49
As worldwide society progresses through the twenty-first century, it
must address the twentieth century's problems of rapid population
growth and expansive globalization. Formulating and implementing a
new, earth-centered ethic is both the consequence of and a responsibility
for the increasing global citizenry.
B. The Impact of the Twentieth Century's Technological Revolution
Technological knowledge can mean advancement, sophistication
and positive change.50 However, some technologies, such as fossil fuel
combustion, have huge negative side effects. 51 As Speth points out: "Al-
41. SPETH, supra note 1, at 19.
42. Id. at 24. "If we have rights, nature must also. The life that evolved here with us should be
allowed to live 'as a matter of biotic right."' Id. (quoting ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY
ALMANAC 211 (Oxford University Press 1949)).
43. Id. at 15-17.
44. Id. at 24.
45. Id. at 192.
46. Id. at 9. "[lIt is now an understatement to say that we are running out of time." Id.
47. Id. at 20.
48. See id. at 96. "But the bottom line is that on the big issues the trends of deterioration
continue. With few exceptions, our instrument of choice, international environmental law, is not yet
changing them, and the hour is late." Id.
49. See infra Part IV for a discussion of unconventional solutions.
50. SPETH, supra note 1, at 129. "Our society has encouraged technological virtuosity, equat-
ing it with progress." Id.
51. See id. at 44. "[T]he buildup of vast quantities of excess carbon dioxide from fossil fuel
use and other sources now threatens to alter the planet's climate and disrupt both ecosystems and
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though the social costs of industrial innovation have often been consider-
able, the material benefits have been irresistible.
5 2
Because infantile technologies and their far-ranging side effects
cannot always be predicted or controlled, new technology is a potential
Pandora's Box.53 Speth explains that the problem "is not that technology
is bad for the environment and social goals per se, but that ... societies
have been largely unable to assess new technologies and direct techno-
logical change in ways that avoid huge environmental costs."
54
Certainly the volumes of new industrial byproducts-biohazards,
toxics and radioactive materials-make speculative new technology a
threat to the environment.5 For example, as many as 400,000 people
were injured (including 10,000 deaths) in 1984 when methyl isocyanate,
an extremely toxic gas, leaked from a Union Carbide pesticide plant in
India.
56
However, new technologies also can be a big part of environmental
solutions.5 7 If we can develop ourselves into technological problems,
hopefully we can develop ourselves through the problems to a brighter
and cleaner future.
HI. WHAT ARE WE DOING TO THE NATURAL WORLD?
As we begin the new century, human activities are disrupting the
great ecological systems and natural cycles that make our planet
habitable, bountiful, and wondrous. Only our heightened care can
save the world as we know it. So, the world is indeed in our hands,
for good or for ill.
58
It is always essential to dissect and assess a problem before attempt-
ing to solve it. Speth uses his own expertise and the most recent findings
of experts in various fields to outline the primary problems of global
human communities." Id. As a consequence of petroleum combustion engines, "the United States is
responsible for 30 percent" of global greenhouse gas accumulation. Id. at 61.
52. Id. at 129.
53. See id. at 127. Speth quotes then President Nixon, who was touring a nuclear power plant:
"We can't be sure what it is going to produce, but on the other hand, we know that by exploring the
unknown, we are going to grow and progress .... [I]n terms of nuclear power, we must not be
afraid." Id. at 129. This sort of naive risk-taking takes on new and tragic irony after the Chemobyl
nuclear accident, which "caused the first officially reported radiation deaths in a nuclear-power-plant
accident." WILLIAM R. SLOMANSON, FUNDAMENTAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 586
(4th ed., Thompson West 2003).
54. SPETH, supra note 1, at 127.
55. Id. at 127-130.
56. SLOMANSON, supra note 53, at 585. See also In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disas-
ter, 634 F. Supp. 842, 844-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (dismissing the Indian victims' suit: "The doctrine of
forum non conveniens allows a court to decline jurisdiction .... [T]he foreign plaintiffs' choice of
the United States forum 'deserves less deference' than would be accorded a United States citizen's
choice.").
57. See infra notes 168-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of technology as a solu-
tion.
58. SPETH, supra note 1, at x.
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health. Pollution and resource depletion have drastically affected the
planet, from the stratospheric ozone layer to the depths of the oceans-
and the air, land and water in between. 5
A. Pollution
Pollution is a fundamental cause driving global deterioration. 6° Un-
fortunately, Speth explains that recent prosperity has caused "vast in-
creases in the quantity of pollutants imposed on a finite environment."
61
Earth is being asked to tolerate air pollution,62 toxics, 63 excessive ni-
trogen,64 phosphorous, 65 and carbon dioxide, 66 radioactive waste,67 acid
68 7rain and water body acidification, atmospheric ozone, 69 human wastes"
and other pollution. As the list of problems in the following sections il-
lustrate, expecting the planet to absorb all of these pollutants is an im-
possible task. As Speth explains, "the more serious pollution problems
are chronic, insidious, and global.'
B. Greenhouse Gases and Climate Change
When the recent Bush administration rejected controls on green-
house emissions through the Kyoto protocol,7 it commissioned a study
from the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), hoping to show that hu-
man activity is not drastically disrupting the global climate.73 However,
the NAS study did not support the Bush stance and instead reiterated
environmentalists' alarm.
74
59. See id. at 23. Speth contends that "[tlhe two megatrends in environmental deterioration
are increasing pollution and biological impoverishment." id. "Biotic impoverishment" is caused by
"human appropriation and consumption of natural resources and... pollution." Id. at 119.
60. See id. at 58.
61. Id. at 45.
62. Id. at 44.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 71-73.
65. Id. at 43-44.
66. Id. at 63-69.
67. Id. at 14.
68. Id. at 44-46, 51-54.
69. Id. at 54-55.
70. Id. at 51. "[W]ater contaminated by human wastes is one of the biggest killers in the
developing world." Id.
71. Id. at73.
72. Id. at 55. "[T]he Kyoto Protocol would require that, around 2010, industrial countries
reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to a level, on average, at least 5 percent below what those
emissions were in 1990." Id.
73. See id. at 55-56. "The Bush administration itself recently published a climate-change
report containing some of the strongest statements to date from the U.S. government about how the
world is getting hotter and the burning of fossil fuels is adding to the problem." Globe Warms; Bush
Fiddles, DENV. POST, July 14, 2002, at Fl.
74. SPETH, supra note 1, at 56. The NAS study found that human activity is increasing green-
house gases, causing global temperatures to rise. Id. Temperature increase and sea-level rise will
continue into the twenty-first century and beyond. Id. Also, "[g]lobal warming could well have
serious adverse societal and ecological impacts by the end of this century . I..." Id. (citing
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOME KEY
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Carbon dioxide is a by-product of fossil fuel combustion and a
greenhouse gas.75 Increased levels of greenhouse gases are causing
global warming, which is causing planet-wide problems, including wide-
spread glacial melting. 76 Polar ice melting causes sea levels to rise and
may alter the Gulf Stream, resulting in catastrophic weather shifts.77
Many scientists believe, as Speth explains, that "The most likely
mechanism for abrupt climate change is disruption of ocean currents
such as the Gulf Stream."78 Gulf Stream changes will impact the entire
Northern Hemisphere, and all its inhabitants, with violent and drastic
shifts in the weather.79
This is but one of a myriad of consequences that will result from
global climate change. Speth delivers the grim forecast: many experts
predict that without major corrections by the end of the twenty-first cen-
tury, it will be "impossible for about half of the American land to sustain
the types of plants and animals now on that land., 80 For example, the
leafy trees that characterize New England-and its colorful autumns-
may soon disappear.8 '
C. Loss of Ecosystems and Productive Lands
Illustrating the complex interactions of global ecology are problems
of biological impoverishment. 82 Biological impoverishment is both a
result of environmental degradation and a cause of other harms.83 Speth
explains the ramifications, as forces behind "biotic impoverishment are
QUESTIONS (National Academy Press 2001)). See also Kevin E. Trenberth, Stronger Evidence of
Human Influences on Climate: The 2001 IPCC Assessment, 43 ENV'T 8 (2001).
75. SPETH, supra note 1, at 3.
76. Id. at 58-59. See also Tim Apenzeller & Dennis R. Dimick, Global Warning: Bulletins
from a Warmer World, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, Sept. 2004, at 12. "From the Arctic to Peru, from
Switzerland to the equatorial glaciers of Irian Jaya in Indonesia, massive ice fields, monstrous gla-
ciers, and sea ice are disappearing, fast." Id.
77. SPETH, supra note 1, at 60.
78. Id. (citing Robert B. Gagosian, Abrupt Climate Change: Should We Be Worried?, WOODS
HOLE OCEANOGRAPHIC INSTITUTION, Jan. 27, 2003, at 8). Global warming is melting arctic ice
caps, increasing fresh water in the Atlantic. Id. at 61. This dramatic "freshening" of the ocean could
"both block the Gulf Stream's release of heat and disrupt the ocean currents that pull the warm
waters of the stream northward." Id. Disruptions in the Gulf Stream will result in drastic weather
disasters throughout the Northern Hemisphere. Id. at 60-61.
79. Id. at 61. "Today's computer models suggest that a shutdown of the Gulf Stream would
produce winters twice as cold as the worst winters on record in the eastern United States." Id. at 60-
61.
80. Id. at 16 (citing J.R. MALCOLM & L.F. PITELKA, ECOSYSTEMS AND GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE: A REVIEW OF POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF U.S. TERRESTRIAL ECOSYSTEMS AND BIODIVERSrrY
11(2000)).
81. Id. at 58. "[E]cological modeling show[s] that climate change in the second half of this
century, if it is not slowed, will largely eliminate maple trees and the maple sugar industry from New
England." Id. (citing NATIONAL ASSESSMENT SYNTHESIS TEAM, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON
THE UNITED STATES: OVERvEW 45 (2000); REPORT OF THE NEW ENGLAND REGIONAL
ASSESSMENT GROUP, PREPARING FOR CLIMATE CHANGE: NEW ENGLAND REGIONAL OVERVIEW 39-
42 (2001)).
82. See id. at 30-33.
83. See id. at 30.
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operating on a global scale, stressing natural systems, homogenizing and
simplifying them, and reducing biological diversity at a rate and scale not
experienced for millions of years." 4 Biotic impoverishment reveals itself
in the problems of deforestation and desertification.
1. Deforestation
One of the problems closely linked to air quality, global warming,
and biodiversity is deforestation.85 Trees and other fauna inhale carbon
dioxide and exhale oxygen.86 Forests also hold large amounts of carbon
while they are alive, but carbon is released as harmful greenhouse gases
when trees die or are burned.87
In a recent article, Brian Kelly and Mark London evaluated the
problems of deforestation in the Amazon region. The Amazon River
Basin "is 80 percent the size of the continental United States and con-
tains a fifth of the world's fresh water. 88 Its rainforests are "home to the
planet's greatest storehouse of biodiversity." 89 Brazil, the largest of the
Amazon nations, is also home to 60 to 90 million people who are living
in poverty. 90 One expert on Amazonian preservation has said, "The main
thing to save the forest is to keep the people out."9 1 But the economic
92temptation to convert forests to farm and ranch lands is great.
Assisting in the exploitation and annihilation of the world's forests
is a global economy and loss of local control over local resources.93 Con-
versely, a solution to deforestation presented by authors Roger Stone and
Claudia D' Andrea would be "allocating responsibility for managing and
84. Id. at 33. The nine drivers of biotic impoverishment are land use conversion (i.e., devel-
opment), land degradation, freshwater shortages, watercourse modification, invasive species, over
harvesting, climate change, ozone depletion, and pollution. Id. at 30-33.
85. Id. at 36.
86. GURUSWAMY, supra note 12, at 1093. "Forest vegetation converts C02 to oxygen (02) in
the presence of sunlight during photosynthesis." id.
87. See Betsy Carpenter, The Deep-Six Fix, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, July 6, 2004, at
24-25 for a discussion of carbon and the prospects for carbon sequestering, naturally in forests or
artificially through expensive and uncertain new technologies.
88. Brian Kelly & Mark London, Home on the Tropical Range, U.S. NEWs & WORLD
REPORT, July 6, 2004, at 76.
89. SPETH, supra note 1, at 36.
90. Kelly & London, supra note 88, at 76.
91. Id. at 75 (quoting Phil Freanside, a scientist at the National Institute for Amazonia Re-
search in Manaus).
92. Id. at 76. Brazilian developer Blairo Maggi explained, "It's very easy to defend the Ama-
zon on the beaches of Rio or in the offices of Washington or London. But our families need jobs and
homes." Id.
93. SPETH, supra note 1, at 40. "Critics of globalization charge that economic globalization
and the World Trade Organization [WTO] are magnifying the trend toward expanded logging by
encouraging high levels of foreign investment, weaker domestic regulation in the face of interna-
tional competition, and loss of local community controls." Id See also Jim Carlton, 'Greens' Target
WTO's Plan for Lumber: Push to End Tariffs Could Intensify Logging in Old Forests, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 24, 1999, at A2.
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protecting forests to the local groups and communities that depend on
their healthy survival ....
If the underlying problems of population and poverty are addressed,
local controls and the help of international financial aid could slow or
even stop deforestation. 95 After evaluating a United Nations study, Speth
optimistically concludes, "[W]e should be able to find a way to save the
world's ancient, intact forests."
96
2. Desertification
Another threat to global health is desertification. Loss of vegetation
increases carbon dioxide levels.97 In turn, greenhouse warming threatens
soil fertility, increases wind and water erosion, and may further destroy
the plants that prevent soil loss. 98 As Speth explains, "The productivity of
crop and grazing land is threatened by water and wind erosion, by the
salinization and waterlogging of irrigated lands, and by overgrazing and
devegetation."99
Desertification can lead to massive dust storms, like those that rav-
aged the Midwest in the 1930s and lead to the nickname "the Dust
Bowl. ''l °° Years of drought in northwest China have created huge dust
clouds.' 01 As one journalist recently observed, "The dust storms that
blow up each spring can sweep east across the Korean peninsula and
Japan, eventually reaching across North America."'
02
Desertification, like deforestation, must be addressed in terms of its
underlying causes if we are to prevent humanity's transformation of fer-
tile, productive and living ecosystems into barren wastelands. 103
D. Loss of Protective Ozone in the Earth's Atmosphere
Ozone in the lower atmosphere in high levels or as a component of
smog can be harmful to human health.104 Yet, as Speth explains, "ozone
94. SPETH, supra note 1, at 40 (citing ROGER D. STONE & CLAUDIA D'ANDREA, TROPICAL
FORESTS AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT: JOURNEYS TO THE BRINK OF HOPE 5 (2001)).
95. Kelly & London, supra note 88, at 76-77.
96. SPETH, supra note 1, at 41 (citing An Assessment of the Status of the World's Remaining
Closed Forests, U.N. Environmental Programme, U.N. Doc. UNEP/DEWAITR 01-2 (2001)).
97. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of plant life and carbon.
98. SPETH, supra note 1, at 16-17, 56-57.
99. Id. at 31.
100. H.E. DREGNE, DESERTIFICATION OF ARID LANDS 203 (Adli Bishay & William G.
McGinnies eds., Harwood Academic Publishers 1983).
101. Jasper Becker, China's Growing Pains: More Money, More Stuff, More Problems. Any
Solutions?, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, March 2004, at 68, 80. See also Ann Schrader, Latest Import from
China: Haze, DENV. POST, April 18, 2001, at Al. A dust cloud "several miles thick" traveled from
China to Colorado in the spring of 1999, and scientists believe that increasing standards of living in
China will only bring more desertification, pollution, and dust. Id. at A10.
102. Becker, supra note 101, at 80.
103. SPETH, supra note 1, at 30-33.
104. Id. at 54.
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is a valuable component of the upper atmosphere, where it acts as a filter,
absorbing harmful wavelengths of ultraviolet radiation."'
0 5
Widespread use of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) in the twentieth
century created a hole in the protective ozone layer "roughly the size of
Russia and Brazil combined."' 6 However, swift international action has
made ozone a rare but exemplary environmental success.10 7
E. Threatened and Endangered Species and the Importance of Biodiver-
sity
Biodiversity is a relatively modem concept that refers to aspects of
animal populations, independent of their numbers as they can exist in
isolation, like in a zoo. As the World Resources Institute explains, the
three aspects of biodiversity represent "the variety of genetically distinct
populations within a given species; the ten million or so species of
plants, animals and micro-organisms; and the diversity of ecosystems of
which species are functioning parts."'1 8 Genetic diversity is essential to
species' survival. °9
In 1982, Harvard professor E.O. Wilson testified before the U.S.
Congress on the Endangered Species Act:
The worst thing that can happen during the 1980s is not energy
depletion, economic collapse, limited nuclear war, or a conquest by a
totalitarian government .... 110 The one process ongoing in the 1980s
that will take millions of years to correct is the loss of genetic and
species diversity by the destruction of natural habitats. This is the
folly our descendants are least likely to forgive us.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 54-55.
107. Id. at 55. The Montreal Protocol, designed to restore the ozone layer, is a promising model
of international cooperation: "With the cooperation of developing nations, scientists estimate that the
ozone layer could fully recover by mid-century." Id. Speth calls the Montreal Protocol "the crown-
ing achievement of global environmental governance." Id. at 95.
108. Id. at 25 (citing WORLD RESOURCES INST., ET AL., GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY STRATEGY
GUIDELINES FOR ACTION TO SAVE, STUDY, AND USE EARTH'S BIOTIC WEALTH SUSTAINABLY AND
EQUITABLY (1992)).
109. For example, cheetahs have become a poster child for biodiversity. See Why Does the
Cheetah Lack Genetic Diversity?, Cheetah Conservation Fund, at http://www.cheetah.org/
?nd=aboutcheetah-03 (last visited Apr. 14, 2005). While cheetahs exist in sufficient numbers and
breeding pairs, the fragile genetic combination that creates this speedy cat does not. Id. Geneticists
have shown that lack of genetic diversity within the cheetah community make the species especially
vulnerable to disease and birth defects. Id. The small breeding stock is most likely doomed, because
the genetic diversity within the cheetah species has already been lost. Id.
110. SPETH, supra note 1, at 24 (quoting E.O. Wilson, GAA: AN ATLAS OF PLANETARY
MANAGEMENT, 159 (Norman Myers, ed., Anchor Books/Doubleday 1984) ("As terrible as these
catastrophes would be for us, they can be repaired within a few generations.").
111. Id. (quoting E.O. Wilson, GALA: AN ATLAS OF PLANETARY MANAGEMENT 159 (Norman
Myers, ed., Anchor Books/Doubleday 1984)).
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Some conservationists are motivated by emotional and spiritual
connections to the ailing natural world. 1 2 However, Speth looks past
sentiment to outline two reasons biodiversity is important: "our ethical
responsibilities and ecosystem services." 13 If humanity cannot be moti-
vated by an ethical duty, pure self-interest will also support protection of
biodiversity. The wealth of goods and services the environment provides,
from resources such as trees and fish to services like pollination and pho-




Water is everywhere, but not in limitless quality and quantity."15
Considering the sad state of global health, it is not surprising to discover
that the planet's largest component-water-is also ailing. Earth's vast
fresh and salt water ecosystems are both threatened today.1 6
1. Fresh Water Scarcities
As population, pollution and global temperatures increase, the de-
mand for fresh water also will rise. Speth finds that "[a]ppropriation of
freshwater supplies is . . . extensive, with widespread devastation of
freshwater habitats."
' 17
Water already is scarce in much of the world. Speth reports, "40
percent of the world's people [are] living in countries that suffer from
serious water shortages."" The chief news editor at Nature magazine
gave the grim forecast: "The water crisis is real. If action isn't taken,
millions of people will be condemned to a premature death. ' 1' 9 Already,
Speth notes, "water contaminated by human wastes is one of the biggest
killers in the developing world."
20
112. STEPHEN R. KELLERT, KINSHIP TO MASTERY: BIOPHILIA IN HUMAN EVOLUTION AND
DEVELOPMENT 12 (Island Press 1997). As Kellert explains, there are aesthetic values inherent in
nature: "living diversity is still an unrivaled contest for engaging the human spirit of curiosity, explo-
ration and discovery, in an almost childlike manner." SPETH, supra note 1, at 28.
113. SPETH, supra note 1, at 28.
114. Michael Satchell, Trouble in Paradise, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, July 6,2004, at 70,
70. The benefits of biodiversity are often termed in the "cure for cancer" argument. Id "Some 40
percent of pharmaceuticals are derived from vascular plants, yet only a mere 2 percent of the
300,000 known flora that contain sap have been screened for their medicinal value. The elusive cure
for cancer could lie in a tree, flower, or shrub, but what if that species is lost?" Id.
115. GURUSWAMY, supra note 12, at 578. "[All1 too characteristically, humanity shows an
astonishing disregard for maintaining the health of the hydrosphere-seemingly oblivious to the fact
the total amount of water in the world is constant, neither to be increased (like timber or fish) nor to
be diminished (like petroleum or coal)." Id.
116. SPETH, supra note 1, at 18, 85-86.
117. Id. at 16.
118. Id. at 32. (citing U.N. ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMME, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL
OUTLOOK 3: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES 150 (Earthscan 2002)).
119. Peter Aldhous, The World's Forgotten Climate, 422 NATURE 251, 251 (2003).
120. SPETH, supra note 1, at 51.
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Professor William Slomanson has found that "[s]ome experts also
believe that acquisition of water and water rights will soon become major
sources of international conflict."' 2 1 Impoverished and suffering regions,
already riddled with political strife, may become embroiled in a life-or-
death struggle for potable water.
The United States is already facing a fresh water crisis, 12 2 especially
in the arid west.1 23 Recent drought has foreshadowed the inevitable con-
flicts that will come with an increase in western United States popula-
tions. As Interior Secretary Gail Norton predicts, 'The drought is a warn-
ing signal ... Water shortages will be repeated even in average rainfall
years because there's simply not enough supply to satisfy all the growing
demands." 124
2. Threats to the Health of the Oceans
25
The world's oceans are home to complex and diverse ecosystems.
But they also receive most of the world's wastes. 126 Unfortunately, pollu-
tion 127 and global warming 128 are taking a huge toll on the planet's hy-
drosphere.
Giant regions of oceanic ecosystems are going extinct. Speth gives
the bad news: "Industrial processes such as manufacture of fertilizers and
other human activities ... [have created] at least fifty dead zones in the
oceans, one the size of New Jersey in the Gulf of 
Mexico."'129
121. SLOMANSON, supra note 53, at 586.
122. Marianne Lavelle & Joshua Kurlantzick, The Coming Water Crisis, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, July 6, 2004, at 58-63. Former EPA Administer Christie Todd Whitman warns that the
quality and quantity of water is "the biggest environmental issue that we face in the 21st century."
Id. at 58.
123. Id. at 61. Aging aqua structures throughout the country, not only in the west, are in need
of repair and many municipal drinking water supplies contain high levels of contaminants. Id. at 58.
124. Alex Markels, The War Over Water, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, July 6, 2004 at 64.
Mark Twain is quoted saying that in the West, "whiskey is for drinking; water is for fighting over."
Id. Conflicts are already arising: conservationists, developers, farmers and ranchers, industries and
others are vying for a finite and unpredictable resource. Id. at 64-66.
125. SPETH, supra note 1, at 16, 18-19, 52-54, 56-60.
126. GuRuswAMy, supra note 12, at 578. "Most of the world's wastes-some twenty billion
tons a year-end up in the sea, commonly without preliminary processing, usually to remain for
years in coastal waters where they impair productive breeding grounds and pollute beaches." Id.
127. SPETH, supra note 1, at 16. See also Thomas Hayden, Trashing the Seas, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT, July 6, 2004 at 48, 48-49. Activist Charles Moore has observed "countless tons of
plastic refuse ... drifting on the high seas." Id. at 48. Japanese scientists have found that plastic
particles at sea act like a sponge for toxic chemicals, absorbing and concentrating them. Id. Plastic
particles, which float on the ocean's surface, "often end up in the ocean's drifting, filter-feeding
animals, like jellyfish." Id. Many species, (including humans) feed on jellyfish. Id. As Moore
explains: "That's not likely to be good." Id.
128. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of oceanic freshening and
glacial melting.
129. SPErH, supra note 1, at 16 (citing JANE LuBCHENCO, Waves of the Future: Sea Changes
for a Sustainable World, in WORLDS APART: GLOBALIZATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT 25 (James
Gustave Speth ed., 2003); C. Yoon, A "Dead Zone" Grows in the Ocean, N.Y. TIMES, 20 January
1998, at FI).
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The bad news gets worse as Speth continues: "Coral reefs and the
life on them are now at great risk due to the combined impacts of coastal
development and pollution, tourism, global warming, and destructive
fishing practices.' 130 Coral reefs are sensitive ecosystems and the fresh-
ening of seawater because of glacial melting, plus the effects of warmer
surface and ocean temperatures, threaten to destroy them entirely. 131 The
forecasts are grim, and as Speth elaborates: "Indeed, painful to say, some
observers believe that most of the world's coral reefs are already
doomed."'' 32 Even if all precautions to curb greenhouse gas emissions are
taken immediately, it is unlikely that we can prevent the subtle increase
in temperatures that scientists fear will cause coral bleaching and reef
extinction.1
33
Speth's urgent cry for quick actions is widely substantiated by the
scientific data available. Indeed, investigation of the most recent scholar-
ship reveals an unhealthy planet with a bleak future. However, because
human activity is behind the pervasive destruction of the Earth's envi-
ronment, it logically follows that human activity is the only force that
can reverse the decline. An understanding of the multi-faceted problems
points to a variety of solutions.
As a global community, we read the reports and realize that we can
change our habits, from decimation of nature to preservation of nature. 134
New ethics show us that we should change. 35 But the underlying ques-
tion upon which the future of life as we know it rests-will we
change?-is up to us to decide.
III. IS PROFITABLE, YET SUSTAINABLE, DEVELOPMENT THE SOLUTION?
CAN THE INCENTIVES FOR EXPLOITATION ($) = THE INCENTIVES FOR
CONSERVATION ($)?
What good is money ifyou can't breathe the air? 136
If money-making is behind our inefficient exploitation of global re-
sources, will the potential for financial loss through resource exhaustion
motivate a change in our ways? Proponents of sustainable development
130. SPETH, supra note 1, at 34. See also Jerry Hirsch, Study: Coral Reefs Hurting: Pollution,
overuse killing off species, DENV. POST, Aug. 27, 2002, at A2. Reefs are considered key indicators
of ocean health. Id.
131. SPETH, supra note 1, at 56-57.
132. Id. at 57-58. If you are hoping to visit the world's coral reefs before they go extinct-
think again! The literal footprints left by well-intentioned but novice ecotourists is one cause of reef
deterioration. LISA MASTNY, TRAVELING LIGHT: NEW PATHS FOR INTERNATIONAL TOURISM 41
(Worldwatch Institute, 159 (2001)).
133. SPETH, supra note 1, at 57-58.
134. Id. at 5. As Speth explains, "For more than two decades even nongeniuses like myself
have known not only the gravity of the climate challenge but also more or less what to do about it.
And, of course, little has been done." Id.
135. See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of environmental ethics.
136. Becker, supra note 101, at 68.
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hope so. Realizing the interdependence between economies and ecol-
ogies may be the key to creating a healthy environmental future. This
section considers a comprehensive solution that addresses money and
conservation, and their relationship to each other.
Section A addresses global issues in terms of an ecological inter-
play. Section B looks specifically at the financial aspects of the world-
wide health crisis. Section C uses Speth's transitions to consider progres-
sive change. Finally, Section D concentrates on the compromise that
sustainable development represents.
A. The Fragile "Ecosystem" of Environment, Economy and Society
The social and political consequences of environmental destruction
cannot be underestimated. When considering massive catastrophes such
as war, nuclear holocaust and terrorism, international law professor Wil-
liam Slomanson conceded the dire consequences of ignoring global
health: "[W]e may come to recognize that environmental degradation
could cause the breakdown of international society as we now know
it.' 137 A healthy planet has "important ramifications.., for human secu-
rity and social stability."'
' 38
Red Sky takes a comprehensive approach to environmental issues,
addressing the entire problem-laden big picture. Due to the interdepend-
ence of organisms within an ecosystem, species preservation involves
protection of entire habitats. 39 Similarly, issues of environmental health
cannot be isolated entirely from the social, financial and political con-
cerns that surround them.
40
The natural environment is an essential-but not exclusive-part of
what sustains life as we know it. As Speth and others point out, this in-
137. SLOMANSON, supra note 53, at 585.
138. SPETH, supra note 1, at 7 (citing the COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY & U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, THE GLOBAL 2000 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: ENTERING THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 4 (1980) [hereinafter GLOBAL 2000 REPORT]. Though the report was initially commis-
sioned in hopes of silencing environmental outcries without making changes, scientific evidence of
global decline and the severity of its consequences were impossible to ignore. SPETH, supra note 1,
at 3. The report found that environmental threats "are inextricably linked to some of the most per-
plexing and persistent problems in the world-poverty, injustice and social conflict ... Vigorous,
determined new initiatives are needed if worsening poverty and human suffering, environmental
degradation, and international tensions and conflicts are to be prevented." Id. at 8 (quoting GLOBAL
2000 REPORT, at 4).
139. SPETH, supra note 1, at 25. "The principal cause of individual species loss by far is habi-
tat destruction." id.
140. See supra notes 15 and 35 for a discussion of the social and political impacts of environ-
mental degradation. See also Dr. Rajendra Ramlogan, The Environment and International Law:
Rethinking the Traditional Approach, 3 VT. J. ENV'T 4, 136 (2001-02), available at
http://www.vjel.org/articles/articles/ramlogan.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2005). Labeling the multi-
tude of international agreements as "treaty congestion," Dr. Ramlogan decides, "having separate
monitoring and non-compliance processes, meetings of parties, financing mechanisms, scientific
sources and advice, dispute resolution systems, and technical assistance schemes-can only lead to
chaos." Id. atlfl 113, 136.
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terdependence requires inclusive and multi-faceted approaches to our
problems.14 Traditional, particularized approaches have failed to correct
underlying causes of global environmental degradation. 42
Interrelated environmental problems require a comprehensive solu-
tion. Speth explains that "[i]f the first attempt at global environmental
governance was aimed primarily at symptoms, future efforts must attack
the disease itself. 1 43 For example, Speth contends that the climate
change convention" treated symptoms, while failing to cure the
underlying disease: "The real problem may be poverty, weak and
corrupt governments, or fossil fuels, or transportation, or chlorine-based
organic chemistry, but the conventions were framed to address the
surface worry rather than the deeper problems.' 45
Environmental issues rely on other life systems--economics, poli-
tics, culture-that surround them. Though some systems, such as envi-
ronment and economy, appear to be antagonistic, their interconnected-
ness exemplifies a dependence among living systems. Diverse problems
associated with global health are as parasitic, interdependent and mutu-
ally-sustaining as different organisms within an ecosystem.
B. Money is the "Root of All Evil, "'46 But What Would We do Without it?
There are financial aspects to almost every problem being addressed
by environmental organizations today. It is naive and simplistic to ad-
dress environmental problems without confronting the economic incen-
tives underlying ecological degradation.
However, money is also an essential part of environmental solu-
tions. Speth quotes an old adage: "conservation without money is con-
versation."'' 47 Well-placed economic aid is fundamental to the solution of
our planet's urgent environmental problems.
48
141. SPETH, supra note 1, at 151.
Global environmental challenges are closely interlinked. They cut across economic sec-
tors and geographical regions. They cannot be addressed issue by issue or by one nation
or even by a small group of nations acting alone. They are driven by powerful forces and
will not yield to the modest efforts we have been mounting.
Id.
142. SPETH, supra note 1, at 132.
143. Id. at 119.
144. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec.
10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 32 (1998).
145. SPETH, supra note 1, at 102.
146. See id. at 124. Speth looks to the world's major religions and cites their doctrines that
warn against "the perils of wealth." Id.
147. Id. at42.
148. See id. at 188-90. For example, money is used to buy conservation lands. See id. at 189-
90. Hundreds of millions of dollars have launched the "hot spot" program, which will buy land
reserves in regions of the world with the greatest biodiversity that have the greatest risk of habitat
destruction. See id. The project will eventually cost billions. See id. at 189.
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Money can help solve the problems, but pursuit of money is primar-
ily what created them. Poverty drives environmental destruction.49 Bra-
zilian congressman Raul Jungman describes the situation in his country
and others like it: "Poverty and misery and hunger. That's what destroys
the environment."'' 50
Money-making has an antagonistic dependency on the environ-
ment.'5 ' Exploitation of natural resources is extremely lucrative, but it is
not without consequences.152 Short-sighted economics can consume re-
sources.153 Conservation efforts can block development 
altogether. 15 4
Also, businesses tend to resist legislation that will cut into profits: Speth
explains that "[e]conomic pressures can lead to political decisions that
undermine even well-crafted treaties."'
55
However, developers and environmental activists must walk hand in
hand if they are to ultimately preserve both of their interests. Speth
warns, "If current trends continue, there will be large economic, social,
and environmental costs to pay in the future."'
' 56
149. See Rio Declaration on Environment & Development, June 14, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 874
(1992) [hereinafter RIO DECLARATION]. The Rio Declaration explicitly requires economic and
humanitarian solutions to environmental problems: "All states and all people shall cooperate in the
essential task of eradicating poverty as an indispensable requirement for sustainable development, in
order to decrease the disparities in standards of living and better meet the needs of the majority of
the people of the world." Id. princ. 5, at 877. See also SPETH, supra note 1, at 42. Also, economic
aid is a fundamental part of the attempt to alleviate international poverty. See id. Speth encourages,
"development assistance and economic cooperation ... debt relief or debt swaps or trade and in-
vestment arrangements." Id.
150. Kelly & London, supra note 88, at 76-77.
151. See SPETH, supra note 1, at 35-36. The findings of a recent World Resources Institute
study of ecosystem health "starkly illustrate the trade-offs we have made between high commodity
production and impaired ecosystems services, and indicate the dangers these trade-offs pose to the
long-term productivity of ecosystems." Id. (quoting WORLD RES. INST. ET AL., WORLD RESOURCES
2000-2001, 51 (2000)).
152. See id. at 36. For example, "the World Bank estimates that the cost of air pollution in
China's forests and crops exceeds five billion dollars annually." Id. at 53 (citing WORLD BANK,
CLEAR WATER, BLUE SKIES: CHINA'S ENVIRONMENT IN THE NEW CENTURY (1997)).
153. See id. at 36. See also Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 168 SCIENCE 1243,
1243 (1968). "The Tragedy of the Commons" is a phenomenon of human nature. See id. The typi-
cal example of a shared and limited resource is a sheepherder's common pasture. Id. The temptation
to add just one more animal is irresistible for each herdsman. Id. However, this tiny lapse of unre-
strained self-interest is ultimately fatal to the whole common pasture. Id. Hardin continues:
Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit in a
world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing
his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom
in a commons brings ruin to all.
Id.
154. See generally Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 153, 156-160 (1978) (stalling for
years the construction completion of a multi-million dollar dam to discern the fate of a tiny regional
fish species); Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Babbitt, 998 F.2d 705, 707 (9th Cir. 1993) (halting logging
operations in Oregon to protect an endangered spotted owl).
155. SPETH, supra note 1, at 107. "Basically, our economic system does not work when it
comes to protecting environmental resources, and second, the political system does not work when it
comes to correcting the economic system." Id. at 133.
156. Id. at 36.
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C. Speth 's Eight Transitions Toward a Healthy Planet
After addressing the large picture of the interdependent systems that
affect global health and narrowing his focus on the economics of envi-
ronmental degradation, Speth presents his solutions. 157 He optimistically
forecasts, "[T]hese transitions interact strongly, supporting each other
and forming a whole that will one day define a qualitatively new ep-
och."'
158
1. Transition One: A Stable or Smaller World Population 59
Speth refers to economist Partha Dasgupta who "argues that if
women had a choice, they would opt for fewer children."' Population
control typifies the intertwined workings needed for true reform. As birth
control technology improves, women gain power, United Nations pro-
grams and financial aid continue, and families in developing nations gain
access to control over their reproduction, population growth will slow. 16 1
2. Transition Two: Free of Mass Poverty' 62
Speth points out the tragic irony that "poverty contributes to envi-
ronmental decline... [and] [e]nvironmental decline also contributes to
poverty."' 163 But he optimistically sees "prospects for widely shared pros-
perity.
''164
Popular fiction writer Tom Robbins analogizes the absurdity of
widespread poverty in a plentiful world: "It was akin to a starving
woman with a sweet tooth lamenting that she couldn't bake a cake be-
cause she didn't have any ounces., 65 The world currently has enough
resources to sustain its population. The problem is not availability-it is
distribution.
157. See id. at 151. Speth addresses necessary and urgent future action. Id.
[T]his period can also become the watershed during which nations and peoples every-
where come together finally to deal with the problems massing on the environmental
front. If we can make that happen, our legacy from these early decades of the new cen-
tury will be a world sustained, not a world of wounds.
Id.
158. Id. at 152.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 121.
161. See id. at 153.
162. Id. at 154.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. TOM ROBBINS, SKINNY LEGS AND ALL 463 (1990). The quote is prefaced by a discussion
of the problems of poverty: "During periods of so-called economic depression, for example, socie-
ties suffered for want of all manner of essential goods, yet investigation almost invariably disclosed
that there were plenty of goods available... What was missing was not materials but an abstract unit
of measurement called 'money."' Id. The passage concludes, "The loony legacy of money was that
the arithmetic by which things were measured had become more valuable than the things them-
selves." Id. at 464.
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Speth agrees that poverty is largely a problem of wealth distribu-
tion: "Eliminating large-scale poverty is not a crazy dream ... [how-
ever,] a serious threat to achieving these goals is near-miserly develop-
ment assistance.' ' 166 Debt relief, trade regulation reform, economic aid,
and shared technology can balance the inequity between developing and
developed nations.
167
3. Transition Three: Environmentally Benign Technologies'
68
Speth's third transition calls for "a worldwide environmental revo-
lution in technology." 169 Advancing the technology that drives modem
lifestyles is a pragmatic way to minimize its harmful side effects without
halting consumption. Speth declares, "the principal way to reduce pollu-
tion and resource consumption while achieving expected economic
growth is to bring about a wholesale transformation in the technologies
that today dominate manufacturing, energy, transportation, and agricul-
ture."
170
4. Transition Four: Environmentally Honest Prices'
71
Speth's fourth transition rests on innovative economics. His neo-
classical economic model seeks "transition to a world in which market
forces are harnessed to environmental ends, particularly by making
prices reflect the full environmental costs.""
172
He also discusses "natural capitalism," which shifts fundamental
paradigms to greater appreciation of natural services. This environmen-
tally friendly economic theory acknowledges human and natural capital
and calls for increased efficiency and improved quality of products and
services.
Natural capitalism also aspires to reform governments to be "based
on the needs of people rather than business." 173 This new economic the-
ory reveres "the economy's dependence on the environment.,1
74
166. SPETH, supra note 1, at 154.
167. See id. at 154-55.
168. Id. at 157.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 161.
172. Id. Speth lists some environmental economists' tools for reform: "securing property
rights to overcome the 'tragedy of the commons' problem, tradable emission permits, pollution
taxes, user fees, shifting subsidies from environmentally damaging activities to beneficial ones, and
making polluters and others financially liable for damages they cause." Id. at 162.
173. Id. at 165-66 (quoting PAUL HAWKEN ET AL., NATURAL CAPrTALISM: CREATING THE
NEXT INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 6 (1999)).
174. Id. at 166.
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5. Transition Five: Sustainable Consumption175
Environmental challenges "require rethinking the utopian material-
ism that puts a premium only on unlimited economic expansion.' 76 Cur-
rent practices of unbridled consumption have disastrous environmental
impacts. 1
77
Speth offers high praise for the Environmental Grantmakers Asso-
ciation's five-part plan for promoting sustainable consumption, calling it"an excellent agenda."' 178 The plan seeks to: 1) "[i]ncrease consumer
awareness and choice"; 2) "[pjromote innovative policies"; 3)
"[a]ccelerate demand for green products"; 4) "[dlemand corporate ac-
countability"; and 5) "[e]ncourage sustainable business practices.' 79
6. Transition Six: Knowledge and Learning
80
Speth attributes part of the current environmental crisis to an unin-
formed public: "If we had invested generously in environmental educa-
tion at all levels over the past three decades, we would not be in as dan-
gerous a situation as we find ourselves today."' 8' The issues surrounding
global health are so obvious and urgent that in many cases, they speak
for themselves.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 113. Speth also refers to the "growth-at-all-costs imperative." Id. at 138. In the
U.S., the phenomenon can individually be termed as an American sense of entitlement, facilitating
24-hour consumerism. Id. This rampant consumer need goes beyond the limits of sensibility and
budget, facilitating epidemics in obesity and consumer debt. Id. As Speth explains: "Can a country
make a decision that enough is enough? Or is our current system so geared to high economic growth
that it is either up, up and away or down, down and out?" Id. at 192.
177. Id. at 83. The American aspects of problematic over-consumption and over-production
have been characterized by Yale professor Charles Reich:
In the second half of the twentieth century [the] combination of an anachronistic con-
sciousness characterized by myth, and an inhuman consciousness dominated by the ma-
chine-rationality of the Corporate State, have, between them, proved utterly unable to
manage, guide, or control the immense apparatus of technology and organization that
America has built. In consequence, this apparatus of power has become a mindless jug-
gernaut, destroying the environment, obliterating human values, and assuming domina-
tion over the lives and minds of its subjects.
CHARLES REICH, THE GREENING OF AMERICA 18 (Random House 1970). Speth defines the interna-
tional forces behind environmental deterioration and concludes, "[T]hese forces-notably the steady
expansion of human populations, the routine deployment of inappropriate technologies, the near
universal aspiration for affluence and high levels of consumption, and the widespread unwillingness
to correct the failures of the unaided market-are indeed powerful and will not yield to half-
measures." SPETH, supra note 1, at 99.
178. Id. at 168-69.
179. Id. (quoting JOEL MAKOWER & DEBORAH FLEISCHER, ENVTL. GRANTMAKERS Ass'WN,
SUSTAINABLE CONSUMPTION AND PRODUCTION: STRATEGIES FOR ACCELERATING POSITIVE
CHANGE 2-3 (2003)).
180. Id. at 169.
181. Id. at 170. Speth calls for increased scientific research, reporting and education; he also
indicts the media for failing to inform the public of environmental problems. See id.
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Unfortunately, there does not seem to be a wide audience listening.
Speth calls for educational reforms: "a well-ordered democracy demands
much larger investments in scientific and environmental literacy."'
182
7. Transition Seven: Taking Good Governance Seriously'
83
8. Transition Eight: Culture & Consciousness184
These final transitions are large enough to each constitute a whole
chapter in Red Sky. 85 They are addressed and expanded upon in Part IVof this paper.18 6
D. Toward Compromise and New Conventions: Sustainable Develop-
ment
As the United Nations Environmental Program realized:
Human activities are progressively reducing Earth's life-supporting
capacity at a time when rising populations and consumption are mak-
ing increasingly heavy demands on the planet. The combined
destructive impacts of a poor majority struggling to stay alive and an
affluent minority consuming most of the world's resources are under-
mining the very means by which all people can survive and flour-
ish.1
87
After decades of frustrated antagonism, pragmatists have tried to
reconcile economic advancement and environmental protection. A pow-
erful think tank of world leaders determined, "unless major complemen-
tary initiatives are undertaken to bring environmental, economic, and
social objectives together in the new synthesis called sustainable devel-
opment, liberalizing trade and reviving growth could lead to short-term
gains and long-term disaster."'
88
Sustainable development "seeks to meet the needs and aspirations
of the present without compromising the ability to meet those of the fu-
ture.''t9 For example, regional fishing industries, which often support
182. Id. at 171.
183. Id. at 172.
184. Id. at 191.
185. See id. at 172-201.
186. See infra Part IV and accompanying text.
187. SPETH, supra note 1, at 132 (quoting INT'L UNION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURE
AND NATURAL RES. ET AL., WORLD CONSERVATION STRATEGY: LIVING RESOURCE
CONSERVATION FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 1 (1980)).
188. Id. at 146 (quoting the "Open Letter to the Heads of State and Government of the Ameri-
cas," written by a group of political leaders including Fernando Henrique Cardoso (later president of
Brazil) and A] Gore, Jr. (later vice-president of the U.S.), in THE NEW WORLD DIALOGUE ON ENV'T
AND DEV. IN THE W. HEMISPHERE, COMPACT FOR A NEW WORLD 1 (1991)).
189. Id. at 141 (quoting WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T AND DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE 40
(1987)).
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totally dependent communities, cannot over harvest to the point of ex-
tinction without completely ceasing to exist. 190
As Speth explains, sustainable development rests on "the 'triple bot-
tom line' of economy, environment, and society. '' It seeks to satisfy
current developing needs without compromising long-term renewable
resources. 92 As opposed to immediate economic gratification that con-
sumes a resource entirely and spits out pollution, sustainable develop-
ment and replentishable harvest levels ensure that more money, ulti-
mately, can be made over a long period of time. 193 This new concept
protects and furthers both economic and environmental interests.
IV. INNOVATIVE JAZZ, FUSION AND OTHER RADICAL IDEAS TO SAVE
OUR SICK PLANET
It seems increasingly probable that Western culture is in the middle
of a fundamental transformation... [rethinking] how to understand
and (re)constitute the self gender, knowledge, social relations, and
culture without resorting to linear, teleological, hierarchical, holis-
tic, or binary ways of thinking and being... [new ideologies] should
encourage us to tolerate and interpret ambivalence, ambiguity, and
multiplicity as well as to expose the roots of our needs for imposing
order and structure no matter how arbitrary and oppressive these
needs may be. 194
If Speth's first six transitions are steps toward sustainability,
Speth's final two transitions, in governance and attitude, empower the
first six.195 Speth' s seventh transition involves government, private busi-
ness and communities working both separately and together for new and
effective governance.1 96 Because the systems currently in place are fail-
190. See Thomas Hayden, Emptying Out the Oceans, U.S. NEWS & WoRu REP., July 6, 2004,
at 40, 42-43. "In a series of recent reports, scientists warn that fish stocks are dangerously overex-
ploited and that many of the methods that provide the fish, crustaceans, and mollusks we so enjoy
are destroying the very ocean habitats and ecosystems needed to rebuild the stocks." Id. at 40.
191. SPETH, supra note 1, at 180.
192. See id. at 180-81.
193. See id. While clear-cutting exemplifies the short-sighted and environmentally destructive
practices that have created the global environmental health crisis, well-managed forestry is a good
example of sustainable development. See generally David Whitman, From Stumps, Lush Forests,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, July 6, 2004, at 77, 77-78. In non-tropical, industrialized countries,
almost ninety percent of forests are managed. Id. at 78. Good management has produced successful
reforesting: "From 1990 to 2000, while tropical forests shrank by 12 percent, non-tropical forests
increased by 3 percent." Id. at 77.
194. Jane Flax, Postmodernism and Gender Relations in Feminist Theory, in FEMINISM/
POSTMODERNISM 39, 56 (Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990).
195. SPETH, supra note 1, at 171.
These six of eight transitions are vital to the success of the effort to chart a new course in
global environmental protection. But they will not get far without strong and effective
government action motivated by an aroused and active citizenry. The needed transitions
in governance and in public attitudes and motivation are taken up in the ... [final] chap-
ters.
Id.
196. Id. at 172-90.
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ing, it is time for reorganization and innovation.1 97 Section A addresses
several ways we can take good governance seriously. 
198
Speth's final, and eighth, transition is a progressive change in per-
sonal consciousness and community culture that appreciates and protects
the natural world. 199 Primarily, we need a new understanding of world-
wide mechanisms such as society and economy.20° Section B discusses a
new paradigm that understands these mechanisms not as independent and
irreconcilable forces, but in terms of an interworking, interdependent,
and evolving system.20 1
Section C looks outside Speth's work to other fields of scholarly in-
quiry. 0 2 First, Subsection One considers undoing the concept of dualism.
Postmodern philosophy presents an ironic, inclusive, dialectic paradigm
that escapes binary thinking and the artificial constructs of dual polari-
ties.20 3 Next, Subsection Two considers how a departure from the colo-
nial Western paradigm of command and control power politics, to a
scheme driven by ethics and honor, may be a more effective means of
enacting and enforcing change.2°
In Subsection Three, an examination of the rhetoric of rights shows
that many proclamations are merely aspirational ghost rights, as opposed
to living, empowered rights.20 5 And finally, Subsection Four looks at the
many schools of feminist thought to help define and create a feminized
consciousness that encourages harmonious human interaction with the
planet.2 °6
Emerging throughout Part IV and throughout Red Sky is a theme of
inclusiveness. 20 7 This inclusiveness avoids unnecessary choice by syn-
thesizing disparate concepts, accepting pluralism and paradox. Also,
perhaps ironically, reflecting the American consumerist attitude of need-
ing everything and more-an insatiable, consuming juggernaut, but in
197. See id. at 149 ("Despite the repeated alarms rung over the past quarter century, the earth's
ills have deepened and widened. Our initial effort at global environmental governance has fallen
short, and we must turn with urgency to new approaches and to a new generation of environmental
leaders.").
198. Id. at 172-90. This is Speth's seventh fundamental transition and the title of Chapter Nine.
199. See id. at 149 ("And, at the heart that drives the flow of these many [new governance]
actions, there must be a deeper change, a different way of seeing ourselves in relation to the planet
on which we live.").
200. Id.
201. Id. at 151. "Global environmental challenges are closely interlinked. They cut across
economic sectors and geographical regions." Id. A revised inclusive paradigm echoes the admoni-
tions of "Social Ecology." See infra notes 263, 313, 374 and accompanying text.
202. See infra notes 254-328 and accompanying text.
203. See infra notes 260-69 and accompanying text.
204. See infra notes 270-85 and accompanying text.
205. See infra notes 286-304 and accompanying text.
206. See infra notes 305-28 and accompanying text.
207. SPETH, supra note 1, at 201.
[Vol. 82:1
LEARNING FROM RED SKY AT MORNING
the realm of ideas. 20 8 Speth inclusively decides that three factors have
"stymied real progress on the global environmental front.' ,209
But although Speth can list problems, he also lists solutions. 210 His
eight transitions work inclusively: "these transitions interact strongly,
supporting each other and forming a whole ... .,,21 1 Accepting Red Sky's
underlying theme of inclusiveness epitomizes and facilitates the para-
digm transformations that Speth calls for.2 12 Why choose to limit our-
selves when we can have it all?
2 13
A. Taking Good Governance Seriously
Speth's seventh transition is multi-faceted.2 14 New models of action
and government come from The World Business Council for Sustainable
Development (WBCSD), an international group comprised of major cor-
porations, the goals of which are primarily economic. 215 The group's first
system is the old, ineffective one: "FROG," which stands for "First Raise
Our Growth., 216 FROG places primacy on immediate economic gain, at
the expense of the environment.
WBSCD's second concept is GEOpolity, which is the traditional
world of law and government. 2 8 But their third and fourth systems,
JAZZ and FUSION, are part of the revolutions in paradigms and culture
that respond to the urgent need for true innovation.219 JAZZ is about pri-
208. SPETH, supra note 1, at 183.
209. SPETH, supra note 1, at 200.
Is the main barrier simply the United States, which has dragged its feet on issue after is-
sue since initially giving leadership in protecting Earth's ozone shield? Or are we con-
fronting a typical situation in politics where noneconomic goals need higher priority,
more urgency, and some new policies and approaches? Or is the problem deeply struc-
tural, rooted fundamentally in our economic system and our international system of sov-
ereign states? My conclusion. . . is that it is all three.
Id.
210. Id. at 152.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. By "having it all" I mean to say that we can save the planet and continue to live comforta-
bly. As Speth explains, "[t]he initiatives that are recommended to advance the eight transitions do
not fundamentally threaten the prevailing economic and international systems." Id. at 201.
214. Id. at 172-90. Chapter Nine addresses governance, which is governing through govern-
ment and more. Id. (emphasis added). "'Global governance' does not imply global government; nor
does it include only the actions of governments. Many non-government communities, for-profit and
not-for-profit, are already playing large roles in the governance of the global environment as we
know it today." Id. at 77.
215. Id. at 172.
216. Id.
217. Id. (citing WORLD BUSINESS CouNcIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, EXPLORING
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: GLOBAL SCENARIOS, 2000-2050: SUMMARY (1997)).
218. Id. at 172-73.
219. Id. at 173, 188-89.
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vate businesses and citizens enacting their own change,220 while FUSION
is the harmonious inclusion of both GEOpolity and JAZZ.221
1. FROG: First Raise Our Growth
222
The attitude that growth and money-making need to be immediate
and should come at all costs quickly is becoming outmoded. 223 As Speth
describes it, "FROG is thus a business-as-usual scenario leading to huge
environmental costs."224 A system that places economics above all else
may have short-term financial pay-offs, but the long-term consequences
are disastrous.
225
Even economically, resource depletion, overharvesting to extinc-
tion, and desertification of productive lands are bad for business.2 26 Thus
Speth concludes, "FROG leads not just to a wrecked global ecosystem
but to a wrecked global society as well. It is a path to failure even in the
eyes of the business-oriented WBCSD. 227
2. GEOpolity:228 The Traditional World of International Law
One of the common arguments used to dispute the "Tragedy of the
Commons" scenario 229 is that modem governments do not let self-
interest go completely unchecked and that regulation can solve environ-
mental problems.230 Speth acknowledges the important role of govem-
220. Id. at 173, 184-89.
221. Id. at 188-90.




226. Id. at 31-32.
227. Id. at 172. See also WORLD BUSINESS COUNCIL, supra note 217, at 19-21.
228. SPETH, supra note 1, at 172-73.
229. See supra note 153 for a discussion of the "Tragedy of the Commons."
230. GURUSWAMY, supra note 12, at 244-46 (reprinting Julian Simon, There Is No Environ-
mental, Population or Resource Crisis, in LIING IN THE ENVIRONMENT: AN INTRODUCTION TO
ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE 29 (1992)). Julian Simon is considered a scholarly opponent of environ-
mentalism. However, even his "there is no environmental crisis" analysis relies on strong and en-
forceable international laws. "But the world's physical conditions and the resilience in a well-
functioning economic and social system enable us to overcome such problems ...." Id. at 246.
Unfortunately, regulations are not doing enough and there are still many government subsidies that
encourage pollution and waste, so his argument suffers for its faith in systems that pragmatically fall
far short of simply "overcoming" environmental problems. Simon's ideas also seem to rely on the
fact that environmentalists (who do not agree with him) will take charge and solve everyone else's
problems.
[W]e do not say that a better future happens automatically or without effect. It will hap-
pen because men and women-sometimes as individuals, sometimes as enterprises work-
ing for profit, sometimes as voluntary nonprofit-making groups, and sometimes as gov-
ernmental agencies-will address problems with muscle and mind, and will probably
overcome ....
Id. Even critics like Simon, who appear to disagree with Speth, agree with his assertions that strong
government, environmental regulation and citizen action are essential to global sustenance. Id. Speth
debunks Julian Simon and Danish skeptic Bjom Lomborg and their anti-environmental ideologies.
SPETH, supra note 1, at 113-15.
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ment with his Seventh Transition, but he also says that today's system
needs improvement.23'
Speth explains, "[U]nder 'GEOpolity,' people turn to governments
to focus the market on environmental and social ends, and they rely
heavily on intergovernmental institutions and treaties. ' 23 2 Although in-
ternational law has had its successes, reliance on GEOpolity alone is not
enough.233
Speth decides that finding real solutions to the global environmental
crisis "requires new action on two mutually supportive fronts: pursuing a
very different approach to GEOpolity, and taking JAZZ [explained be-
low] to scale, enlarging it until it is a major part of the solution."
234
3. JAZZ: People and Businesses Acting for the Earth, by Them-
selves
235
The WBCSD calls its third scenario JAZZ. As Speth describes:
"people and businesses create a world full of unscripted, voluntary initia-
tives that are decentralized and improvisational, like jazz .... Govern-
ments facilitate more than regulate .... ,,236
Consumers exercise great power with their spending. JAZZ-type in-
novations represent what Benjamin Cashore has called, "a startling new
phenomenon ... the emergence of domestic and transnational private
governance systems that derive their policymaking authority not from the
state, but from the manipulation of global markets and attention to cus-
tomer preferences. 237
Speth argues that "green JAZZ is the most exciting arena of ongo-
ing action today. Environmental groups, consumer groups, and other
231. SPETH, supra note 1, at 173. It has been over thirty years since the international commu-
nity proclaimed, "The protection and improvement of the human environment is a major issue which
affects the well-being of peoples and economic development throughout the world; it is the urgent
desire of the peoples of the whole world and the duty of all Governments." STOCKHOLM
DECLARATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT, 11 I.L.M.
1416, Part 1 (1972). It has also been twelve years since the world community declared: "States shall
cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of
the Earth's ecosystem." RIO DECLARATION, supra note 149, at princ. 7. Yet despite these and other
treaties, as well as other international and domestic laws, the health of the global environment has
continued to deteriorate to the urgent crisis stage we are currently facing. Id. Speth determines that
we need a "transition in governance to capable, accountable, and democratic governments." SPETH,
supra note 1, at 173. He also says, "there must be new procedures, institutions and understandings if
GEOpolity is to do the job." Id. at 175.
232. SPETH, supra note 1, at 172.
233. Id. at 173.
234. Id. See infra Part V for a discussion on possible new approaches to international govern-
ment.
235. Id. at 184-88.
236. Id. at 173.
237. Id. at 184-85 (quoting Benjamin Cashore, Legitimacy and the Privatization of Environ-
mental Governance: How Non State Market-Driven (NSMD) Governance Systems Gain Rule Mak-
ing Authority, 4 GOVERNANCE 15, 503-04 (2002)).
2004]
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NGOs [non-government organizations], private businesses, state and
local governments, foundations, religious organizations, investors, and
others are behind a remarkable outpouring of initiatives that are the most
hopeful things happening today.'
23 s
While governments and international laws are tools for change,
Speth concludes that "[g]lobal problems have gone from bad to worse,
governments are not yet prepared to deal with them, and, at present,
many governments, including some of the most important, lack the lead-
ership to get prepared. 239 So action by others, through improvisational,
self-reliant JAZZ, is an important part of an inclusive plan for global
sustenance.
4. FUSION: Incorporating the Best of Both Worlds
24°
Just as the world's mechanisms of economy, politics, ecology and
society are part of an integrated, interdependent system, GEOpolity and
JAZZ share the same goals and, thus, can work together. Speth explains:
"One reason we are hearing so much JAZZ, especially from the busi-
ness community, is because of all the classical music being played
over in GEOpolity Hall. And what is it when jazz and classical music
are brought together? It's called FUSION, of course, and we are be-
ginning to see it as well."
241
So just as the global community must come together to solve our
planet's urgent health crisis, we must also bring together as many meth-
ods and mechanisms as possible.242 JAZZ and FUSION, and the harmo-
nious cooperation they represent, are part of the innovations in thought
and action that can affect real-and urgently needed-change.
B. The Most Fundamental Transition of All
243
Resolving many environmental problems will require shifting cul-
tural paradigms. Speth describes his eighth transition as quintessential:
"[t]he most fundamental transition is the transition in culture and con-
sciousness." 24 Speth refers to the "new consciousness" of scholars such
as the Global Scenario Group. "They favor a 'new sustainability' sce-
nario where society turns 'to nonmaterial dimensions of fulfillment...
the quality of life, the quality of human solidarity and the quality of the
238. Id. at 184.
239. Id. at 97.
240. See id. at 188.
241. Id. at 188. See supra notes 207-13 and accompanying text for a discussion of inclusion.
242. See infra note 260-69 for a discussion on abandoning dualities for more inclusive and co-
operational paradigms.
243. SPETH, supra note 1, at 191. This is the title of Chapter Ten, and the eighth, and final,
transition that Speth hopes will eventually form "a whole that will one day define a qualitatively new
epoch." Id. at 152.
244. SPETH, supra note 1, at 191.
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earth . . . . Sustainability is the imperative that pushes the new
agenda.,
245
As the Leopoldian land ethic evolves, 246 concepts of humanity as
conquerors of nature may some day seem barbaric. But concepts of
stewardship also may fail, because they reflect a subtle arrogance and
implied possession and dominance over the natural world.248
The new paradigm may be one of an indentured servant-utterly re-
liant, indebted, and working hard to satisfy a demanding master. As
Speth points out, we owe the planet, and our debt is large.249 Centuries of
unchecked development have devoured natural resources and left us with
a sick ecosystem. Speth acknowledges that "[t]he global environment is
. . . powerfully affected by human activities and requires manage-
ment.
, 250
The image of an indentured servant is a bleak one. A kinder image
is one of humanity in the age-old metaphor of an infant relying on its
mother, earth. However, this kinder image of nurturing and sustenance
may be too kind, because humanity will never be weaned. It is precisely
because we forgot our infantile dependence on Mother Earth that we find
ourselves in this dire predicament today.25 I As Speth explains, "[t]he fact
is, we are utterly dependent on ecosystems to sustain us.
2 52
245. Id. at 193 (quoting PAUL RASKIN ET AL., GREAT TRANSITION: THE PROMISE AND LURE OF
THE TIMES AHEAD, 44-45 (Stockholm Institute/Tellus Institute 2002)).
246. See Timothy N. Jenkins, Economics and the Environment: A Case of Ethical Neglect, 26
ECOLOGICAL ECON. 151, 153, 159-62 (1998).
[T]here is a clear postmodem re-emergence of a Leopoldian 'land ethic' in the West,
which is slowly... changing public policy and popular culture. Such an ethic is premised
on the idea that an individual is a member of an interdependent community, with all that
this implies with regard to social and antisocial conduct, and that the community's
boundaries are extendable to include 'land' in its broadest sense (i.e. the natural world).
Id.
247. SPETH, supra note 1, at 24. "Leopold's 'land ethic' ... changes the role of homo sapiens
from conqueror of the land-community to plain member and citizen of it." Id. (quoting RODERICK
FRASIER NASH, THE RIGHTS OF NATURE: A HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 63-77 (1989)).
248. See id. at 110. "At the root of America's negative role is what can only be described as a
persistent American exceptionalism, at times tinged with arrogance." Id. Speth also notes President
Bush's reluctance to cooperate with United Nations programs, refusal to sign or ratify treaties, and
recent refusal to even attend conferences on the environment. "[T]he lion's share of the blame must
go to the wealthy, industrial countries and especially to the United States, which, since the Montreal
Protocol, has not accorded global-scale environmental challenges the priority needed to elicit deter-
mined, effective responses." Id. at 116.
249. See id. at 21. "We now live in a full world. An unprecedented responsibility for planetary
management is now thrust upon us, whether we like it or not. This huge new burden, for which there
is no precedent and little preparation, is the price of our economic success." Id.
250. Id. at 78. "The global environment is more of an integrated system than the global econ-
omy. It is even more fundamental to human well-being." Id. Speth calls for a "Declaration of De-
pendence-the economy's dependence on the environment." Id. at 166.
251. Id. at 138 ("This view of the world-that nature belongs to us rather than we to nature-is
powerful and pervasive, and it has led to much mischief.").
252. SPETH, supra note 1, at 26.
From the water we drink to the food we eat, from the sea that gives up its wealth of prod-
ucts, to the land on which we build our homes, ecosystems yield goods and services that
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However we choose to envision it, the changes needed to create a
healthy global ecosystem cannot come without transition to a new re-
spect for humanity's reliance on a fragile planet. Earth Charter elo-
quently expresses the changes needed:
The resilience of the community of life and the well-being of human-
ity depend upon preserving a healthy biosphere with all its ecological
systems, a rich variety of plants and animals, fertile soils, pure wa-
ters, and clean air. The global environment with its finite resources is
a common concern of all peoples. The protection of Earth's vitality,
diversity, and beauty is a sacred trust.
25 3
C. Incorporating Creative Ideas from other Realms of Scholarship
Speth warns, "it is business as usual that is utopian, whereas creat-
ing a new consciousness is a pragmatic necessity. 254 Invoking Einstein's
adage that you cannot solve problems with the mindset that created them,
Speth has called for a fundamental revolution in culture and paradigm.
The following four subsections examine failed concepts such as dual-
ity,255 Eurocentric superiority,256 reliance on ghost rights,257 and male
domination.258 Casting off these detrimental constructs are essential steps
toward creating a new consciousness of inclusiveness, diversity, power-
ful living rights and gender equality.259
1. Undermining Traditional Duality
One of the products of Enlightenment thinking is organization of
the world into binary polarities: good/evil, male/female, man-
made26°/natural, and rational/emotional.26 However, the organic world
does not fit so comfortably within these extreme artificial constructs. As
postmodemists bring new philosophies of being, objectification and un-
we can't do without. Ecosystems make the Earth habitable: purifying air and water, main-
taining biodiversity, decomposing and recycling nutrients, and providing myriad other
critical functions.
Id.
253. THE EARTH CHARTER, supra note 33.
254. Id. at 196.
255. See infra notes 260-69 and accompanying text.
256. See infra notes 270-85 and accompanying text.
257. See infra notes 286-304 and accompanying text.
258. See infra notes 305-28 and accompanying text.
259. See infra notes 260-328 and accompanying text.
260. Decisions on gendered language have a unique position in historical discussions. In many
instances, decisions made by the political power structures of "humanity" are reflections of a domi-
nantly male, patriarchal mindset. Therefore, conversion to gender-neutral language is not always
ideologically appropriate. "[T]erminology... is sexist... the inevitable result of the long exclusion
of women from the realm of international politics and law [and] a tangible symbol of one of the
silences of international law." GURUSWAMY, supra note 12, at 14. Because women were largely
silent as the paradigm emerged, it is fair to say "man-made," not humanity-made, versus natural.
261. See Peter H. Huang, International Environmental Law and Emotional Rational Choice, 31
J. LEGAL STUD 237, 244 (2002) ("Rene Descartes envisioned such a rigid separation or dualism
between body and mind.").
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decidables 262 to the intellectual table, environmentalists can use these
tools to deconstruct the culture of global environmental degradation and
its reliance on dualistic thinking. 63
One of the grave dangers of binary thinking is the traditional mind-
set that pits man against nature.2 4 We should not wage war against the
planet, which can continue its life without us, just as it did when dino-
saurs went extinct. We need Mother Earth more than she needs us.
2 65
Undermining dualistic, binary logic will help in the work toward
pragmatic solutions to our global health crisis. Viewing humanity as part
of nature, not diametrically opposed to nature, is an essential cultural
transition. 266 Also, abandoning absolute polar opposites facilitates com-
promise, inclusion, 67 and cooperation. Sustainable development rests
on the idea that the economy and the environment need not face off in
262. JACK REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING DERRIDA 46 (Jack Reynolds & Jonathan Roffe eds.,
2004) ("An undecidable . .. is something that cannot conform to either polarity of a dichotomy
263. John Clark, What is Social Ecology?, in RENEWING THE EARTH: THE PROMISE OF SOCIAL
ECOLOGY 5, 5-11 (John Clark ed., 1990), reprinted in GURUSWAMY, supra note 12, at 306. Clark
describes Social Ecology's rejection of binary categorization:
A dualism that sets spirit against matter, soul against body, humanity against nature, sub-
jectivity against objectivity, and reason against feelings. A dualism that is intimately re-
lated to the social divisions that are so central to the history of civilization: ruler versus
ruled, rich versus poor, ... male versus female, in short, the dominant versus the domi-
nated.
Id.
264. See supra note 260.
265. See supra notes 250-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of humanity's infantile
dependence on Mother Earth. "We incline to other pernicious habits of thought.., seeing the natural
world as a resource for the economy rather than seeing the economy as nested in the natural world."
SPETH, supra note 1, at 139.
266. THE EARTH CHARTER, supra note 33, at the Preamble:
We are at once citizens of different nations and of one world in which the local and
global are linked ... The spirit of human solidarity and kinship with all life is strength-
ened when we live with reverence for the mystery of being, gratitude for the gift of life,
and humility regarding the human place in nature.
Id.
267. See supra notes 207-12 and accompanying text for discussion of inclusion.
268. Christopher C. Joyner & George E. Little, It's Not Nice to Fool Mother Nature! The
Mystique of Feminist Approaches to International Environmental Law, 14 B.U. INT'L L.J. 223, 240
(1996).
Dialectical reasoning examines processes that bring together ideas which appear to be an-
tithetical to one another. Construction of a dialectic occasions the 'organic emergence' of
links between certain ideas that at first blush appear contradictory ... [T]wo 'diametri-
cally opposed' images in the dialectic thus are vigorously made to reflect off one another,
casting similar and different shadows. Both the similarities and differences between the
two images are important to recognize. Dialectic synthesis does not permit clear labeling
of the dichotomies as mutually exclusive or self-evidently incompatible.
Id. Donna Haraway goes beyond a dialectic model to a model for "an ironic political myth faithful to
feminism, socialism and materialism," which has analogous lessons for creating practical environ-
mental solutions. Donna Haraway, A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist
Feminism in the 1980s, in FEMINISMIPOSTMODERNISM 190 (Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990). "Irony is
about contradictions that do not resolve into larger wholes, even dialectically, about the tension of
holding incompatible things together because both or all are necessary and true." Id.
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opposition: we do not have to choose between healthy economies and
healthy ecosystems because we can have both.269
2. Rethinking the Dominant and Domineering Western Paradigm
In many ways, the current environmental crisis is a byproduct of co-
lonial rule and the mindset that European, male, and Christian ideologies
were superior. 270 This self-serving paradigm entitled colonizers to domi-
nate and exploit the rest of the world.271 Many developing nations resist
international law today as a product and, thus, reflection, of this skewed
paradigm.272 Some also perceive environmentalism as a luxury or even
conspiracy that richer nations have proliferated to inhibit developing
nations' growth. 73 Speth addresses the problem in terms of Northern and
Southern hemispheric distinctions.274
Western oppression links concerns over an exploited environment
to concerns of oppressed peoples. For example, one of international
law's primary feminist works discusses the analogous worldviews of
African cultures and women.275 Also, an international task force found
that environmental ethics mirror the paradigms of many indigenous peo-
ples.276 These parallels illustrate how eroding the dominant colonial
mindset will liberate exploited peoples and exploited ecosystems. The
civil rights movements of the past two hundred years have been efforts to
269. See supra notes 187-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of sustainable develop-
ment.
270. See generally, NOAM CHOMSKY, YEAR 501: THE CONQUEST CONTINUES (South End
Press 1993) Chomsky discusses European colonists' oppressive exploitation of the Americas:
The major theme of this Old World Order was confrontation between the conquerors and
the conquered on a global scale. It has taken various forms, and been given different
names: imperialism, neocolonialism, the North-South conflict, core versus periphery, G-7
(the 7 leading state capitalist industrial societies) and their satellites versus the rest. Or,
more simply, Europe's conquest of the world.
Id. at3.
271. Id.
272. MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 49-50
(1979). "International law made use of a series of justifications and excuses to create legitimacy for
the subjugation and pillaging of the Third World, which was pronounced uncivilized." Id.
273. SPETH, supra note 1, at 107-08.
274. Id. at 107-08, 174-75.
275. Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. INT'L L.
613, 617-22 (1991).
276. See GURUSWAMY, supra note 12, at 313-14 (citing IUCN INTER-COMMISSION TASK
FORCE ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND SUSTAINABILITY: CASES AND ACTIONS
36-38 (1997)). In contrast to the Western paradigm of man conquering nature, "Indigenous Peoples
frequently view themselves as guardians and stewards of nature. Harmony and equilibrium among
components of the Cosmos are central concepts in most indigenous cosmologies." Id. at 314. While
refusing to over-generalize because, "[t]his ethic cannot be regarded as universal," the task force did
offer prevalent themes among indigenous cultures. Id. They include cooperation, strong family ties
(including past and future generations), self-sufficiency through reliance on local natural resources,
and "restraint in resource exploitation and respect for nature, especially for sacred sites." Id.
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cast off colonial legacies, impacting the rights of ethnic and racial mi-
norities, indigenous peoples, women and the environment.
277
A new worldview will benefit all who are exploited by Western
models of oppression. Speth envisions a "new consciousness ... [that]
breaks with anthropocentrism and contempocentrism ..... , 278 Replacing
the oppressive and exploitative paradigm that created the global health
crisis will benefit all who are dominated.
This new culture may borrow from the world's other cultures, as
well as from psychology and socio-economic theory.279 One suggestion
is for "a different model of compliance with international environmental
law, soft or hard, that is based on the motivation of not wanting to lose
face in the international community.' 280 Making environmental policies
honorable and relying on self-monitored compliance may be a more real-
izable task than trying to force external sanctions upon the unwilling.
Western "command and control" politics rely on third-party en-
forcement and external exertions of power. 281 However, as Huang indi-
cates, in world with weak laws and a high level of deference to national
sovereignty, "compliance ... cannot ultimately rest solely on enforce-
ment by external sanctions."282 Even if traditional "command and con-
trol" policies were feasible, which Speth points out is thus far a practical
impossibility,283 they may not be entirely desirable as the exclusive tools
of international environmental governance.284 In the end, it may be far
more effective to appeal to a new morality and self-governance than to
277. SPETH, supra note 1, at 193-96. Speth notes that, "the potential for conscious evolution is
evident in great social movements that societies have already experienced, such as the abolition of
slavery, the civil rights movements, and the collapse of communism and the Soviet empire." Id. at
196. Speth continues with an admonition: "our global civilization had better move rapidly to modify
its cultural evolution and deal with its deteriorating environmental circumstances before it runs out
of time." Id. at 193 (quoting PAUL R. EHRLICH, HUMAN NATURES: GENES, CULTURES, AND THE
HUMAN PROSPECT 330 (2000)).
278. SPETH, supra note 1, at 192. Anthropocentrism is a human-centered paradigm that places
people above all else to the detriment of the natural world. Id. at 138. Speth defines contempocen-
trism as "the habit of thought that discounts the future in favor of the present." Id.
279. Huang, supra note 261, at 241. "Microeconomic theorists originally formulated and
developed rational choice models to mathematically analyze the pure theory of individual consumer
behavior." Id. Huang follows the scholarship that applies rational choice theories to political science
and international relations. Id. at 241-42. Huang goes on to incorporate theories about the impor-
tance of emotions in rational choice making and the over-all relevance of this theorizing to the study
of law. Id.
280. Id. at 248. "There is evidence that a desire to avoid the loss of face motivates countries in
the context of international negotiations." Id. at 253. Though foreign to many Westerners, the con-
cept of behaving honorably and saving face is prevalent and extremely powerful in Eastern cultures.
Id.
281. SPETH, supra note 1, at 162-63 (discussing the "command and control" model as applied
to economics).
282. Huang, supra note 261, at 249.
283. SPETH, supra note 1, at 75. "[A]ttempts so far at solving environmental ills have fallen
short ... the responses mounted by the international community appear pitifully weak." Id. "[T]he
bottom line is that these treaties and their associated agreements and protocols do not drive the
changes that are needed." Id. at 96.
284. Huang, supra note 261, at 253.
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continue to rely exclusively on the external-and failing--colonial
method of coercion and punishment.
285
3. The Rhetoric of Rights: Discerning Living Rights from Ghosts
Author and poet Oscar Wilde, in his work Critic as Artist, bestows
the highest power of art creation to the art critic: "For the highest criti-
cism deals with art not as expressive, but as impressive, purely.
286
Rights are also impressive: one can express one's rights from the roof-
tops until one goes hoarse, like a tree falling alone in a forest, but unless
those rights are recognized by others, they are essentially dead, and
merely aspirations or dreams. They are ghost rights.
There is much discourse surrounding rights and legal implications
of these rights.287 One of the feminist criticisms of international law is its
creation of rights without practical meaning.288 A true revolution in con-
sciousness should reflect a distinction between living rights and mere
ghosts. Living rights are valuable, relevant, and powerful. They produce
tangible changes and receive the utmost respect and deference. 289 To be
285. See SPETH, supra note 1, at 191-202.
286. OSCAR WILDE, THE PORTABLE OSCAR WILDE 84 (Richard Aldington & Stanley Wein-
traub, eds., Penguin 1974). Art creation through critique is "the highest kind." Id. at 85.
It treats the work of art simply as a starting-point for a new creation. It does not confine
itself-let us at least suppose so for the moment-to discovering the real intention of the
artist and accepting that as final. And in this it is right, for the meaning of any beautiful
created thing is, at least, as much in the soul of him who looks at it as it was in his soul
who wrought it. Nay it is rather the beholder who lends to the beautiful thing its myriad
meanings, and makes it marvelous for us, and sets it in some new relation to the age, so
that it becomes a vital portion of our lives, and a symbol of what we pray for, or perhaps
of what, having prayed for, we fear that we may receive.
Id. at 85-86.
287. See Joyner & Little, supra note 268, at 146. "In a feminist analysis, however, rights are, to
some extent, linguistic promises that accomplish little change in the area of gender equality. While
the thrust of a right to a healthy environment certainly is correct, the right's genuine practical impli-
cations are not as clear." Id.
288. Charlesworth, supra note 275, at 634-43. "Feminist scholars have argued that, although
the search for formal legal equality through the formulation of rights may have been politically
appropriate in the early stages of the feminist movement, continuing to focus on the acquisition of
rights may not be beneficial to women." Id. See also Joyner & Little, supra note 268, at 255-57.
Many international instruments assert "in different ways a like-minded legal entitlement: all peoples
have the right to enjoy a wholesome and robust environment that promotes quality of life and fun-
damental social and economic well-being." Id. at 255. However,
[Rlights may assert profound hopes, but they do not, in and of themselves, bring about
the realization of the content of those hopes or that right. Rights require legal implemen-
tation and active support by policy-makers. Unfortunately, the acknowledged human
right to a healthy environment, which is extolled and purportedly ensured by numerous
international agreements, suffers from the lack of implementation and enforcement by na-
tional governments.
Id.
289. The rights enumerated in the U.S. Constitution are an example of "living fights." U.S.
CONST. Amen. I-X. The Bill of Rights is defended and enabled by a strong judiciary. U.S. CONST.
ART. Im. Other assertions must yield: laws that violate rights will be struck down. Id. The right to a
fair trial, for example, means that the accused receive legal counsel (even if the people, essentially
the opponent, have to pay for it with public defenders). See generally Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 375 (1963) (stating that violations of these fights may nullify any proceedings); see generally
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truly alive, the right to something must have that right because compli-
mentary counterparts allow or enable it. Rights must reciprocally receive
enunciated duties and responsible parties that ensure that rights are rec-
ognized, fully enabled and have actual meaning.
Unfortunately, even some rights recognized by the United Nations
carry no real force or practical impact.2 ' These phantoms are truly
scary-by giving the false appearance of change, they can slow progres-
sive movements. Also, ghost rights allow the powerful to fight against
needed action with an arsenal of words that carry no impact.291 Recogniz-
ing ghost rights ensures that concerned activists are not satiated with
benign rhetoric. 292
While attainment of rights certainly has profound emotional and
psychological implications, real power comes from obligations, duties
293and responsibilities of other parties. Courts of international law have
refused to enforce ghost rights. The International Court of Justice enun-
ciated this in the Asylum case: "[tihe Colombian Government must prove
that the rule invoked by it is in accordance with a constant and uniform
usage practised by the States in question, and that this usage is the ex-
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that a violation of the Fifth Amendmint nullified
defendant's conviction).
290. The United Nations has announced the right of all people to be free from hunger and
poverty. U.N. INT'L COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL & CULTURAL RIGHTS, Article 11, available
at http://www.unhchr.ch/htm1Imenu3/b/a.cscr.htm (Jan. 3, 1976). While the covenant calls upon
signing members to enact legislation empowering this right, the treaty has not been fulfilled, as
recent famines evidence. How this right will be realized, and who exactly will be responsible for
empowering it, is to be decided domestically. Because many signing nations have refused to accept
complete responsibility, the right of all people to be free from hunger is more of a dream or aspira-
tion than a living right.
291. See GURUSwAMy, supra note 12, at 75 (citing HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 454-56 (R. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1966)). 'The term 'norm' designates the objec-
tive phenomenon whose subjective reflections are obligation and right. The statement that the treaty
has 'binding force' means nothing but that the treaty is or creates a norm establishing obligations and
rights of the contracting parties." Id. at 75. In terms of customary international law, enforceability
relies on "a right belonging to one party and a duty lying on the other party. Without that nexus of
legal obligation, and the opinio juris which recognizes it, there is no custom." Id. at 103. See also
Elizabeth Olson, Forum on Torture Hears of U.S. Efforts to End Police Brutality, N.Y. TIMES, May
11, 2000, at A19 (despite the fact that the United States has signed and ratified treaties pronouncing
the human right to be protected from torture, the United States conceded the truth of an Amnesty
International report finding "institutionalized" torture throughout the United States).
292. Recognizing the pain in ironic and hollow words, Jane Jacobs explains: "There is a quality
even meaner than outright ugliness or disorder, and this meaner quality is the dishonest mask of
pretend order, achieved by ignoring or suppressing the real order that is struggling to exist and be
served." JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 15 (1961).
293. For a discussion of the emotional implications of rights, see Patricia J. Williams, Alchemi-
cal Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401,431
(1987). "'Rights' feels so new in the mouths of most black people. It is still so deliciously empower-
ing to say. It is a sign for and a gift of selfhood that is very hard to contemplate reconstructuring...
at this point in history." Id. Recognizing ghost rights should in no way belittle the hard work of
activists who have won the acknowledgment of rights. However, their movements will be best
served by truly empowering the rhetoric with action that really helps the powerless and rightless. See
also SPETH, supra note 1, at 194 "[UIt is imperative that we, the peoples of Earth, declare our respon-
sibility to one another, to the greater community of life, and to future generations." Id.
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pression of a right appertaining to the State granting asylum and a duty
incumbent on the territorial State.,
294
Responsibilities give rights their power: meaning both that (1) du-
ties instilled in a second party enable and empower the rights of the pri-
mary party and that (2) parties (developed nations) actually give fights
(like the human fight to eat) their (the nation's) power (aid). Future gen-
erations may have a valid right to visit living coral reefs, and arguably
the reefs have a valid right to exist. Unfortunately, because no one or-
ganization has ever assumed responsibility for the healthcare of coral
reefs, this fight is probably unrealizable-a ghost. 95
Rights also are restrictively impressive, not boundlessly expressive,
because one right ends where the other begins. Rights often dissolve into
phantoms when they are unprotected and can be intruded on by the per-
ceived rights of another. Many regional debates are clothed in the rheto-
ric of rights. Fishermen, loggers and farmers (among others) assert their
right to earn a living over environmental rights. Their fight will mean
nothing, however, if the resources on which they depend (fish, trees, and
soil and water) are exhausted. Their right must be protected, perhaps by
self-restraint, to continue to live and have meaning.
Some sovereign rights, such as the right to bear nuclear weapons,
are self-empowering simply through the "might-makes-fight" physics of
power-the global community acknowledges its responsibility to con-
cede through silence. Also, the bestowing of some rights may appear to
be unilateral exercises of self-restraint. However, they are typically self-
serving adherence to custom so the right-giver can enjoy the same cus-
tom. Because most nations want unrestricted development of their own
natural resources, international law recognizes that States have a "sover-
eign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environ-
mental and developmental policies . ,296
Principle 2 also contains the protective provision that States have a
"responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control
,297do not cause damage to the environment of other States." While stateresponsibility has occasionally been enforced,298 it is only upon the con-
294. Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), 1950 LCJ. 266,276 (1950).
295. SPETH, supra note 1, at 57-58. Despite numerous treaties on the protection of the oceans,
coral reefs have not been adequately protected and some observers believe that they are "doomed."
Id. at 58. Because there is no responsible party and duty to protect it, the coral reefs have lost their
right to exist. Id. See also supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
296. Rio DECLARATION, supra note 149, at princ. 2.
297. Id.
298. See generally Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.) (1941) 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. (1938)
(1949). Washington state farmers claimed damage caused by a Canadian smelter's air pollution. Id.
Because both parties agreed to be bound by the arbitration, a tribunal held Canada liable and ordered
payment of some (not all prayed for) damages to the United States. Id.
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cession of the State to jurisdiction. 299 There were no suits-let alone
damages awarded-for any of the injured parties after the world's largest
environmental disaster.300 There is simply no international environmental
agency with the power to enliven many bestowed rights. 30 1 These rights
remain dead on-the-books rhetoric.
So, while creating and acknowledging rights is an important step,
empowering and enlivening rights is essential. As Speth's work illus-
trates, we cannot be lulled into complacency by the appearance of rights
in big-sounding international treaties. Investigation shows that laws and
practice often disregard espoused human, environmental or other
rights.30 2 Also, perceiving a right to something does not automatically
entail open-ended empowerment. One "right to" may overstep another,
so understanding the power dynamics between rights and duties helps
effectuate self-restraint and delineate living rights.
Also, Speth's work is practical because he articulates obligations
and calls for the imposition of duties. Throughout the global community,
pages are overrun with talk about "the right to," but Speth offers real
options for change when he says "the right because." He actually tells the
reader how to empower their right.30 3
Sometimes, the duty is to refrain from asserting one's perceived
rights. To realize humanity's universal right to a healthy environment,
Speth calls for a true measure of self-control:
[O]ur duty to exercise a conserving and protecting restraint extends
... to the community of life-animal and plant-that evolved here
with us. There are limits beyond which we should not go in disrupt-
ing or changing this community of life, which, after all, we did not
create. Although our dominion over the earth may be nearly absolute,
our right to exercise it is not.
304
299. Military & Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 LC.J. 14, 110-12 [hereinafter
Military & Paramilitary Activities]. Although the United States was found liable for harm caused to
Nicaragua by the United States' support for Contra rebels, the United States has never paid the
damages ordered by the court. Id.
300. The nuclear accident at Chernobyl, in the former Soviet Union, is clearly transboundary
harm. "Scientists estimate that up to 600,000 people outside of the Soviet Union have been adversely
affected by the nuclear fallout." GURUSWAMY, supra note 12, at 552. But no one has ever held the
Soviet government accountable for the damage. Id. at 550-52.
301. Rio DECLARATION, supra note 149, at princ. 1. "Human beings are at the centre of con-
cerns for sustainable development. They are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with
nature." Id.
302. SPETH, supra note 1, at 176.
303. Id. at 152-228. Speth's eight transitions are all ways to enliven the espoused universal
right to a healthy environment. Id. at 152. Also, following the tenth chapter, Speth lists activist
organizations and their contact information, transition by transition. Id. at 203-28. Going beyond a
rhetoric of rights, Speth actually enables the reader with tools and information to empower their
activism.
304. Id. at 5 (quoting U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, GLOBAL ENERGY
FUTURES AND THE CARBON DIOXWE PROBLEM iii-viii (Government Printing Office, 1981)).
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4. Feminism/ist Movement/s and the Environmental Cause
As Speth begins his chapter on transitions in culture, he says, "[tihe
change that is needed can be best put as follows: in the twentieth century
we were from Mars but in the twenty-first century we must be from Ve-
nus-caring, nurturing, and sustaining. ' 3°5 Women and feminism (in all
its forms) play an essential role in a new cultural consciousness. Princi-
ple 20 of the Rio Declaration sets forth, "[w]omen have a vital role in
environmental management and development. Their full participation is
therefore essential to achieve sustainable development.
306
Women already exercise their power, or show the unwelcome con-
sequences of squelching it, through population rates. 30 7 In many ways,
the women's movement, like the environmental movement, functions as
part of a living interdependent system incorporating economics, politics,
sociology and more. Moreover, the women's movement, like the envi-
ronmental movement, can both inspire and benefit from the casting off of
the exploitative, oppressive and destructive legacies of colonialism, re-
flected in politics, economies, societies, and more.
Feminizing our worldview should not replace one inequitable power
structure with another. It is not simply acquiring the right for women to
exploit like men. 30 8 Rather, feminizing paradigms can synthesize the best
of traditional actions with the best of new approaches. Following from
the abandonment of dualism309  and colonial anthro-contempo-
305. SPETH, supra note 1, at 191. Speth may be criticized for borrowing from feminism with-
out giving proper credit. Though uncited, this admonition appears to reference the book MEN ARE
FROM MARS, WOMEN ARE FROM VENUS by John Gray, PhD., especially because the three adjec-
tives for a Venus paradigm-caring, nurturing, and sustaining are characteristics typically associated
with femininity. This may be a glaring oversight. However, it may also be out of respect for certain
schools within feminism that resist the biological determination inherent in blanket gender generali-
zations. It can be fairly argued that feminism, by undoing duality and incorporating ironic contradic-
tions to liberate women (and men) from restrictive dualist stereotypes, has undone itself and would
prefer to be called humanism.
306. Rio DECLARATION, supra note 149, at princ. 20.
307. See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of women and population
growth.
308. CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND THE
LAW 4-5 (Harvard Univ. Press 1987). As MacKnnon explains:
With few exceptions, feminism applied to law has provided no critique of the state of its
own, and little insight into specific legal concepts from the standpoint of women's ex-
perience of second-class citizenship. Particularly in its upper reaches, much of what has
passed for feminism in law has been the attempt to get for men what little has been re-
served for women or to get for some women some of the plunder that some men have
previously divided (unequally) among themselves. This is not to argue that women
should be excluded from the spoils of dominance on the basis of sex, exactly. Rather it is
to say that it is antithetical to what women have learned and gained, by sacrifice chosen
and unchosen, through sheer hanging on by bloody fingernails, to have the equality we
fought for turned into equal access to the means of exploitation, equal access to force
with impunity, equal access to sex with the less powerful, equal access to the privilege of
irrelevance. As male academics have been able to afford to talk in ways that mean noth-
ing, so also women ... if this is feminism it deserves to die.
Id.
309. See supra notes 260-69 and accompanying text.
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Eurocentrism3 l° is a transition in consciousness that embraces tradition-
ally feminine ideas of inclusion, 311 community, and cooperation. 312 This
is the transition that Speth advocates-a new culture of caring.313
Carol Gilligan's work In a Different Voice314 uses innovative child
development concepts to help formulate a feminine perspective: the
"ethic of care. 3 15 Her studies revealed that girls invoke different prob-
lem-solving ethics than boys. Girls tend to invoke an
'ethic of care' attitude .... [G]irls place a high level of importance
on 'relationships, responsibility, caring, context, [and] communica-
tion.' Boys, on the other hand, employ an 'ethic of rights' or 'ethic of
justice' mind-set, which tends to emphasize principles of right and
wrong, fairness, logic, rationality, and winners and losers, while ig-
noring context and relationships.
316
As we teach our sons and daughters to play nicely together, can we
learn from them? Can we reconcile and recreate a world where it is logi-
cal to be caring, rational to consider context and fair to consider relation-
ships?
3 17
Although some feminist theorists would argue against Gilligan's
generalized distinctions based on gender, 1 s citing them as a product of a
problematic social structure, 319 it is naive and impractical to ignore theuniqueness of female experience.32° On one hand is a distinctive charac-
310. See supra notes 270-85 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 207-13 and accompanying text for a discussion of inclusion.
312. SPETH, supra note 1, at 201. "Down one path, [expected economic] ... growth can pro-
tect, regenerate, and restore the environment. It can provide sustainable livelihoods for the world's
poor and lead to large improvements in quality of life for all." Id.
313. SPETH, supra note 1, at 191. This new paradigm can also be discussed in terms of Social
Ecology. See Clark, supra note 263, at 5-11. "Social Ecology proposes a principle of ecological
wholeness, which Bookchin defines as 'a dynamic unity of diversity' in which 'balance and harmony
are achieved by ever-changing differentiation."' Id. (quoting MURRAY BOOKCHIN, THE ECOLOGY OF
FREEDOM: THE EMERGENCE AND DISSOLUTION OF HIERARCHY 24 (1981)).
314. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT 164 (1982).
315. Id.
316. Joyner & Little, supra note 268, at 237.
317. GILLIGAN, supra note 314, at 164.
318. See Owen Flanagan & Kathryn Jackson, Justice, Care and Gender: The Kohlberg-
Gilligan Debate Revisited, in FEMINISM & POLITICAL THEORY 37, 39 (Cass R. Sunstein, ed., 1990).
319. See Joyner & Little, supra note 268, at 266 n.78. "Males and females are both capable of
accommodating either the 'ethic of care' or 'ethic of justice."' Id. at 254. Joyner & Little explain that
Flanagan & Jackson "argue that the care-justice differentiation does not mandate that people employ
either of these orientations all of the time." Id. The acceptance of an inclusive paradigm would
indicate that it is possible to synthesize both. See Charlesworth, supra note 275, at 616. Joyner &
Little describe the attack on Gilligan's theory as "[c]oncerns ... that identification of a 'distinctive
feminine morality' could impede the prospects for feminist international law attaining more 'univer-
sal validity."' Joyner & Little, supra note 268, at 238. See also Flanagan & Jackson, supra note 318,
at 39.
320. Joyner & Little, supra note 268, at 238.
Why deny the reality of difference? To recognize that men and women reason in different
ways and come to moral decisions through different processes does not perforce perpetu-
ate male power. Nor does it admit to any female inferiorities or male superiorities.
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ter-woman. 321 On the other hand, we have feminists who reject this
"women's voice" concept ideologically as a reinforcing product of bio-
logical determinism. 322 And on the other hand we have feminists who
primarily and fundamentally reject any science or discourse as gender-
biased and flawed.323 And on yet another hand, we have radical feminist
theorists who favor inclusion to the point of paradox, who agree and dis-
agree with everyone.324
The fact that we have four hands also illustrates the limits of dualis-
tic thinking and traditional metaphors.325 It reveals the need for us to
Rather, it provides more solid ground on which women can assert their own moral con-
siderations.
Id.
321. Charlesworth, supra note 275, at 615 ("Much feminist scholarship has been concerned
with the identification of a distinctive women's voice that has been overwhelmed and underesti-
mated in traditional epistemologies."). But attendant to that fundamental concept are worlds of ideas
of what it means to be feminine or female or human.
322. See MACKINNON, supra note 308, at 4-5.
323. Charlesworth, supra note 275, at 645 n.6 ("Some continental European, particularly
French, feminists have pursued a different set of concerns from those of Anglo-American feminists.
They have undertaken the task of deconstructing the dominant masculine modes of speech and
writing."). See also LUCE IRIGARAY, SPECULUM OF THE OTHER WOMAN 137 (Gillian C. Gill trans.,
1985), noting:
But man only asks (himself) questions that he can already answer, using the supply of in-
struments he has available to assimilate even the disasters in his history. This time at any
rate he is prepared to lay odds again, and, give or take a few new weapons, he will make
the unconscious into a property of his language. A disconcerting property, admittedly,
which confuses everything he had long since assigned meaning to. But that, it seems, is
not the most important thing at stake. The really urgent task is to ensure the colonization
of the new 'field,' to force it, not without splintering, into the production of the same dis-
course. And since there can be no question of using the same plan/e [sic] for this
'strange' speech, this 'barbarous' language with which it is impossible to conduct a dia-
logue-read monologue-the discovery will be set out hierarchically, in stages. Will be
brought to order. By giving here a little more play to the system, here a little less. The
forms of arrangement may vary, but they will all bear the paradox of forcing into the
same representation--the representation of the self/same-that which insists upon its het-
erogeneity, its othemess.
Id.
324. CATHERINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 241-44 (1989).
Inequality on the basis of sex, women share. It is women's collective condition. The first
task of a movement for social change is to face one's situation and name it. The failure to
face and criticize the reality of women's condition, a failure of idealism and denial, is a
failure of feminism in its liberal forms. The failure to move beyond criticism, a failure of
determinism and radical paralysis, is a failure of feminism in its left forms .... As sexual
inequality is gendered as man and women, gender inequality is sexualized as dominance
and subordination .... The next step is to recognize that male forms of power over
women are affirmatively embodied as individual rights in law.
Id. MacKinnon includes characterizing a distinctive "women's voice," as a primary step, with cast-
ing off of oppressive determinist labels. Her accommodation of divergent views reflects an inclusive
paradigm. See SPETH, supra note 1, at 201. Speth applies this reconciliatory approach in his sustain-
ability doctrine, his concepts of transition (implying a movement and not a constructed polarity
switch, like legal-illegal), and his generally inclusive approach. Id. See also supra notes 207-13 and
accompanying text.
325. Joyner & Little, supra note 268, at 239.
Often the male legal dimension is portrayed in asymmetrical and conflictive terms, for
example, as right versus wrong, or legal versus moral, or good versus evil... or man ver-
sus nature. Feminists allege that the male reasoning process tends to filter options through
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respect difference and to abandon labels and oversimplification, 326 re-
flecting the importance of Speth's eighth transition to a new paradigm
that is inclusive and reconciliatory rather than divisive and adversarial.327
Feminists and postmodernists and other -ists and -isms are rethink-
ing thought and the thinking process. They are questioning words, dis-
course and the questions themselves. As long as these intellectual acro-
batics serve as more than ends in themselves, they can be an essential
part of restoring global health and solving environmental problems by
helping us into Speth' s transition of consciousness.328
A new consciousness that conforms to Speth's vision should replace
dualism with inclusiveness, shed an exploitative "command and control"
power regime for a paradigm of honor and self-restraint, insist that mere
ghost rights be given enlivening power, and feminize a worldview to
include human-not purely male or female-characteristics, while at the
same time accepting the uniqueness of individual human experience.
V. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
The basic framework of policy formation tends to remain in place as
long as the institutions of power and domination are stable, with the
capacity to deflect challenges and accommodate or displace compet-
ing forces. 
329
The momentum of Speth's transitions is the type of force that can
knock the powers-that-be off balance and open the power structure up to
change. Incorporating Speth's eight transitions, Part V will take ideas
presented in Part IV, with the overall theme of inclusiveness 330 and ex-
plore the practical applications of new paradigms to the world of law.
Government and law are also organisms within the global ecosystem.
a sieve of these competing 'black and white' dualities, which may be implicitly related to
gender hierarchies, political power, and social domination.
Id. However, contemporary philosophy has a response to dualistic thinking. "Dialectic synthesis
does not permit clear labeling of the dichotomies as mutually exclusive or self-evidently incompati-
ble." Id. at 240. "Proponents of feminist international law encourage the search for a deeper under-
standing of the commonalities across seemingly conflictive legal dichotomies." Id.
326. Id. at 266 n.28.
Nearly all feminists are too eclectic to fit neatly into any one category, and so it is mis-
leading to set up categories or theories as though they worked in that limiting sort of way
for feminists. Creating distinct or rigid categories within which to fit particular account or
limit dialogue is a decidedly anti-feminist way of proceeding, as feminists generally op-
pose this sort of abstract conceptualization without attention to context and detail.
Id. (quoting FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE AND THE NATURE OF LAW, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST
JURISPRUDENCE 3, 9 (Patricia Smith ed., 1993)).
327. SPETH, supra note 1, at 201.
328. Id. at 191.
329. CHOMSKY, supra note 270, at 50.
330. See supra notes 207-13 and accompanying text for a discussion of inclusion.
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Law dictates, defines and depends on politics, society, economics and
other human systems-and vice versa.31
Section A considers how emerging progressive concepts of liabil-
ity-both public and private-could develop to help solve the global
health crisis. Section B considers how a paradigm of inclusiveness would
apply to Speth's seventh transition-taking good governance seri-
ously. 332 This includes a new model for a much-needed international
environmental governing body with real power.
A. The Implications of Expanded Liability
If big businesses cannot be motivated by moral obligations, perhaps
legal duties will cause them to turn to ecologically beneficial practices.
Customs are strongly influential in international law,
333 so as JAZZ 334
inspires private businesses to exercise sound environmental practices, the
standard by which all behavior is measured (through norms and custom)
will rise.335 As the consequences of environmental degradation are un-
derstood and as international governing bodies wield greater influence,
concepts of liability are changing. This change could benefit global envi-
ronmental health.
Businesses may be inspired to "go green" by the fear of liability in
tort, as well as fines, sanctions and even criminal prosecution.336 One
trend that is emerging is a FUSION 337 of international tort law and busi-
ness strategies. 338 Speth explains that "the environment is becoming more
central to business strategic planning."
339
331. SPETH, supra note 1, at 106. "[Tjhe potential success of international environmental law
... has been undermined by the unfortunate tendency to neglect the social and political context in
which international agreements are arrived at and then implemented." Id. See also Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 ("[Ilnternational law . . . needs to be multi-
disciplinary, drawing from other disciplines such as history, sociology, anthropology, and psychol-
ogy such wisdom as may be relevant for its purpose.").
332. SPETH, supra note 1, at 172-90. "International environmental law is failing today on the
big issues, but it need not." Id. at 173.
333. See GuRuswAMY, supra note 12, at 102-03, for a discussion of customs becoming en-
forceable as law. Id. Certain customs may become "obligatory as a matter of law." Id. These state
practices will even become enforceable against parties outside the general practice, as a matter of
binding international law. Id.
334. See supra notes 235-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of JAZZ.
335. SPETH, supra note 1, at 186. Embodying the spirit of JAZZ, several large companies have
voluntarily agreed to adopt more eco-friendly practices. Id.
336. SLOMANSON, supra note 53, at 603-04. Fifty European states have drafted a treaty on
criminal liability for environmental wrongs. Id. Among other things, the treaty prosecutes knowing
pollution and negligence that results in harm to persons or "substantial damage to the quality of air,
soil, water, animals or plants." Id. The Preamble pronounces the gravity of environmental wrongs:
"[E]nvironmental violations having serious consequences must be established as criminal offences
subject to appropriate sanctions... perpetrators of such acts ... [shall] not escape prosecution and
punishment." Id.
337. See supra notes 240-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of FUSION.
338. SPETH, supra note 1, at 187.
339. Id. Companies are voluntarily cleaning their emissions, issuing "sustainability reports" to
stockholders, developing profitable sustainable products and enterprises, building new partnerships
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Also, massive tort liability is taking on international dimensions.
ChevronTexaco is currently involved in a $6 billion suit for damages
after its oil drilling operations caused human and ecosystem illness in
Ecuador. 4° If companies are made to pay for environmental harm, they
will be encouraged both to avoid future liability through eco-friendly
practices, and to incorporate environmental costs in their pricing. 341
Another consideration is whether future generations could have
standing in suits to protect their inheritance. Could future generations, as
legal entities with inheritable property rights, be recognized in suits to
preserve finite resources? What about the potential for a child to sue a
parent over depletion of non-renewable resources on inheritable proper-
ties, on behalf of future grandchildren (who have legally been given title
upon death of parent and child)? Could this standing extend to heirs of
public lands? If an ethical obligation to future generations is not inspir-
ing,34 2 could a legal obligation to sustain the planet for the unborn be
recognized?
There are huge ramifications if the United States and other polluting
nations were to be held legally responsible for the consequences of
global warming. 343  The United States is the world's largest emitter of
greenhouse gases by far, but smaller nations will feel the most drastic
global warming impacts. 344 If some of the predictions of sea level rise are
correct, entire island nations will be submerged during the twenty-first
century.345 Some estimates predict catastrophe by 2030.
346
with environmental groups and more. Id. The changes reflect the pure fact that sustainability is good
for business Id. Also, these progressions may reflect a change away from the growth-at-all-costs
imperative that drives environmental degradation. Id. at 137. Speth explains how "[s]o much in our
society, economy, and polity is geared to rapid, continued economic growth. Id.
340. Carla Bass, In Ecuador, First Phase of Trial Ends in Battle with Chevron Texaco, PLATr'S
OILGRAM NEWS, Nov. 6, 2003, at 1. Although the case was dismissed to be tried in Ecuador, a New
York court has assured plaintiffs that an Ecuadorian judgment will be enforced in the United States.
Aguinda v. Texaco, 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
341. SPETH, supra note 1, at 186-87. Environmental issues affect corporate America when, for
example, "inaction on climate change" is assessed as a financial "risk." Id. See also supra notes 171-
74 and accompanying text for a discussion of environmentally honest pricing. "[W]henever a scarce
resource comes free of charge (as is typically the case with our limited stocks of clean air and water),
it is virtually certain to be used to excess." Id. at 133. However, "[e]nvironmental economists make a
powerful case for full-cost pricing and have identified a variety of economic instruments that are
available to move in this direction." Id. at 162.
342. Id. at 192 (discussing "trusteeship of the earth's natural wealth and beauty for generations
to come").
343. See id. at 69. "Another source of pressure for climate action is likely to come from the
courts. Citizens, states, and other parties injured by climate disruption could seek redress in court."
Id.
344. SPETH, supra note 1, at 192. The United States "emits the same amount of greenhouse
gases as 2.6 billion people living in 151 developing nations. Yet the developing world is more vul-
nerable to change." Id. at 61. See also Nancy Shute & Charles W. Petit, Preparing for a Warmer
World, U.S.NEws & WORLD REPORT, July 6, 2004, at 14. "The United States is the single largest
generator of greenhouse gases, contributing one quarter of the global total." Id.
345. Shute and Petit, supra note 344, at 11. "Rising sea levels could contaminate the aquifers
that supply drinking water for Caribbean islands, while entire Pacific island nations could disappear
under the sea." Id. As Tuiloma Neroni Slade, Samoa's U.N. representative and chairman of the
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The damage award to an island nation-whose own greenhouse
emissions are almost nonexistent-that has been completely annihilated
by rising seas is unfathomable. And losses are far beyond financial-
encompassing cultures, natural and anthropological wonders, and even
human life. Although the United States has already ignored court deci-
sions and refused to pay previous damage awards,34 7 laws are constantly
changing. Perhaps even the possibility of paying for a destroyed country
will encourage practices of sustainability, in order to avoid liability for
harm. Advancing concepts of liability for environmental damages im-
pacts corporations, nations, local governments and private actors.
Though love of money has encouraged environmentally destructive pat-
terns, fear of losing that money through liability may be the seminal
force needed for real change.
B. Global Governance that Embraces a New Consciousness
As today's serious global health crisis indicates, current interna-
tional environmental law is failing.348 Soft law is weak and the current
plentitude of treaties has not solved the problems.349 Citing the ineffi-
ciency, repetition and disorganization that results from a multitude of
separate agreements, Dr. Ramlogan has concluded that "treaty conges-
tion and its difficulties may be avoided by the abandonment of the sec-
toral approach and the employment of an all-embracing approach., 350 He
joins Speth and others who call for the creation of a powerful unified
international environmental organization.
351
Alliance of Small Island States, explains: "Climate change is the type of global issue not of our
making, so it raises questions of equality and ethics." Barbara Crossette, Rising Seas Plague Island
States, DENY. POST, Sept. 5, 1999, at A-3. See also Associated Press, Tuvalu: Country Ready to
Pack Up, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2001, at Fl. The eleven thousand residents of Tuvalu, a tiny South
Pacific island nation (with its highest elevation only sixteen feet above sea level), have sought refuge
in other countries, as they predict rising seas will make their country uninhabitable in fifty years. Id.
346. SPETH, supra note 1, at 62. "In a business-as-usual scenario, earth is scheduled to reach
this [dangerous carbon dioxide] level by about 2030." Id See also Michael D. Lemonick, Life in the
Greenhouse, TIME, April, 2001, at 26."With seas rising as much as 3 feet, enormous areas of densely
populated land---coastal Florida, much of Louisiana, the Nile Delta, the Maldives, Bangladesh-
would become uninhabitable." Id.
347. See Military & Paramilitary Activities, supra note 299, at 110-12.
348. SPETH, supra note 1, at 105. "[T]he international institutions created in the United Nations
to address global environmental issues.., are among the weakest multilateral organizations." Id. See
also Palmer, supra note 32, at 262. The United Nations does have an Environmental Program
(UNEP) but as Sir Palmer explains: "it is not an adequate international organization for protecting
the world's environment." Id. at 261.
349. GURUSWAMY, supra note 12, at viii. "[A]s long as we do not have an effective and en-
forceable legal regime at the international level, we must rely on political commitment as the pri-
mary basis for cooperative action in negotiating and enforcing legal instruments." Id. Also, Speth
notes: "International agreements are essential in confronting global environmental challenges, but
rarely will they solve major problems by themselves, and even less rarely will they succeed if their
requirements are not clear and meaningful." SPETH, supra note 1, at 100-01.
350. Ramlogan, supra note 140, at 116.
351. Id. SPETH, supra note 1, at 177. "Over the past decade, the leaders of France, Germany,
and other countries have called for the creation of a World Environmental Organization [WEO]." Id.
"Today's GEOpolity approach can also be redesigned for success by insisting on new procedures for
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Although unconventional changes in international government may
seem drastic, drastic measures are needed.352 While globalization and
loss of national sovereignty are legitimate concerns, the practical reality
is that the World Trade Organization (WTO) exists and wields enormous
power.35 3 To allow global economic activity to grow exponentially with-
out creating a World Environmental Organization (WEO) with power-
and budget--equal to the WTO is not only reckless global healthcare, it
is bad business.354 Those opposed to environmental preservation are
adamantly afraid of a WEO, indicating the potential scope and impact of
its power.355
A WEO should embrace concepts from the new consciousness.356
One of the dangers of binary logic is creating adversarial pairs from dif-
ferences that are not necessarily in opposition.357 Escaping the limits of
dualistic thinking could facilitate new law-making techniques. Mi-
crotreaties on detailed particulars could be part of larger treaties.358
Hopefully, many urgent goals could be realized through a specialized
setting international requirements and on new institutions, including a World Environmental Organi-
zation." Id. at 176. See also Palmer, supra note 32, at 278-83 (discussing New Zealand's proposal to
the United Nations which suggests implementation of an Environmental Protection Council).
352. As long as corporations are aided by the WTO, declining natural assets and biotic impov-
erishment may go unchecked: "[m]ost analysts now agree that, from an environmental perspective,
sustainable development requires living off nature's income rather than consuming natural capital. In
the terminology of the economists, it implies nondeclining natural assets, at a minimum." SPFTH,
supra note 1, at 141. Unfortunately, while "the transition to a globalized world is progressing rap-
idly .... the transition to a sustainable one is not." Id.
353. Id. at 99. "Thus far, governments have been willing to concede much in the area of sover-
eign autonomy to achieve economic expansion but not to protect the environment." Id Speth also
notes: "While efforts to promote economic globalization proceed apace through the WTO and else-
where, policy-makers should pursue, with equal determination, reforms and institutions needed in
the social and environmental areas." Id.
354. See id. at 147. "If the world wishes to evolve toward an international economy, and it
certainly seems to, it will need to develop an international polity equal to the challenge of governing
its newly global economy." Id. Speth posits, "[e]ventually, leaders in the political and business
worlds will see that it is powerfully in their self-interest to promote the eight transitions." id at 198.
Sustainable development should be the goal of any world trade. However, because financial gain and
environmental protection do not fit easily together, we need a WEO. A WEO comparable to the
WTO could facilitate global sustainability and protect the environment from degradation.
355. See id at 141-47. A group of conservative think tanks wrote to President Bush to applaud
his decision not to personally attend the Johannesburg convention on Sustainable Development in
2002. They also "strongly support ... [President Bush's] opposition to signing new international
environmental treaties or creating new international environmental organizations ...." Id. at 112.
The anti-environmentalists continue: "In our view, the worst possible outcome at Johannesburg
would be taking any steps towards creating a World Environmental Organization, as the European
Union has suggested ... " Id. Reflecting their prejudice-and the inference that their opposition to a
WEO is actually a strong endorsement--they continue: "The least important global environmental
issue is potential global warming, and we hope that your negotiators at Johannesburg can keep it off
the table ..... Id. These and other efforts to forestall the creation of a WEO indicate the potential
for such an organization to affect real change.
356. See supra Part IV.C for an explanation of this new consciousness.
357. See supra notes 260-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of dualism.
358. Whether broken down by issue, or by increments, or both; rethinking proposals on an
individualized basis may facilitate real progress. These tiny issue-by-issue agreements, in shades of
participation rather than all or nothing, may make consensus and action readily realizable. Nations
wouldn't be forced to make a binary participation decisions---to either join or not join. Rather, they
could decide at what level, from a continuum of contribution intensities, to participate.
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and fragmented system, replacing the "baby with the bathwater" practice
that blocks so many valuable initiatives in today's scheme.359
Also, an ethic of care360 is best administered on a particularized and
individualized level, so that context and relationships are considered in
the law-making process. Though environmental problems are large, try-
ing to broaden and generalize issues denies the uniqueness and diversity
of real world situations. A large representative organization can confront
the behemoth of environmental degradation, but on a small, practical,
issue-by-issue basis that will really fix problems. The governing body
would be unified, but the issues addressed would be particularized. In-
stead of simply spawning grandiose treaties that do not function in real
life,361 a new world environmental legislature could effectively and judi-
ciously develop contextualized, personalized and workable solutions.
As Sir Palmer explains: "What is missing from the present institu-
tional arrangements is the equivalent of a legislature: some structured
,362
and coherent mechanism for making the rules of international law." A
world environmental legislature would be efficient, despite a full docket
of small issues, because so much time and money that is currently wasted
organizing and negotiating the negotiations--only a few meetings every
decade thus far-would be saved.363 Also, definitive consensual deci-
sions about particular issues would prevent the problematic litigation we
have currently under our vague practice of international customs and
norms.
A paradigm of inclusion364 would create a large, but more realisti-
cally representative, world congress. It could allocate votes to member
nations based on population, economic contribution or equally (each
nation has the same number of votes). Or perhaps all three, creating a
triad of legislative bodies, akin to the two houses of the United States
Congress.
Over-simplification and generalizing negates many experiences. An
inclusive WEO, where a diversity of voices is heard, may affect greater
change. States and interests within states are much more likely to con-
359. SPETH, supra note 1, at 104. Many nations, including the U.S., require that international
agreements be ratified by domestic legislation. Id In the United States, "[t]he Senate is a virtual
graveyard full of unapproved environmental treaties." Id. Escaping binary form and providing a
wide range of possibilities would make agreement more realizable.
360. See supra notes 314-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ethic of care.
361. See Palmer, supra note 32, at 263. "While the number of instruments is impressive.
during the time these instruments were being developed, the environmental situation in the world
became worse and is deteriorating further. There is no effective legal framework to help halt the
degradation .... [Miany international agreements do not necessarily mean many ratifications." Id.
362. Id. at 264.
363. Id. at 263. There is much time and effort put into the large conventions that currently
constitute world environmental law-making. As Sir Palmer points out: "[t]he making and negotia-
tion of the instruments themselves has to start anew each time .... Each negotiation proceeds differ-
ently." Id.
364. See supra notes 207-13 and accompanying text for a discussion of inclusion.
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form to legislation that they participated in creating than submit to regu-
lation that is cast over them like a net.365
In addition to giving a large number of votes to various nations, the
votes could be decided by various experts. Nations could design their
electorate bodies using the jury model. As Sir Palmer explains: "[flor
such an institution to succeed, it must have access to high-quality streams
of advice." 366 Experts from various scientific, economic, social and po-
litical arenas could come together like a jury to deliberate international
environmental policies. 367 If jury-like panels are appointed by elected
officials, democracy on a more public level remains intact.
368
The WEO should also adopt a progressive epistemology. Conserva-
tion measures could be given a presumption of validity, modeled after
the presumption of innocence. 369 Using a high burden of proof, experts
must be convinced that ecologically protective measures are unfeasible,
beyond a shadow of a doubt. This is similar, in science, to the precau-
tionary principle advocated by Speth.37°
The legislature will also have to run on some sort of majority rule
principle.37' A WEO should learn from the mistakes of the past and in-
corporate the best of innovations for its future.
365. See supra notes 270-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of alternatives to Western
"command and control" enforcement attempts.
366. Palmer, supra note 32, at 264. Many powerful leadership positions are filled by experts in
their field. The United States Secretary of Defense is a military, not political professional. Similarly,
representatives need not all be experts in the field of government. An inclusive legislature with
inclusive electorate panels would provide access to unlimited expertise in all important organisms of
the human "ecosystem." See supra notes 137-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of human-
ity's ecosystem(s).
367. In an era when many powerful politicians are elected for accomplishments in celebrity
(and not Nobel-winning sciences, legal training or public service), allowing scientific experts and
highly educated professional access to power may be essential.
368. Today judges, committee members and agency authorities have huge amounts of power,
which they acquire through appointment. Panel members could be elected by the public, but this
risks all the evils (private interest, campaign monies, party affiliation, etc.) of typical electoral poli-
tics.
369. At a convention for the Center for Health, Environment and Justice, Peter Montague
remarked, "[wie need to put the burden of proof on potential polluters to prove that a substance or
activity will do no harm, instead of communities having to prove otherwise." Peter Montague, Tak-
ing a Giant Step, EVERYONE'S BACKYARD, Winter 1997, at 8.
370. SPETH, supra note 1, at 175-76 ("Where there are threats of serious or irreversible dam-
age, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective meas-
ures to prevent environmental degradation.").
371. Palmer, supra note 32, at 264.
One of the biggest obstacles that must be overcome in international negotiations is the
rule of unanimous consent. This rule impels each negotiating body to search for the low-
est common denominator; it adds to the difficulty of negotiations because sometimes a
single nation can resist the development of a common position and demand concessions
as the price of securing unanimous consent.
Id. See also Ramlogan, supra note 140, at 82. "Developments like majority vote, provisional im-
plementation, and the use of central supervisory bodies, alter somewhat traditional international law
jurisprudence which promote the view that states are only bound by the international norms to which
they have consented." Id.
2004]
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CONCLUSION
As Einstein warned, "[t]he destiny of civilized humanity depends
more than ever on the moral forces it is capable of generating.,
372 Speth
quotes Charles Reich, who wrote of a "new consciousness [which] seeks
restoration of the non-material elements of man's existence, the elements
like the natural environment and the spiritual that were passed by in the
rush of material development."
373
Part of the emerging contemporary paradigm is the concept of hu-
manity's systems (politics, economics, etc.) as living entities, constantly
growing and evolving. The term "environmental movement," as opposed
to "environmentalism," a static noun, reflects this concept of motion and
progress. Many of today's progressive movements reflect the new con-
sciousness of inclusion, respecting diversity and revering 
life.3
74
Speth's transitions also embody this paradigm. They are not steps to
be completed. Rather, they envision ethical kinetics-actively moving
transitions toward a sustainable future.37 5 As humanity advances through
the twenty-first century, we must move toward harmonious habitation
with and through the world's living systems.
376 The future of life as we
know it may well depend on these transitions.
Yvette Livengood
372. EINSTEIN, supra note 17, at 94. See also FALK, supra note 31, at 91-92. Many writers
during the Atomic Age and under the threat of nuclear holocaust were addressing global destruction
through war. However, their thoughts about human behavior with annihilating consequences mirror
concerns about global environmental destruction. And their aspirations for human restraint and
action to prevent world-wide catastrophe are apt and fitting hopes for the current global crisis of
environmental health.
373. SPETrH, supra note 1, at 193. Speth continues with the hope that scholars "have given our
species enough time to grow up. It is doubtful that the planet can take much more of our heedless
childhood." Id.
374. For an example of such a progressive movement, see Clark, supra note 263, at 5-11.
Social Ecology rests on the principle that "[tihe common planetary good can therefore be conceptu-
alized only in a non-reductionist, holistic manner." Id.
375. SPETH, supra note 1, at 151. If we can move through the transitions, "'our legacy from
these early decades of the new century will be a world sustained, not a world of wounds." Id.
376. Speth espouses environmental preservation: "It is a sacred trust-our duty to our children,
our neighbor's children, and their children-and it is a trust at which we are failing." Id. at 139.
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